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To Erica,

whose patience, support, and love has made everything possible

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ABSTRACT

MAGIC AND RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY IN PHILOSTRATUS' *LIFE OF APOLLONIUS OF TYANA*

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This dissertation examines Flavius Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, an eight-book biography written in the early third century CE about a Cappadocian sage who lived in the first century. Prior to Philostratus' biography, Apollonius had a reputation of being a magician. Philostratus isolates two explicit reasons for Apollonius negative reputation: his association with eastern sages, particularly Indian Brahmans, and his gift of foreknowledge. I examine how Philostratus defends Apollonius by (1) representing India as a Hellenistic utopia, a land of pure Greek identity, uncomplicated by the realities of the Roman Empire, and (2) creating a theory of Apollonius' foreknowledge (*prognōsis*) rooted in contemporary Middle Platonic physical and ethical philosophy. I conclude that the implicit reason for the accusation of being a magician made against Apollonius stems from the threat he presents to traditional political and religious authority. In my analysis, Philostratus' Apollonius represents both the contours of Greek identity under the Roman Empire and the rise of the pagan holy man.

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Introduction

Apollonius of Tyana is not as well-known a name today as it was in antiquity. Even among scholars who study Apollonius, little can be said about the historical Apollonius. He was Greek Pythagorean from Cappadocia (modern-day Turkey), lived in the first century CE, and was likely a traveling sage and sophist, akin to those represented in Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*. However, Apollonius became a major, if not *the* major, pagan counterpoint to Christ in Late Antiquity. The reception, construction, and subsequent reconstructions of his life over the several centuries following his death provides us an important view into the contours of Greek identity in the so-called "Second Sophistic," the role of ethnography in the construction of this identity, the rise of the pagan holy man, and the relationship between magic and religion. Two scenes from Late Antiquity illustrate the changing reception of Apollonius.

The first comes the late fourth century CE in *The Life of the Deified Aurelian* from the *Historia Augusta*. When Aurelian rose to the purple in 270 CE, his first order of business was to reunite the Italian provinces of the empire, after which he safeguarded Rome with the building of the Aurelian Wall. He then turned his eyes towards Asia Minor, which had broken from Rome in 260 to form the Palmyrene Empire. When he reaches Tyana, a small city located in southern Cappadocia in modern-day Turkey, he finds the city gates closed to him. Aurelian becomes enraged and exclaims, "in this town I will not even leave a dog alive" (*"canem in hoc oppido non relinquam,"* SHA *Aurel.* 22.5).[1] Despite his anger, the citizens of Tyana suffered no harm, since one of them informed Aurelian of a weak point in the defensive wall that would allow for the easy

[1] All translations my own, unless noted.

capture of the city. The soldiers clamor for the destruction of the city, recalling the emperor's earlier words. Aurelian replies "I did indeed declare that I would not leave a dog alive; well, then, kill all the dogs" (*"canem," inquit, "negavi in hac urbe me relicturum: canes omnes occidite,"* SHA *Aurel.*23.2).

The author continues to explain how the vision of Apollonius of Tyana led to Aurelian's change in temperament:

> We must not omit one event which enhances the fame of a venerated man. For, it is said, Aurelian did indeed truly speak and truly think of destroying the city of Tyana; but Apollonius of Tyana, a sage of the most renowned reputation and authority, a philosopher of former times, a true friend of the gods, who must be celebrated as a divine power himself, as Aurelian was withdrawing to his tenth, suddenly appeared to him in the form in which he is usually portrayed and spoke to him as follows, using Latin in order that he might be understood by a man from Pannonia, "Aurelian, if you wish to be victorious, there is no reason you should plan the slaughter of my citizens. Aurelian, if you wish to rule, abstain from the blood of innocents. Aurelian, conduct yourself mercifully, if you wish to live." Aurelian recognized the countenance of the venerated philosopher, and, in fact, he had seen his portrait in many a temple. And so, at once stricken with terror, he promised him a portrait and statues and a temple, and he returned to a better state of mind.
>
> Taceri non debet res, quae ad famam venerabilis viri pertinet. Fertur enim Aurelianum de Tyanae civitatis eversione vere dixisse, vere cogitasse; verum Apollonium Tyanaeum, celeberrimae famae auctoritatisque sapientem, veterem philosophum, amicum vere deorum, ipsum etiam pro numine frequentandum, recipienti se in tentorium ea forma, qua videtur, subito adstitisse atque haec Latine, ut homo pannonius intellegeret, verba dixisse, "Aureliane, si vis vincere, nihil est quod de civium meorum nece cogites. Aureliane, si vis imperare, a cruore innocentium abstine. Aureliane, clementer te age, si vis vivere." Norat vultum philosophi venerabilis Aurelianus atque in multis eius imaginem viderat templis. Denique statim adtonitus et imaginem et statuas et templum eidem promisit atque in meliorem redit mentem. (SHA *Aurel.* 24.2-6)

In the following chapter, the author reports how Aurelian obeys the orders of Apollonius and acts with greater kindness and mercy. This strategy of leniency causes cities to welcome his approach; Aurelian plays the role of liberator and not conqueror and quickly regains control of Asia Minor.[2]

Though his manifestation is brief, Apollonius plays a central role in the life of Aurelian, literally appearing half way through the work. Apollonius, as the author notes,

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[2] Cf. Watson (1999): 71-2.

wields an incredible amount of *auctoritas*. In the first place, the author equates Apollonius with the gods (both a friend of gods and a divine power himself). Second, Apollonius himself both gains the religious devotion of the Emperor and changes the course of his military campaign. Indeed, the author equates Aurelian's later military success directly with his adherence to Apollonius' edicts (*praeceptis, quantum probatur, venerabilis viri Apollonii parens humanior atque clementior fuit*, SHA *Aurel.* 25.1).[3] Political, military, and religious *auctoritas* all come together in the Apollonius depicted by the author of the *Historia Augusta*.

The second scene occurs nearly two centuries earlier in Cassius Dio's *Roman History*. Writing about the emperor Caracalla, who became co-emperor with his brother Geta in 211, Dio states that "he took such pleasure in *magoi* and *goētes* that he praised and honored Apollonius the Cappadocian, the one who was a *goēs* and *magos* in the strict sense of the word, and he built a heroic shrine for him" (τοῖς δὲ μάγοις καὶ γόησιν οὕτως ἔχαιρεν ὡς καὶ Ἀπολλώνιον τὸν Καππαδόκην τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ Δομιτιανοῦ ἀνθήσαντα ἐπαινεῖν καὶ τιμᾶν, ὅστις καὶ γόης καὶ μάγος ἀκριβὴς ἐγένετο, καὶ ἡρῷον αὐτῷ κατασκευάσαι, 77.18.4). Like the *Historia Augusta*, Dio highlights the religious veneration Apollonius receives from the Emperor; Caracalla builds a heroic shrine for Apollonius. This time, however, it's the wrong emperor honoring Apollonius for the wrong reasons. Dio's Apollonius is not a sage, let alone a friend of the gods or a divine power. Dio's Apollonius is a *magos* and a *goēs*.

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[3] The similarity between Aurelius' vision of Apollonius and Constantine's vision of the chi-rho are striking. However, these similarities should not be taken to imply that the author of *Aurel.* was writing an anti-Christian polemic. See further Long (2006): 231-233.

Translators frequently use "magician" and "sorcerer" to render *magos* and *goēs*, but such a translation for the passage from Dio creates the problem of redundancy. Nor would such a translation take into account the force of *akribēs*, which, modifying *magos*, emphasizes precision or exactness – "in the strict sense of the word" as I translate it.[4] Dio uses both *magos* and *goēs* pejoratively but to suggest two different ideas about Apollonius.

Magos originally designated Persian priests (Herod. 1.107-8, 1.132, 7.37, 7.113-14); Xenophon calls them "technicians of the divine" (τοῖς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς μᾶλλον τεχνίταις, *Cyr.* 8.7.11); Plato, in his *First Alcibiades*, defines *mageia* as "worship of the gods" (θεῶν θεραπεία, 122a). It eventually becomes a term of abuse (cf. Aesch. 3.137). Given the importance of the "Persian barbarian other" for the construction of Athenian identity, particularly in Greek tragedy, I argue that Greek authors generally use *magos* to highlight their target's "otherness" and place them within the periphery of mainstream society.

Magos mainly refers to cultural identity, and it is not until early Christian literature that it becomes associated with religious charlatan. A.D. Nock first suggested that the use of the term *magos* in the New Testament, particularly in the Acts of the Apostles, reflected a contest over religious authority.[5] Thus the Jewish *magos* Bar-Jesus (Acts 13:6) and the *magos* Elymas (Acts 13:8) and most famously Simon *magos* (Acts 8:9) were contemporary religious rivals of the apostles. Yet, Nock overlooks the *magoi* of Matthew 2:1, who come from the East to Jerusalem. Far from being religious rivals,

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[4] *LSJ* s.v. II.2.a.
[5] Nock (1922-1939), reprinted in Nock (1972):308-330.

these *magoi* lend authority to the birth of Jesus. In fact, the usual translation of *magoi* in Matthew 2:1 is either "wise-men" or the more common transliteration of it into Magi. *Magos* only comes to signify a religious charlatan quite late. If Dio truly means to use *magos* in the strict sense, and given the Atticizing tendency of the period in which he was writing, he would be highlighting Apollonius' cultural otherness.

Goēs is a much stronger pejorative than *magos*. Demosthenes frequently uses it in his speeches to attack rivals (18.276, 19.102, 29.32). Plato, in the *Laws*, states that those who practice *goēteia* claim to accomplish two things: leading up souls of the dead and persuading the gods (*Lg.* 909b2-5). The *goēs* had strong necromantic associations; the term even shares a common root with the verb *goaō*, to lament or mourn. Necromantic activity could lead to the connotation of magical practices, but a translation of "magician" fails to elucidate exactly what Dio is critiquing in his depiction of Apollonius and Caracalla.

Lucian's *Alexander, the False-Prophet* can help clarify the term. Lucian labels Alexander of Abonoteichus a *goēs* (*Alex.* 5), but this has less to do with his ability to perform magical acts than with Lucian's depiction of him as a religious charlatan. Alexander was an oracle whom Lucian presents as duping the general populace. Lucian's portrayal of Alexander has been compared to the characteristics and behaviors of modern cult leaders.[6] It is precisely this that Lucian seeks to get across in his satire. Cassius Dio is likewise advertising Caracalla's attachment to illegitimate religious leaders, Apollonius being among them. Hence in Dio, we find a portrait of Apollonius as both cultural other (a *magos*) and as a religious fraud (a *goēs*).

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[6] Kent (2006).

One sees the changing nature of the reception of the figure of Apollonius of Tyana by placing Cassius Dio and the *Historia Augusta* side-by-side. While the historical Apollonius lived in the first century CE, by the late second/early third century he came to be regarded as a *magos* and *goēs*. In the late fourth century, historians and the emperors they wrote about venerated him as a philosopher and divine man.

The part of the story that is missing is when and how the representation of Apollonius changed from cultural other and religious fraud to quintessential pagan holy man. Flavius Philostratus provides the pivotal point for this story. His *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* (henceforth *VA=Vita Apollonii*) became the standard work on Apollonius and later pagan and Christian authors turn to this biography for their own tracts and polemics.

Prior to the last few decades, New Testament scholars dominated the critical scholarship on Apollonius of Tyana. Their interest in him was, and to a large extent still is, limited to the degree in which he represents the Hellenistic *theios anēr*. Peter Brown's seminal article on the holy man in late antique society inaugurated the most recent scholarship on "godlike men" by arguing for a major paradigm shift in the fourth and fifth centuries CE, when certain special individuals became both the center of civic and religious activity and the primary conduit between man and the divine.[7] The original *theios anēr* hypothesis focused not on the saints and holy men of the later Roman world but on Christ himself. Scholars of the early twentieth century believed that one could find a Hellenistic model for the Christ of the gospels and thereby better situate him within a pagan context. In 1935, Ludwig Bieler, a scholar of medieval Christianity, provided the

[7] Brown (1971). The importance of Brown's work cannot be overstated, as two collections celebrating the 25th anniversary of his 1971 article attests. Elm and Janowitz, eds. (1998) and also Howard-Johnston and Hayward, eds (1999).

first fully developed archetype of the *theios anēr* with his two volume monograph. Bieler was the first to identify miracle-working as the primary means of legitimizing the holy man's divine nature. Unfortunately, his reliance on later pagan sources (particularly *VA*) has called into question many of his findings. The implication of Bieler's work is that second and third century pagan sources influenced the first century gospels. Not surprisingly, only Philostratus' *VA* and the Christian gospels depict an individual with the full range of characteristics Bieler identifies.[8]

Bieler's work has by now been largely discredited, in no small part due to his uncritical collation of source material.[9] Nevertheless, Bieler's heavy reliance on Apollonius of Tyana, an understandable (but inappropriate) source given Apollonius' importance in the early debates between Pagans and Christians, has made the first century philosopher/sage ubiquitous in all discussions of Greco-Roman holy men. However, New Testament scholars either critique the usefulness of Apollonius to New Testament exegesis or use him as a point of general comparison with Christian Gospels.[10]

Despite the overwhelming dominance of New Testament scholars on Apollonius of Tyana, Classical philologists, particularly in the last few decades, have offered their own approach on the sage and his biographer. The reliability of Philostratus as narrator, biographer, and historical source continually arises in the scholarship. Various scholars

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[8] The careless use of later pagan source material was symptomatic of many of the early twentieth-century scholars working on the *theios anēr* hypothesis. See Corrington (1986) 1-43, Flinterman (1996) 84-90, and Koskeniemi (1998) 456-460.

[9] See Smith (1971), Corrington (1986), and Koskeniemi (1998).

[10] Critical literature includes Koskeniemi (1991) and (1998), Blackburn (1991); comparative literature includes Reimer (2002).

assert that the work is completely fictitious, trustworthy fact, or a combination of both.[11] The last decade has seen the question change from one of strict reliability to one of why Philostratus chooses the particular method and manner of representation of his hero. For example, Simon Swain contextualizes Philostratus' biography within the culture of the Second Sophistic. In his view, the Second Sophistic responded to the existence of the Roman Empire by asserting the continuity of Hellenistic culture in spite of Roman Imperial domination.[12] Flinterman and Whitmarsh focus more specifically in the way in which Apollonius functions as a philosophical advisor, instructor, and critic to the emperors.[13] Regardless of their individual concerns and approaches, these scholars agree on Greece's relationship to Rome as the underlying issue in their research. Their work, which focuses primarily on cultural and political engagements, has largely excluded a discussion of the philosophical and religious component of Greco-Roman relations. New Testament scholars have focused more heavily on the religious and philosophical elements of the *VA* but largely in relation to early Christianity. Philostratus' relationship to pagan religion and philosophy has been both overlooked and underworked.

In the gap between the two fields of study lies the overlooked and understudied relationship of the cultural and political to the philosophical and religious. An analysis of Philostratus' reasons for and methods of writing his biography shows that the relationship between the two hinges on his defense of Apollonius against charges of being a magician. Philostratus relates two explicit reasons for the charge against Apollonius: (1) his travels

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[11] Bowie, Bowersock, and Jones are the major proponents of the fiction camp. The most thorough defense of Philostratus has been Grosso (1954). Anderson (1986) offers a middling approach by acknowledging the difficulty in separating questions of historicity from questions of sophistic style and rhetoric.
[12] Swain (1996). Cf. Swain (1999).
[13] Flinterman (1995) and Whitmarsh (2001a)

to and associations with eastern sages, and (2) his power of *prognōsis* (foreknowledge). I examine how Philostratus responds to each aspect of the accusation in the two parts of my dissertation. Though both sides of the accusation seem quite different, Philostratus uses the same method in constructing his response, namely by refamiliarizing that which seemed "exotic" and "other" about Apollonius. Throughout Apollonius' travels, Philostratus Hellenizes the eastern world and its inhabitants. Furthermore, Philostratus roots Apollonius' prognostic skill in Middle Platonic philosophy and Greek religious ritual, so that a thoroughly Greek philosophical and religious system, and not esoteric Eastern magic, becomes the root of his foreknowledge.

When Philostratus comes to write the *VA*, Apollonius belonged to what Jan Assmann terms in *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis* "communicative" memory (*das kommunikative Gedächtnis*), the site of oral history and tradition, an area of memory that is generational and changes as generations change.[14] Assmann places communicative memory between "object" memory (*das Gedächnis der Dinge*), which extends only to the individual's past, and "cultural memory" (*das kulturelle Gedächtnis*), which extends beyond the horizon of oral tradition and exists in codified, if not canonized, texts, rites, and rituals. The deep past becomes a normative past. For example, by the eighth century BCE, the Homeric epics formed part of Greek cultural memory by bridging the gap between the present and the Late Bronze Age and creating and, in later centuries, reinforcing a pan-Hellenic group consciousness. "Communicative" memory exists between the recent past of object memory and the deep past of cultural memory; it is a

[14] Assmann (1992): esp. 19-21. Cf. Assman (1995).

highly contested zone with no authoritative version and always has the potential for either being altogether forgotten or becoming firmly embedded into cultural memory.

Philostratus reveals Apollonius' position in communicative memory in the programmatic chapter of the work. He states that though Apollonius "lived in a time *neither ancient nor quite recent*, men do not yet know him for the true wisdom, which he cultivated philosophically and purely" (γενόμενον κατὰ χρόνους οὔτ' ἀρχαίους οὔτ' αὖ νέους οὔπω οἱ ἄνθρωποι γιγνώσκουσιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθινῆς σοφίας, ἣν φιλοσόφως τε καὶ ὑγιῶς ἐπήσκησεν, *VA* 1.2). Apollonius transitions into cultural memory through Philostratus' biography, which gains its own authority from the purported discovery of the memoirs of Damis, Apollonius' disciple and travelling companion. Philostratus belonged to the literary circle of Julia Domna, the Syrian who was wife to the emperor Septimus Severus. When Julia discovers the Damis memoirs, she commissions him to edit the work. He takes on the task of giving "an accurate account of the man, observing the chronology of his words and acts" (ἐξακριβῶσαι τὸν ἄνδρα τοῖς τε χρόνοις, καθ' οὓς εἶπέ τι ἢ ἔπραξε, *VA* 1.2). The Damis memoirs, presented as a codified, albeit uneloquent, text, validates and authorizes Philostratus' own account to become the definitive work on Apollonius.

In what follows, I examine Philostratus' defense of Apollonius on both cultural and philosophical lines. Chapter one examines the sources Philostratus references, namely the biographies of Moiragenes and Maximus of Aegae and the supposed letters of Apollonius himself. Each source presents Apollonius in a manner that Philostratus must ultimately reject in order for him to construct Apollonius as a universal holy man. Chapters two and three examine the explicit reasons for the accusation made against

Apollonius of being a magician. Chapter two focuses on Philostratus' presentation of Apollonius' travel to the east to study with the Indian Brahmans. I argue that Philostratus constructs Apollonius' journey eastward to represent a journey backwards in time to a time and space where Greek identity can exist in its purest form, unadulterated by the history of imperialism. In chapter three, I explore the theory of *prognōsis*, which Apollonius learns under the tutelage of the Indian Brahmans. I show how Philostratus employs Middle Platonic philosophy and Greek religious ritual in order to create a theory of foreknowledge that ultimately rejects traditional divinatory methods. Chapter four moves from the explicit reasons for the accusation of magic to the implicit reasons. I argue that behind the accusation of magic exists an anxiety over the authority of traditional religious and political authority.

Chapter 1

Philostratus and the Traditions on Apollonius

In the second chapter of the *VA,* Philostratus lists three types of sources for his biography of Apollonius: the local traditions of the cities and temples that honored him, the writings of others about Apollonius, and the letters of Apollonius himself (*VA* 1.2).[1] The scholar of Apollonius and Philostratus has the difficult task of determining where and how Philostratus uses his sources, assuming that Philostratus had not completely fabricated his sources. Can the scholar of Apollonius reconstruct a pre-Philostratean Apollonius, or even an "historical" Apollonius? If so, what image of the sage from Tyana develops and how does it compare to Philostratus' divine man? Unfortunately, Philostratus provides the major source of information about Apollonius, and his agenda of defending the sage against accusations of magic obviously colors his biography and his use of earlier sources. Later writers, particularly pagan and Christian polemicists, rely heavily upon Philostratus' biography for their own information about Apollonius. However, an independently transmitted collection of epistles survives, which can provide us with a non-Philostratean portrait of Apollonius. The Apollonius of the epistles (the "epistolary Apollonius") has more in commont with the localized, itinerant philosophers and rhetoricians depicted in Philostratus' own *Lives of the Sophists* than with the divine man of Philostratus' hagiography. We can discern that prior to Philostratus, Apollonius was largely a localized philosopher and sophist, and it was only through Philostratus'

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[1] ξυνείλεκται δέ μοι τὰ μὲν ἐκ πόλεων, ὁπόσαι αὐτοῦ ἤρων, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἱερῶν, ὁπόσα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐπανήχθη παραλελυμένα τοὺς θεσμοὺς ἤδη, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ὧν εἶπον ἕτεροι περὶ αὐτοῦ, τὰ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἐκείνου ἐπιστολῶν. ἐπέστελλε δὲ βασιλεῦσι σοφισταῖς φιλοσόφοις Ἠλείοις Δελφοῖς Ἰνδοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις ὑπὲρ θεῶν ὑπὲρ ἐθῶν ὑπὲρ ἠθῶν ὑπὲρ νόμων, παρ' οἷς ὅ τι ἁμαρτάνοιτο, ἐπηνώρθου. τὰ δὲ ἀκριβέστερα ὧδε συνελεξάμην· See Flinterman (1985) 67-88 for an analysis of these sources.

biography that he gained wider significance. In this chapter, I will examine pre-Philostratean traditions of Apollonius, namely the biographies of Moiragenes, Maximus of Aegae, and the epistles of Apollonius, and argue that Philostratus, through his biography, transforms someone whom others depict as a local sophist into a universalizing holy man.

I. Moiragenes

Philostratus names two specific authors of biographies of Apollonius: Maximus of Aegae and Moiragenes (*VA* 1.3). Philostratus relies upon the former work for his chapters on Apollonius' stay in Aegae. Though, as I will argue below, Philostratus and Maximus ultimately represent Apollonius in divergent manners and with different aims, Philostratus maintains a positive disposition towards Maximus' work. On the other hand, he displays a great deal of hostility towards the latter. He states, "we must disregard Moiragenes, who, though he wrote four books concerning Apollonius, was ignorant of many things concerning the man" (οὐ γὰρ Μοιραγένει γε προσεκτέον βιβλία μὲν ξυνθέντι ἐς Ἀπολλώνιον τέτταρα, πολλὰ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὸν ἄνδρα ἀγνοήσαντι, ibid.).

It is of course a difficult task to reconstruct the work of Moiragenes from such scant evidence. Based on the testimony of Philostratus alone, we need not assume that Moiragenes' portrait of Apollonius was negative. One can view his attack on Moiragenes in light of the agonistic context of literary production; in trying to write the definitive work on Apollonius, Philostratus must challenge the work that may have previously been

the standard work.[2] His desire to undercut Moiragenes' authority reveals itself best when he goes against the information found in the Damis memoirs. Philostratus states that both the Damis memoirs and Moiragenes mention "four books concerning astral divination" (περὶ μαντείας ἀστέρων βίβλους τέτταρας, *VA* 3.41). Philostratus places Damis, his primary source (fictionalized or otherwise) for the biography, in agreement with Moiragenes, suggesting that Moiragenes' work contained information useful to and even used by Philostratus. Immediately following this statement, however, Philostratus rejects the existence of a book on astral divination.[3] Philostratus' willingness to undercut the authority of Damis on this particular point, a move he generally does not make, shows the extent to which he will go to discredit Moiragenes as a reliable source on Apollonius. Philostratus demonstrates how truly ignorant Moiragenes was as a biography of the sage.

The question remains as to how Moiragenes portrayed Apollonius to warrant such a harsh attack by Philostratus. Our only other testimony to Moiragenes work comes from Origen's *Contra Celsum*. Celsus argues that magic only has power against uneducated and immoral men, while those have studied philosophy are immune to its effect.[4] Origen responds with reference to Moiragenes' work:

> So on the subject of magic (μαγείας) we say that anyone interested in examining whether or not even philosophers have sometimes been taken in by it may read what was written by Moiragenes of the memoirs of Apollonius of Tyana, the magician and philosopher. In them the author, who is not a Christian but a philosopher, observed that some not undistinguished philosophers were convinced by the magic (μαγείας) of Apollonius, although when they went to him they regarded him merely as a charlatan (γόητα). Among such, so far as I remember, he included even the well-known Euphrates and a certain Epicurean.

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[2] Cf. Bowie (1978): 1673.
[3] *VA* 3.41.2.
[4] Orig. *Contra Celsum* 6.41.

> περὶ μαγείας φαμὲν ὅτι ὁ βουλόμενος ἐξετάσαι, πότερόν ποτε καὶ φιλόσοφοι ἁλῶτοί εἰσιν αὐτῇ ἢ μή, ἀναγνώτω τὰ γεγραμμένα Μοιραγένει τῶν Ἀπολλωνίου τοῦ Τυανέως μάγου καὶ φιλοσόφου ἀπομνημονευμάτων· ἐν οἷς ὁ μὴ Χριστιανὸς ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφος ἔφησεν ἁλῶναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν Ἀπολλωνίῳ μαγείας οὐκ ἀγεννεῖς τινας φιλοσόφους ὡς πρὸς γόητα αὐτὸν εἰσελθόντας· ἐν οἷς οἶμαι καὶ περὶ Εὐφράτου <τοῦ> πάνυ διηγήσατο καί τινος Ἐπικουρείου. (Ibid., tr. Chadwick)

Graham Anderson neatly summarizes Origen's statement on Moiragenes as representing "reputable philosophers as being taken in by Apollonius, then rejecting him."[5] Based on such a reading of Origen, most scholars have accepted Moiragenes' work as hostile towards Apollonius.[6] If we, however, take Origen's statement and collate it with information from Philostratus' biography, quite a different picture emerges. In the first place, Anderson assumes that the "reputable philosophers" were originally disciples of the sage and later recanted their allegiance to him.[7] The original Greek however does not suggest that the "reputable philosophers" were originally disciples or adherents of any sort to Apollonius. They were never his pupils but his opponents who "were defeated" (ἁλῶτοί εἰσιν) by the magic of Apollonius. We can be certain of the hostility of the philosophers mentioned since Origen includes Euphrates among those philosophers. It is unlikely that Euphrates was ever "taken in" by Apollonius, as Anderson's reading of Origen would suggest, since all our other evidence suggests a rather hostile relationship between the two.[8] Given that Philostratus makes Euphrates the primary orchestrator of

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[5] Anderson (1986): 299.

[6] Cf. Bowersock (1970): 12; Anderson (1986): 299-300.

[7] Anderson (1986): 299-300. Anderson suggests that the "certain Epicurean" is none other than Damis, and Moiragenes presents Damis as rejecting Apollonius at the end of his life. If this is in fact what Moiragenes relates in his biography, one can understand why Philostratus would want to suppress Moiragenes biography, as they would undercut the credibility of Philostratus' own primary source. However, this is rather unlikely. An Epicurean would be an unexpected disciple of a Pythagorean, making the identification of the "certain Epicurean" with Damis difficult. The Epicurean must be an unnamed opponent of Apollonius.

[8] Euphrates not only orchestrates the charges against Apollonius to Domitian (*VA* 7.36, 8.3), but also slanders him to the Naked Sages (*VA* 6.7). Furthermore, in the independently transmitted collection of

the charges against Apollonius, it is much more likely that Origen is relating a portion of the memoirs of Moiragenes that deals with the trial of Apollonius. We should translate "εἰσελθόντας" in the legal sense of "taking to court," instead of the literal translation that Chadwick provides.[9] Taken as a whole, Origen states that Moiragenes relates that "certain notable philosophers were defeated by the *mageia* of Apollonius when they were taking him to court as if he were a *goēs*." Such a translation correlates better with what we know from Philostratus' own account, namely that Euphrates brought Apollonius as a *goēs*, and from the hostility present in the letters from Apollonius to Euphrates.

We are still left with the question of what Origen was signifying with the use of the word *mageia*. If he implies that Moiragenes represented Apollonius as a magician, one can easily understand Philostratus' hostility towards the work. D.H. Raynor has suggested that a representation of Apollonius as a magician need not be a hostile one. Drawing upon evidence from the epistolary collection, Raynor suggests that the term *magos* was a term of praise to Apollonius.[10] Raynor argues that Philostratus rejects Moiragenes work because of its "misplaced enthusiasm" in stressing "the supernatural actions of Apollonius while giving insufficient weight to the philosophical aspect."[11] In Raynor's reconstruction, Apollonius as *magos* is both an individual who is *theios kai dikaios*, the definition of *magos* that Apollonius provides in *Epistle* 16, while at the same

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letters, Apollonius engages in polemics against Euphrates in several letters (*Ep. Ap.* 1-8, 55). *VS* 488 also relates the quarrel between Euphrates and Apollonius.

[9] *LSJ* s.v. III.

[10] Raynor (1984) 224, referencing *Ep. Ap.* 16 and 17.

[11] Ibid.

time adept in magical arts.[12] Raynor argues that for Moiragenes, magic does not carry the negative valence that it does with later authors.

Raynor correctly asserts that Moiragenes' biography was not hostile to Apollonius, but he misses the mark in suggesting that it portrays magic positively. From the testimony of Origen, we could assume that Moiragenes' portrayal of Apollonius dealt with magic. In a later section, Origen attacks the groups Celsus considers inspired. He states that "Celsus also reckons the *Magoi* among the most inspired races, though from them magic, which takes its name from their race, has come to other nations as well, to the destruction and ruin of those who use it" (Ἀλλὰ καὶ Μάγους τοῖς ἐνθεωτάτοις κατατάττει ἔθνεσιν ὁ Κέλσος, ἀφ' ὧν ἡ παρώνυμος τοῦ ἔθνους αὐτῶν μαγεία καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἔθνεσιν ἐπὶ διαφθορᾷ καὶ ὀλέθρῳ τῶν χρωμένων αὐτῇ ἐπιδεδήμηκε, Orig. *Contra Celsum* 6.80, tr. Chadwick). To Origen, *mageia* comes from the *magoi,* and he holds a strongly negative sense. Origen's view of *mageia* colors his reading of Moiragenes' biography. When Moiragenes refers to Apollonius' *mageia*, Origen assumes that he refers to magic, which he understands negatively. It is important to note that when Origen refers to Moiragenes' work, he is working from *a memory* of the work and not directly from the work itself. Origen states that *he thinks* (οἶμαι) that Euphrates and a certain Epicurean are among the philosopher who bring Apollonius to court. Origen qualifies his knowledge of Moiragenes twice, both through the use of the verb οἶμαι and his inability to name the Epicurean specifically. Had he the text in front of him, such qualifications would not have been necessary, nor would he have to leave the Epicurean philosopher unnamed. Origen recalls the work of Moiragenes and recalls the

[12] Raynor (1984): 224-5.

presentation of Apollonius' *mageia* and immediately associates it with magic. The scholars who have taken Moiragenes work as hostile to Apollonius have based their assumption on a misreading of Moiragenes work that dates back to Origen himself.

Rather, Moiragenes represents Apollonius as *magos* in the strictest sense of the word, namely as one who has been initiated into the mysteries of the Persian priests. Furthermore, *mageia* refers not to magic but rather to the learning of the Persian priests, which I will refer to as Persian *paideia*. What the Persian *paideia* consists of will have to remain unknown, given the lack of more testimony from Moiragenes and Philostratus' own silence on the subject.

We can further gain from Origen's testimony a likely title of Moiragenes work. Origen refers to Moiragenes' work as *The Memoirs of Apollonius of Tyana, Philosopher and Magos* (ἀπομνημονευμάτα τῶν Ἀπολλωνίου τοῦ Τυανέως μάγου καὶ φιλοσόφου, Orig. *Contra Celsum* 6.41). This title immediately recalls Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (also titled ἀπομνημονευμάτων in the Greek). We can further see a connection between Moiragenes and Xenophon in that both write four books on their subject. Moiragenes relates to Apollonius in the same way as Xenophon does to Socrates, as both pupil and disciple. If Moiragenes' Apollonius is a Socratic figure, this further supports my assertion that Origen refers to a legal case brought by rival philosophers against Apollonius. Furthermore, early Christian authors such as Justin Martyr use *apomnēmoneumata* to refer to the Gospels, suggesting a positive valence of the term.[13]

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[13] Justin *Apol.* 66.3; 67.3; *Dial.* 100.4; 101.3; 102.5; 103.6; 103.8; 104.1; 105.1; 105.5; 105.6; 106.1; 106.3; 106.4; 107.1. Furthermore, the Gospels, like Moiragenes, Xenophon, and Philostratus, culminates with the trial of the protagonaist, suggesting that Origen describes Moiragenes' work as including a trial scene.

Moiragenes thus presents a Socratic Apollonius, who, like Socrates himself, faced legal accusations from rival philosophers. Such a picture hardly seems hostile to the Tyanean sage and we are thus still left with the question as to why Philostratus displays so much disdain for Moiragenes' work. We can find the answer if we remember that Moiragenes presents Apollonius as *magos kai philosophos*, with *magos* being used in the strictest sense of the word. Philostratus rejects Moiragenes' work because of his representation of Apollonius as a *magos*, while Philostratus goes to great lengths to emphasize Apollonius Hellenic identity.[14] Philostratus takes issue with Moiragenes' work not because of a hostile representation of Apollonius as a magician but rather because of his emphasis and positive presentation of Apollonius as not merely a student of Persian *paideia* but as a *magos*, a Persian priest, himself. We can recall Philostratus' opening remarks about the general ignorance of the population about Apollonius. Philostratus laments "because of his association with the *magoi* of Babylon, the Indian Brahmans, and the *Gymnoi* (Naked Ones) in Egypt, some consider him a *magos* and misrepresent his wisdom as coercive" (ἐπειδὴ μάγοις Βαβυλωνίων καὶ Ἰνδῶν Βραχμᾶσι καὶ τοῖς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Γυμνοῖς συνεγένετο, μάγον ἡγοῦνται αὐτὸν καὶ διαβάλλουσιν ὡς βιαίως σοφόν, *VA* 1.2). Moiragenes represents exactly this view; Moiragenes' biography has led people to consider Apollonius a *magos* and not the champion of Hellenism that Philostratus wishes to present him as.

[14] On Philostratus' presentation of Apollonius' Greek identity, see chapter two.

II. Maximus of Aegae

Aside from the local traditions of cities and temples and the letters of Apollonius, Philostratus names the memoirs of Damis as his major source of information about the sage. Damis, however, only meets up with Apollonius in Old Ninos, recounted by Philostratus in *VA* 1.19. Prior to this, Apollonius spends time in Tarsus, Aegae, Pamphylia, Cilicia, and Antioch. For at least part of these journeys, Philostratus relies upon other sources. He mentions that he "happened upon the book of Maximus of Aegae, containing all the deeds of Apollonius in Aegae" (ἐνέτυχον δὲ καὶ Μαξίμου τοῦ Αἰγιέως βιβλίῳ ξυνειληφότι τὰ ἐν Αἰγαῖς Ἀπολλωνίου πάντα, *VA* 1.3). Philostratus recounts Apollonius' time in Aegae in *VA* 1.7-12. He likely relied upon Maximus' book for this portion of his biography. He specifically refers to Maximus' book after recounting the tale of the lecherous ruler of Cilicia, whose sexual advances Apollonius rebukes. Philostratus recounts how public slaves executed the governor of Cilicia for conspiring with Archelaus against Rome. He states that "this and many similar things were written by Maximus of Aegae, and he was deemed worthy of the imperial correspondence, being highly esteemed for his style of speech" (ταῦτα καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα Μαξίμῳ τῷ Αἰγιεῖ ξυγγέγραπται, ἠξιώθη δὲ καὶ βασιλείων ἐπιστολῶν οὗτος εὐδοκιμῶν τὴν φωνήν, *VA* 1.12). Maximus' service in the imperial court as *ab epistulis Graecis* makes him likely a historical figure who flourished sometime between Trajan and Caracalla.[15]

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[15] Flinterman (1995): 68-9; Bowersock (1969): 19 n.7; Graf (1984/5): 72; Bowersock (1969): 53 notes other figures of the Second Sophistic who also earned this position. Given that Maximus writes about Aegae in propagandistic fashion, he more likely flourished during a time when Aegae's position as an important cult center had yet to be established, i.e. in the late first century to early second century CE.

Archelaus provides us a fixed chronological point; Tiberius deposed him from Cappadocia in 17 CE.[16] We are thus capable of dating Apollonius' stay in Aegae to the same time period.[17] However, this dating creates some chronological difficulties with his voyage to the East, which has led some scholars to discount Maximus' book as a fabrication of Philostratus.[18] Apollonius decides to go to India at a young age, stating that "it is proper for a young man to go abroad and to take on foreign travel" (προσήκειν φήσας νέῳ ἀνδρὶ ἀποδημεῖν τε καὶ ὑπερορίῳ αἴρεσθαι, *VA* 1.18). If Apollonius began this voyage immediately following his five-year period of silence, it would date to the early 20s CE, and Apollonius would be approximately the same age. Yet Philostratus has Apollonius reach Babylon two years after Vardanes had regained control of the land (*VA* 1.28). Vardanes ruled Parthia from 40-45 CE, dating Apollonius initial arrival at Babylon to 42 CE.[19] Twenty-five years have passed since Apollonius' encounter with the Cilician governor, not only making the "young Apollonius" in his forties but also raising the question of what happened in the intervening years.

It is precisely these chronological difficulties that suggest that Philostratus was working with various sources. Had Philostratus relied solely upon his own imagination, he could have easily provided a consistent chronology. Instead, Philostratus relies upon

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[16] Suet. *Tib.* 37; Tac. *Ann.* 2.42; Cass. Dio. 57.17.3-7.
[17] Graf (1984/5): 68 provides the following chronology for Apollonius' life: born around the turn of the millennium, goes to Tarsus at age 14 (*VA* 1.7), becomes a Pythagorean at age 16 (*VA* 1.7-8), stays in Aegae until he reaches majority, somewhere between 20 and 23 years old. Apollonius' father dies when he is only 20 and his elder brother 22 (*VA* 1.13), and after arranging certain affairs in Tyana, Apollonius returns to Aegae for some time.
[18] Meyer (1917): 401-5; Solmsen (1941): 147. Anderson (1986): 124 accepts the existence of a Maximus source but discredits it as "miraculous drivel."
[19] See Jones n. 32 at *VA* 1.21.2.

two different traditions.[20] As Fritz Graf notes, the first tradition, most likely the book of Maximus of Aegae, sets Apollonius' early years in Aegae corresponding to the beginning of Tiberius' reign. The second tradition reports Apollonius meeting with the Parthian king Vardanes. Graf suggests that the second tradition comes from Moiragenes; Moiragenes' representation of Apollonius as *magos kai philosophos* corresponds well with a visit to the *magoi* living under the rule of Vardanes.[21] Given Philostratus' explicit statement about his interest in accurate chronology (*VA* 1.2.3), he uses the two solid dates given to him by the two different traditions. Philostratus fills the sections in between the encounter with the Cilician governor (*VA* 1.12) and the crossing of the Zeugma (*VA* 1.20) "with a wealth of detail and a literary excursus in order to conceal rather than to fill the gap."[22]

Given that Philostratus uses differing sources, which leads to the chronological difficulties detailed above, we can attribute the stories of Apollonius' stay at Aegae to the book of Maximus. Maximus likely wrote his book partially as propaganda for Aegae and the temple of Asclepius located there.[23] Before Apollonius had come to Aegae, he stayed for a short period of time in Tarsus. As Flinterman notices, Philostratus' description of

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[20] Graf (1984/5): 68-70; Petzke (1970): 73, 151ff.
[21] Graf (1984/5): 69.
[22] Ibid., "mit Detailreichtum und einem literarischen Exkurs die Lücke eher zu kaschieren als zu füllen." The "wealth of detail" includes Apollonius' return to Tyana upon the death of his father (*VA* 1.13), after which he returns to Aegae for some time; his period of silence (*VA* 1.14ff), during which time he resolves the grain shortage in Aspendus (*VA* 1.15); his visit to Antioch at the end of his period of silence (*VA* 1.16), where Philostratus provides a detailed description of Apollonius' daily activities; an excursus by Philostratus on Apollonius' style of speech (*VA* 1.17); his decision to travel to India (*VA* 1.18); and finally, his arrival at Old Ninos, where Damis begins to journey with him (*VA* 1.19).
[23] Flinterman (1995) 69; Graf (1984/5) 71.

Tarsus and Aegae suggests that Philostratus' source saw the two cities, situated near each other, as rivals.[24] Philostratus states Apollonius' view of Tarsus:

> Apollonius, though he depended upon his teacher, he considered the character of the city foul and unsuited to the study of philosophy. For nowhere more than here were men attached to luxury, and they were all frivolous and lewd. They devoted themselves to fine linen more than the Athenians to wisdom.
>
> ὁ δὲ τοῦ μὲν διδασκάλου εἴχετο, τὸ δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἦθος ἄτοπόν τε ἡγεῖτο καὶ οὐ χρηστὸν ἐμφιλοσοφῆσαι, τρυφῆς τε γὰρ οὐδαμοῦ μᾶλλον ἅπτονται σκωπτόλαι τε καὶ ὑβρισταὶ πάντες καὶ δεδώκασι τῇ ὀθόνῃ μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ σοφίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι. (VA 1.7.1)

Apollonius moves to Aegae "where there was a quiet fit for one pursuing philosophy and more serious pursuits and a temple of Asclepius, where the god manifests himself to men" (ἐν αἷς ἡσυχία τε πρόσφορος τῷ φιλοσοφήσοντι καὶ σπουδαὶ νεανικώτεραι καὶ ἱερὸν Ἀσκληπιοῦ καὶ ὁ Ἀσκληπιὸς αὐτὸς ἐπίδηλος τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, *VA* 1.7).

In all likelihood, Maximus' biography of Apollonius provided the source for Philostratus' depiction of Tarsus. This depiction contradicts the one found in earlier writers, such as Strabo. Strabo praises Tarsus for exactly that which Philostratus' Apollonius found lacking there:

> The people there have such a zeal for both philosophy and all other general education that they have surpassed even Athens and Alexandria and any other place that one can name where there are schools and philosophical lectures.
>
> Τοσαύτη δὲ τοῖς ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώποις σπουδὴ πρός τε φιλοσοφίαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παιδείαν ἐγκύκλιον ἅπασαν γέγονεν ὥσθ' ὑπερβέβληνται καὶ Ἀθήνας καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρειαν καὶ εἴ τινα ἄλλον τόπον δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν, ἐν ᾧ σχολαὶ καὶ διατριβαὶ φιλοσόφων γεγόνασι. (Strabo, 14.5.13)

The contrasting portrayals of Tarsus suggest a rivalry between Tarsus and Aegae, which would create an appropriate context for Maximus' biography. Philostratus himself suggests in his *Lives of the Sophists* the importance of sophists for the fame of cities.[25]

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[24] Ibid.

[25] E.g. Clazomenae begs Scopelian to come to their city "because they thought it would greatly benefit Clazomenae if so talented a man should open a school there" (προβήσεσθαι τὰς Κλαζομενὰς ἐπὶ μέγα

Maximus of Aegae's biography uses Apollonius' local fame to engage in a rivalry with nearby Tarsus. This material proves useful for Philostratus to demonstrate Apollonius' prodigious youth, but Maximus' Apollonius was likely only of local importance. Maximus couples the importance and reputation of Aegae to the rising the fame of Apollonius; Philostratus seeks to break that link and demonstrate a more universal importance for the sage of Tyana.

III. The Letters of Apollonius

1. Introduction

A collection of letters attributed to Apollonius survives in an independently transmitted tradition, and several more are quoted by Stobaeus in the fifth century.[26] Between Philostratus, Stobaeus, and the independently transmitted tradition, we have a little over a hundred letters ascribed to Apollonius. These letters were included in anthologies of Greek epistolographers. Gottfried Olearius appended the letters to his 1709 critical edition of Philostratus; C.L. Kayser followed suit when he published his edition in 1844; even the Loeb Classical Library editions of F.C. Conybeare (1912) and C.P. Jones (2006) include the letters of Apollonius along with Philostratus' biography.

ἡγουμένων, εἰ τοιοῦτος δὴ ἀνὴρ ἐμπαιδεύσοι σφίσιν. *VS* 516, tr. Wright). Compare also the rivalry between Polemo and Favorinus, the cause of which Philostratus states to be the honors they received from Smyrna and Ephesus respectively (*VS* 490). Philostratus also relates the many ways Polemo benefitted Smyrna by opening a school there (*VS* 531). Cf. Anderson (1993): 24-28.

[26] A critical edition of the letters of Apollonius is provided by Penella 1979, whose text and numbering of the letters I follow (= *Ep. Ap.*). Penella numbers the separately transmitted collection as *Ep. Ap.* 1-77; 42a-h and 77a-f appear both in the *VA* and in the independently transmitted collection. *Ep. Ap.* 78 is a fragment cited by Prophyry in *De Styge* (preserved in Stobaeus). 79-100 come from Stobaeus' anthology. The letters which appear only in Philostratus form Appendix 1-16.

There is no reason to doubt that the historical Apollonius wrote letters, but the authenticity of the letters that have survived is still questionable. Regardless of their authenticity, which I shall discuss in detail below (section 2), they nevertheless provide a different portrait of Apollonius than that of Philostratus' biography. A more interesting set of questions arise: Where do the letters agree or disagree with Philostratus' depiction of Apollonius? Can the collation of the letters with Philostratus' text bring us closer to the 'historical' Apollonius? When the letters conflict with Philostratus, what are the implications of the differences to our understanding of Apollonius?

It is precisely on the issue of valuing others that we find a major point of difference between the "epistolary" and Philostratean Apollonius. Several of the letters are addressed to Tyaneans, four specifically to his brother Hestiaeus. In those letters, Apollonius displays a great deal of affection, concern, and love of his native land, to the point of rejecting the cosmopolitan philosophy that Philostratus' Apollonius embraces. The epistolary Apollonius acts as a representative for Tyana, winning the friendship and admiration of other cities. His relationship to Tyana puts him on par with the sophists depicted in Philostratus' own *Lives of the Sophists*. They frequently acted as representatives and benefactors to their native or adoptive cities. I argue that prior to Philostratus, Apollonius was merely a local sophist. I will examine the issues of representation and benefaction in the two traditions (section 3) and demonstrate how Philostratus replaces Apollonius' relationship with Tyana with a relationship to all of Greece.

2. The Value of the Letters of Apollonius

What value do the letters have to the study of Apollonius? The issue of their authenticity and their relationship to Philostratus' biography immediately arises. Philostratus himself includes among his sources a collection of letters, which Apollonius "wrote to kings, sophists, philosophers, Eleans, Delphians, Indians and Egyptians, on the subject of gods, customs, ethics, and laws, through which he set right whatever they done wrong" (ἐπέστελλε δὲ βασιλεῦσι σοφισταῖς φιλοσόφοις Ἠλείοις Δελφοῖς Ἰνδοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις ὑπὲρ θεῶν ὑπὲρ ἐθῶν ὑπὲρ ἠθῶν ὑπὲρ νόμων, παρ' οἷς ὅ τι ἁμαρτάνοιτο, ἐπηνώρθου, *VA* 1.2). He argues against the authenticity of letter of "an unpleasant length" (τὸ δὲ μῆκος ἄχαρι, *VA* 7.35). He states that "having collected the most of his letters, I have never found long-windedness in one of his letters, for they are all brief like a Spartan dispatch" (ξυνειλοχὼς αὐτοῦ πλείστας, οὐδὲ μακρηγορίαν πω τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐν ἐπιστολῇ εὗρον, βραχεῖαι γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ σκυτάλης πᾶσαι, ibid.). Towards the end of the biography, he states that Hadrian acquired "some of Apollonius' letters, but not all" (τινας τῶν τοῦ Ἀπολλωνίου ἐπιστολῶν, οὐ γὰρ δὴ πάσας γε, *VA* 8.20).

The implications of Philostratus' comments about the letters are several. In the first place, Apollonius' letters were in circulation by the second century. We can further ascertain that there was more than one edition in circulation, since Philostratus claims to have made his own collection of his letters. No "critical edition" of the letters existed in antiquity, since Apollonius had no one to play Tiro to his Cicero. Moreover, by giving a criteria by which to judge the authenticity of a letter, he reveals that forgeries existed by the time he was writing his biography in the third century. His criteria, namely "Spartan" brevity and the lack of μακρηγορία (long-windedness), would suggest that the longest letter in the collection, letter 58, a letter of consolation to the Proconsul of Asia, must be a

forgery. However, scholars have viewed this letter as the most authentic of the collection.[27] Philostratus is either exaggerating to bolster his argument, as Penella suggests, or he simply did not have the longer letters in his collection.[28]

Philostratus reveals one possible reason for the existence of forgeries. He mentions the forged letter in the context of Apollonius' first meeting with Domitian, after he had imprisoned the sage on charges of magic. Apollonius already had his fair share of enemies in his own lifetime and even more throughout the second century. While Philostratus depicts Apollonius bravely facing the emperor, he ascribes a forged letter, in which Apollonius begs Domitian to release him, to "those slanderously framing these events" (οἱ δὲ βασκάνως ταῦτα ξυνθέντες, *VA* 7.35).

But just as slander can lead to forgeries, so too can praise. After Philostratus' biography, Apollonius gained the admiration of quite a number of pagan elites.[29] The contemporary and younger relative of Philostratus, usually referred to as Philostratus of Lemnos, states "of the philosophers, the Tyanean and Dio seem to me to have best examined the epistolary style of discourse, after the ancients" (Τὸν ἐπιστολικὸν χαρακτῆρα τοῦ λόγου μετὰ τοὺς παλαιοὺς ἄριστά μοι δοκοῦσι διεσκέφθαι φιλοσόφων μὲν ὁ Τυανεὺς καὶ Δίων, II,257 Kayser = test. 8 Jones).[30] This admiration, coupled with the intense debates between pagans and Christians from the third to fifth centuries, could

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[27] Cichorius, quoted in Norden (1913): 337ff; Meyer (1917): 412; Hempel (1920): 20; Wilamowitz (1925): 307; Petzke(1970): 44; Penella (1979): 24 n.86 and 119-120.
[28] Penella (1979): 24 n.86
[29] Penella (1979): 28-29 includes among Apollonius' admirers Themistius, Libanius, Ammianus Marcellinus, Eunapius, and the writer(s) of the *Historia Augusta.*
[30] Jones (2006): 599 notes that reference to Apollonius as "the Tyanean" suggests that his letters were "generally accessible."

easily have occasioned the forging of letters that depicted Apollonius to the individual's own ends.

One can think of any number of other situations in which the letters were forged: Philostratus could have invented them to add more color to his work; another author's biography or Philostratus' own may have inspired their production[31]; they could have been the product of classroom exercises (e.g. the well-known quarrel between Apollonius and Euphrates could have become a letter-writing exercise for school)[32]; and so forth. With so many possibly reasons for forgery, it would be an impossible task to evaluate the collection of letters as a whole.[33]

Penella collects the manuscripts into two groups based on shared conjectural errors. Upon collecting the manuscripts, Penella noticed that the letters that appear in both the independently transmitted tradition and in the *VA* are grouped together (*Ep. Ap.* 42a-h, 77a-f), suggesting that the original compiler drew upon Philostratus biography for these letters.[34] This does not necessarily mean that Philostratus had fabricated these letters; there is still the possibility that they are genuine letters of Apollonius or at least that Philostratus worked with an earlier tradition in creating these texts.[35] However, it would be very difficult to ascertain what in these letters represent a pre-Philostratean tradition. Likewise, the letters preserved in Stobaeus (*Ep. Ap.* 79-100) are too short to

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[31] Bowie (1978): 1676-1678 makes a good argument for Moeragenes using authentic letters of Apollonius.
[32] On letter-writing as a school exercise, see Stirewalt (1993): 20-24.
[33] Penella (1979): 23-29 outlines the different criteria used by scholars and provides some overarching comments.
[34] Penella (1979): 20 and n. 70.
[35] Flinterman (1995): 71.

merit consideration. Each of these letters is a mere sentence or two and could likely be quotations from longer letters.[36]

What remains are the letters which solely appear in the independently transmitted collection. On a whole, the letters and the *VA* present similar portraits of Apollonius.[37] Occasionally there are contradictions, which are succinctly summarized by Penella.[38] For example, in *Ep. Ap.* 26, Apollonius rejects all sacrifices, whereas in the *VA* he only rejects blood sacrifices (e.g. *VA* 1.10, 1.16).[39] When contradictions such as these occur, one wonders which version is closer to the historical Apollonius. Even if the letters are fabrications, they could still be based on more reliable tradition that predates Philostratus.[40] Where the letters and the *VA* agree, there is always the possibility that these letters have been forged based on the *VA*, but, as both Penella and Flinterman note, there is no material evidence to corroborate such a claim.[41]

The assessment of both Meyer and Hempel in the early twentieth-century that the question of authenticity will remain subjective and never certain seems still to hold true.[42]

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[36] Penella (1979): 3. Penella suggests that *Ep. Ap.* 98-100 could have formed a longer *consolatio*, such as found in *Ep. Ap.* 55 and 58. Wilamowitz (1925): 307-8, 310 conjectured that longer letters could be reconstructed by collecting some of the shorter letters together, e.g. *Ep. Ap.* 30 + 31 +54.

[37] Penella (1979): 28; Meyer (1917): 409-411.

[38] Penella (1979): 27.

[39] See Penella (1979): 104-105. Penella argues that *Ep. Ap.* 26 is irreconcilable with *Ep. Ap.* 27, where Apollonius condemns priests for performing blood sacrifices. However, there seems to be no good reason why Apollonius could not have written both letters, condemning sacrifices in general in 26 and specific practices in 27.

[40] Meyer (1917): 412. Bowie (1978): 1677-8 points to a manuscript (codex Mazarinaeus) that contains an extra passage between an exchange with the Spartans which explains that the second letter is Apollonius' reaction to the Spartans' laudatory letter (Penella does not include this passage in his edition). Bowie hypothesizes that this passage is a fragment of Moiragenes, the biographer against whom Philostratus displayed so much animosity in *VA* 1.3, and that Moiragenes either knew the letters and drew upon them or even quoted them in full.

[41] Flinterman (1995): 71; Penella (1979): 28f and n. 111.

[42] Meyer (1917): 412; Hempel (1920): 13; cf. Penella (1979): 23-4. However, Jones (2006) offers some useful suggestions about the authenticity of *Ep. Ap.* 12,13, 26, 27, 32, 56, 65-67, drawing upon archaeological and epigraphical evidence.

It thus seems worthwhile to put aside the question of authenticity and work with a provisional thesis that the independently transmitted collection represents a pre-Philostratean tradition.[43] Of particular interest for my purposes are the letters addressed to and from Tyaneans (*Ep. Ap.* 44-48, 53, and 55). Included among these are letters to his brother Hestiaeus (44, 45, 55). *Ep. Ap.* 44 addresses the importance of one's native city; 45 expresses Apollonius' rejection of monetary gain; 55 is a letter of consolation after the death of his brother's wife. The picture of Apollonius we get from these letters is that of an individual dedicated to his family, friends, and native city. In the *VA*, Tyana and Tyaneans make almost no appearance at all. The one exception occurs when Apollonius returns to Tyana from Aegae upon his father's death and reconciles with an unnamed older brother (*VA* 1.13). The absence of Tyana from Philostratus' biography makes the letters all the more interesting. It also makes Philostratus' parenthetical remark that Apollonius liked to be addressed as "Tyanean" (*VA* 7.38) unexpected. G.R.S. Mead refers to this as one of Apollonius' "peculiarities," stating:

> It could hardly have been that Apollonius was particularly proud of his birth-place, for even though he was a lover of Greece, so that at times you would call him an enthusiastic patriot, his love for other countries was quite as pronounced. Apollonius was a citizen of the world, if there ever has been one, into whose speech the word native-land did not enter, and a priest of universal religion in whose vocabulary the word sect did not exist.[44]

While Mead rightly emphasizes that Philostratus' Apollonius had cosmopolitan allegiances, he fails to recognize what is likely a trace of an earlier tradition, one in which Apollonius was dedicated to his native city. Since Philostratus had made a collection of Apollonius' letters, though probably did not include all of them in his biography, he could easily have known of Apollonius' affection for Tyana, such as expressed in the

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[43] Meyer (1917): 409f; cf. Flinterman (1995): 71.
[44] Mead (1901): 127-8.

letters to his brother and other Tyaneans. The letters thus present us with a pre-Philostratean tradition that emphasizes Apollonius' relationship to Tyana, a relationship Philostratus chooses to acknowledge but ultimately limit in order to proclaim Apollonius' universalism.

3. Representation and benefaction

As I have noted above, in the epistolary tradition, Apollonius displays a great deal of concern and love for his native city of Tyana. We find him playing the role of representative of his city during his travels and benefactor to both the city as a whole and to individuals within the city. He travels in order to win the goodwill of other cities for Tyana and he assists his fellow citizens in their personal problems. In this regards, the letters portray Apollonius in the same way that Philostratus portrays sophists in his *Lives of the Sophists* (*VS*). Philostratus' sophists actively engaged in the political, social, and cultural concerns of their native or adoptive cities, often times holding public offices, sometimes entering into quarrels with their city's local government.[45] Some sophists, such as Aelius Aristides, Herodes Atticus, and Favorinus, had international fame. For the most part, however, the activities of the sophists held local allegiances and their activities were circumscribed to their particular city or region.

In this regard, the letters show Apollonius acting in a manner consistent with Philostratus' sophists. In a letter addressed to "the assembly and people of Tyana" (Τυανέων τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ), Apollonius takes a defensive and self-aggrandizing position, arguing that his travels abroad where done for the sake of Tyana (*Ep. Ap.* 47):

[45] Examples from the *VS* are collected in Bowersock (1969): 26-29 and Anderson (1993): 24-30.

> I am obeying your command to return home. Of course, summoning a citizen to honor him would be a more proper action for a city to take towards an individual. During all the time I traveled, I have traveled to win you fame and glory – though it may be in bad taste to say this – to win you the goodwill and friendship of outstanding cities and men. And if you deserved an even greater and higher reputation, only my personality and natural disposition would have sufficient strength and zeal to achieve this for you.
>
> (tr. Penella)

> Προστάττουσιν ὑμῖν ἐπανιέναι πείθομαι. τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ πρὸς ἕνα πόλει πρεπωδέστερον <ἂν> εἴη, εἰ ἕνεκα τιμῆς μεταπέμποιτο πολίτην ἑαυτῆς. καὶ ὃν ἀπεδήμησα δὲ χρόνον, ἀπεδήμησα περιποιῶν ὑμῖν, εἰ καὶ ἐπαχθὲς εἰπεῖν, εὔκλειάν τε καὶ ὄνομα καὶ εὔνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν πόλεων ἐπιφανῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν. εἰ δὲ καὶ μείζονος ἔτι καὶ κρείττονος ὑμεῖς ὑπολήψεως ἄξιοι, τό γε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῆς ἐμῆς φύσεως ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐξήρκει μόνον δυνάμεώς τε καὶ σπουδῆς.[46]

Apollonius responds to a summons to come home, but the reason for his summons cannot be easily discerned. As Penella notes, the defensive posturing of the second sentence and later in the phrase εἰ καὶ ἐπαχθὲς εἰπεῖν, indicates that Tyana did not summon him to receive honors.[47] The comparative πρεπωδέστερον in the second sentence begs the question more proper than what? Pairing πρεπωδέστερον with what follows, namely Apollonius' statements about the good he has done for the city through his travels, reveals that the summons was not a positive occasion. Apollonius implicitly states that while he has been helping Tyana, Tyana is not returning the favor. Moreover, his final statement that only he can improve the city's reputation suggests that he is requesting to be allowed to continue his travels.

Ultimately, this letter places Apollonius on par with the sophists of Philostrauts *VS*. Apollonius presents himself as a benefactor to his native city of Tyana, even if Tyana does not recognize the good he has done for them. In contrast, Philostratus' Apollonius works to the benefit of all Greece. This is best illustrated in his encounter

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[46] Jones, in his edition of the letters, excises τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ πρὸς ἕνα πόλει. He translates the second sentence "for of course what could be more proper than this, that a city should summon its own citizen to do him honor?" and states in n. 54 that the translation is uncertain. Jones errs, however, by translating the sentence as a rhetorical question.

[47] Penella (1979): 114, contrary to Petzke (1970): 43-44 and Jones, *ad loc.*

with the Indian king of Paraca (*VA* 3.31-32). While the king had held a negative opinion of the Greeks, having heard slander about them from Egyptian traders, Apollonius demonstrates how the Greeks are in fact morally superior to the Persians. After their interchange, the king of Paraca reconciles himself with the Greeks and states "I will pray all I can for them" (εὔχεσθαί με ὑπὲρ Ἑλλήνων ὅ τι δύναμαι, *VA* 3.32). Philostratus ultimately shows his Apollonius doing for Greece what the epistolary Apollonius had done for Tyana alone.

Chapter 2
"Where Wisdom Leads Me": Apollonius in India

When Apollonius of Tyana announces his plans to travel to India, he informs his disciples, "I must go to the place where wisdom and the *daimōn* lead me" (ἐμοὶ δὲ βαδιστέα, οἳ σοφία τε καὶ δαίμων με ἄγει, *VA* 1.18). So begins a journey that covers the next two and one-half books of Philostratus' biography. The journey is a testament to Apollonius' bravery and superiority over other men. Philostratus notes "the bravery Apollonius displayed as he traveled through barbarian and brigand tribes who were not yet subject to Rome" (τῆς τε ἀνδρείας, ᾗ χρώμενος ὁ Ἀπολλώνιος διεπορεύθη βάρβαρα ἔθνη καὶ λῃστρικά, οὐδ' ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίοις πω ὄντα, *VA* 1.20). Apollonius embarks upon an intellectual pilgrimage to a people "wiser and by far more divine" (σοφώτερά τε . . . καὶ πολλῷ θειότερα, *VA* 3.16) than the Greeks. Apollonius becomes an arch-Hellenist during his stay in Paraca, where Greek culture is preserved, unaltered and undefiled by the realities of the Roman Empire. Philostratus populates Paraca with Indians who speak perfect Greek (*VA* 3.12), worship the most ancient of Greek deities (*VA* 3.14), and live on the ὀμφαλός of India (ibid.). Philostratus transforms the Indian land into a Greek utopia both temporally, by harkening to the culture and religion of the Hellenistic past, and spatially, through his descriptions of the land and the city itself. Apollonius' journey to India thus becomes a journey through history, marked by encounters with memorials of both Alexander the Great's conquests and important moments of Greek mythic history. And, India becomes the ideal location in which to assert Apollonius' Hellenic identity. Upon returning to Greece, Apollonius renews Greek religious practices, restores decaying shrines and temples, and rebukes Greek

acceptance of Roman habits and culture. Philostratus' representation of India reveals India not as it was in the third century, an approach taken by modern scholars,[1] but as a space to negotiate the anxieties that preoccupied the mind of a Greek living and writing under the Roman Empire.

I begin this chapter by examining the contexts of Greek identity in the Second Sophistic. I continue by explaining how Apollonius' relationships with Eastern sages relate to the accusation of magic. In the final section, I provide a detailed analysis of Apollonius' travels to and through India and how Philostratus uses them to elevate Apollonius to the stature of a pure Greek and fated cultural reformer in the face of Roman imperial domination.

I. The Greek Identity of Apollonius

Philostratus must prove Apollonius' Greek identity in the context of the Second Sophistic, a time when Greek identity was far from clearly defined. Sophists, the educated (*pepaideumenoi*) and elite men whose oratory and literary production set the temporal limits of the period,[2] thrived under the *pax Romana*. Nevertheless, it was

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[1] This methodology was most prevalent in nineteenth century and early-twentieth century Indology, when scholars sought to determine whether the wise men of Paraca were Brahmans or Buddhists. See particularly Lassen (1858-1874) vol. 1, p. 761ff. ; De Beauvoir Priaulx (1860); Charpentier (1934); Hopfner (1934); more recently, Bernard (1996), who regards the whole Indian journey as an invention of Philostratus; Filliozat (1981) and Puskás (1991) take the opposing view. The equation between Philostratus' Brahmans and Indian Buddhists is particularly compelling, given the rise of Buddhism in the early centuries of the common era, on which see Ray (1986) and (1994). However, I put aside the question of historicity and contextualize Philostratus' *representation* of India within the discourses and cultural concerns of the Second Sophistic.

[2] In the scholarship, the Second Sophistic is roughly limited to 50 to 250 CE. The scholarship includes more authors and genres than Philostratus, who first coins the term "Second Sophistic" in *The Lives of the Sophists* 481, intended, including the Greek prose novelists (Chariton, Achilles Tatius, Xenophon, Heliodorus), medical writers (Galen), geographers and other periegetes (Strabo, Pausanius), and historians (Arrian, Cassius Dio). Philostratus limits the sophists to the virtuoso orators who practiced what he termed "philosophical rhetoric" (Τὴν ἀρχαίαν σοφιστικὴν ῥητορικὴν ἡγεῖσθαι χρὴ φιλοσοφοῦσαν, *Lives of the*

specifically the existence of, and their subjugation to, the Roman Empire that caused such concern for Greek writers of this period. Nostalgia for the "free" Greek past of the Classical and Hellenistic periods is a primary marker of Second Sophistic literature. Writers of this period frequently drew upon older Greek models, constructing "a homogenous Greek past" rooted primarily in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE and generally without regard to the individuality of the Greek city-states.[3] They created this "imaginary community" by using what James Porter has called "selective amnesia" about recent history.[4] Pausanias, writing in the second century CE, travels through the Greek lands but omitted from his record the monuments and dedications made after 150 BCE.

The relationship between Rome and Greek writers of the Second Sophistic is heavily contested. Glen Bowersock, in his seminal book on the topic, defined the sophists as mediators between the Greek provinces and the Roman Empire.[5] Bowersock, followed by Christopher Jones, argued that Rome is the measuring stick by which to gauge the significance of the sophists.[6] Other scholars, most notably Ewan Bowie and Simon Swain, see a strong expression of Hellenism against the realities of Roman occupation in the nostalgia of the period.[7] As Bowie states, "to reassure themselves that Greece had a claim comparable to that of Rome, they [Greek writers] began to dwell more and more in their principal cultural activities, on the political

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Sophists 480). For difficulties that the term "Second Sophistic" raises, see Goldhill (2001): 14-15. On the so-called "third sophistic" see now Quiroga (2007).

[3] Vasunia (2003): 370.

[4] Porter (2001): 66, writing specifically about Pausanias and Longinus.

[5] Bowersock (1969).

[6] Jones (1971) and (1978).

[7] Bowie (1970) and (1982); Swain (1996).

greatness of the past."[8] More recently, Tim Whitmarsh has argued to move away from the simple binarism of Greece versus Rome to see "a dynamic and mutually productive (and at times destructive) relationship between the two phenomena."[9] Greek and Roman identities were fluid, allowing for "cultural miscegenation" and the ability to be a "Roman Greek Alexandrian Jew."[10]

The fluidity of identity that Whitmarsh suggests led to multiple strategies of perceiving and representing one's "Greekness." Philostratus uses these various strategies to assert Apollonius' Hellenic identity. The construction of a holistic Greek past, one that ignores the particularities of individual city-states and their rivalries, moves Greek ethnicity beyond the older aggregative model.[11] At the same time, the existence of Rome as a *tertium quid* to the Greek/barbarian dichotomy upsets the simple oppositional model of ethnicity that developed after the Persian wars.[12] However, genealogical descent remains an important element of Greek self-definition.[13] Hadrian's Panhellenion exemplifies this point since cities requesting membership were made to prove their authentic Greek descent.[14] In Dio Chrysostom's oration to the Nicomedians, he makes recourse to the common descent of the Nicomedians and the Nicaens to encourage concord between the two (*Or.* 38.46). Philostratus likewise emphasizes the pure Greek origin of Apollonius. He calls Tyana "a Greek city in the region of Cappadocia" (πόλις Ἑλλὰς ἐν τῷ Καππαδοκῶν ἔθνει, *VA* 1.4) and says that

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[8] Bowie (1970): 40.
[9] Whitmarsh (2001a): 1; cf. the essays in Goldhill (2001).
[10] Whitmarsh (2001a): 21-22.
[11] On which, see J. Hall (1997): 47ff.
[12] Saïd (2001): 287-288. On the oppositional model, cf. E. Hall (1989); J. Hall (ibid); J. Hall (2002).
[13] Woolf (1994): 129.
[14] Spawforth (2001): 376-377; Romeo (2002): 22-31.

Apollonius' "family was ancient and descended from the city-founders (*oikistōn*)" (γένος ἀρχαῖον καὶ τῶν οἰκιστῶν ἀνημμένον, *ibid.*). Philostratus leaves no room to doubt Apollonius' ethnic origin.

At the level of language, writers and orators expressed their Greek identity by emulating the diction, style, and vocabulary of fifth century Attic Greek.[15] Atticism was so prevalent that lexicographers began cataloging proper (i.e. Attic) and improper (i.e. contemporary) Greek. Phrynichus was one such figure who wrote a *Praeparatio Sophistica*, a lexicon which categorizes correct Attic usage and rejects all other dialects.[16] Phrynichus' hyper-Atticism is all the more interesting when contrasted to his Arabian or Bithynian origin.[17] Atticism was ultimately an affectation that allowed anyone a claim to Greek identity. Hence, in order to boost the Hellenistic credentials of his protagonist, Philostratus notes of Apollonius' speech that "he spoke Attic Greek, and his speech was unaffected by the region" (ἡ γλῶττα Ἀττικῶς εἶχεν, οὐδ' ἀπήχθη τὴν φωνὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθνους, *VA* 1.7). Philostratus' hero comes from the Eastern provinces of the Roman Empire, but the comment about his speech places him squarely within the Greek world of the Second Sophistic.

Beyond the linguistic nostalgia found in the penchant for Atticisim, Hellenistic identity also depended upon the acquisition and display of education (*paideia*). *Paideia*, articulated through supposedly "natural" oppositions of Greek/barbarian, free/slave, and male/female, constructs the elite, male, Greek subject.[18] The agonistic context of Greek

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[15] Swain (1996): 43-64.
[16] On Phrynichus, see Swain (1996): 53-55 and notes.
[17] Arabian: Photius *Bibliotheca* cod. 158, 100a; Bithynian: Suda φ 764.
[18] Whitmarsh (2001a): 90-130; on the use of polarities in Greek thought and culture, see Cartledge (2002): 11-16

society constantly required the individual to reassert his claim to education and the subjectivity it provided.[19]

Education in Classical Greece centered on instilling manliness (*andreia*) in students.[20] *Andreia*, as defined by Laches in Plato's dialogue of the same name, referred to the military activity of the adult male.[21] Since this type of military service is no longer present in the Second Sophistic, militarism became a metaphor used to discuss *paideia*. *Andreia* is a virtue taught through *exempla* and not through actual military service. Plutarch, after quoting from Hector's speech to Andromache in *Iliad* 6, argues that manliness can be taught: "By declaring manliness is something learned . . . Homer urges us not to be neglectful of ourselves but to learn what is good and to give heed to our teachers" (τήν τε γὰρ ἀνδρείαν ἀποφαίνων μάθημα . . . προτρέπει μὴ ἀμελεῖν ἑαυτῶν, ἀλλὰ μανθάνειν τὰ καλὰ καὶ προσέχειν τοῖς διδάσκουσιν, *Mor.* 31f). Hector's willingness to go into battle exemplifies manliness in military action. Plutarch ignores the fact that had Hector been taught *andreia*, it would have happened specifically in a militaristic context. Instead, Hector provides the example of manliness that Plutarch's students would learn through the study of poetry. He moves the education of manliness from the battle field to the classroom.

Plutarch continues to link education and masculinity in his *On Listening to Lectures*, stating that philosophy "alone can confer upon young men the manly and truly perfect order that comes from reason" (ἡ μόνη τὸν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τέλειον ὡς

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[19] Gleason (1995): xxi-xxiv.
[20] See particularly Plato's *Laches* and the discussion by Rosen and Sluiter (2003): 5-8 and Hobbs (2000), esp. 86ff. For *andreia* in the Greco-Roman world, see the articles in Rosen and Sluiter (2003), especially Connolly on the Second Sophistic.
[21] Plat. *Lach.* 190e4; cf. Rosen and Sluiter (2003): 5-8.

ἀληθῶς ἐκ λόγου τοῖς νέοις περιτίθησι κόσμον, *Mor.* 37f). In a more vulgar vein, Lucian's punch-line to the *Eunuch* runs, "I pray that [my son] has neither the intellect nor the eloquence but the balls for philosophy" (εὐξαίμην ἂν οὐ τὴν γνώμην οὐδὲ τὴν γλῶτταν ἀλλὰ τὸ αἰδοῖον ἕτοιμον ἐς φιλοσοφίαν ἔχειν, *Eun.* 13).[22] Lucian makes a literal linkage between the pursuit of philosophy and male sexual identity.

The acquisition and display of *paideia* in this period were thus a part "of an ongoing process of defining manhood" and "a surrogate for the military activity that defined the virility of an earlier period."[23] Plutarch, in *De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute*, once again exemplifies the conflation of the two ideas of militarism and *paideia*. The work begins by responding to Fortune, who claims Alexander to be "the particular work of her alone" (ἴδιον καὶ μόνης αὐτῆς ἔργον, *Mor.* 326d). Plutarch retorts, "it is necessary to respond on behalf of philosophy, or rather on behalf of Alexander" (δεῖ δ' ἀντειπεῖν ὑπὲρ φιλοσοφίας, μᾶλλον δ' ὑπὲρ Ἀλεξάνδρου, *ibid.*). Plutarch equates Alexander with philosophy and his great deeds become the civilizing force of philosophy itself: "O power of marvelous philosophy, because of which the Indians worship the Greek gods, and the Scythians bury their dead and not devour them!" (ὦ θαυμαστῆς φιλοσοφίας, δι' ἣν Ἰνδοὶ θεοὺς Ἕλληνικοὺς προσκυνοῦσι, Σκύθαι θάπτουσι τοὺς ἀποθανόντας οὐ κατεσθίουσι, *Mor.* 328c).

While Philostratus does not use the military metaphor found in Plutarch, he nevertheless employs the language of masculinity to discuss Apollonius' journey to India. After telling his disciples about his decision to travel to the East, he announces,

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[22] Lucian alludes to the sophist Favorinus, who famously lacked sexual organs. Gleason (1995): 132-135 notes the comparisons between this satire and Favorinus' biography.
[23] Whitmarsh (2001a): 114, following Gleason (1995).

"I was testing you to see if you have the strength for the things which I have undertaken. But since you are feeble, I wish you health and love of philosophy" ("ὑμῶν δὲ βάσανον ἐποιούμην, εἰ πρὸς ἅπερ ἐγὼ ἔρρωσθε· ἐπεὶ τοίνυν μαλακῶς ἔχετε, ὑμεῖς μὲν ὑγιαίνετε," ἔφη, "καὶ φιλοσοφεῖτε," *VA* 1.18). The journey to India is a search for wisdom, and therefore relates back to Apollonius' own spiritual and intellectual growth. Undertaking the trip is also a performative act of Apollonius' masculinity. The quote from the introduction to this chapter shows how Philostratus genders the trip by making note of "the courage Apollonius displayed as he passed through barbarous and brigand races, who were not yet subject even to Rome" (τῆς τε ἀνδρείας, ᾗ χρώμενος ὁ Ἀπολλώνιος διεπορεύθη βάρβαρα ἔθνη καὶ ληστρικά, οὐδ' ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίοις πω ὄντα, *VA* 1.20). This last passage has two effects. First, it solidifies Apollonius' masculinity, thereby solidifying his Hellenic identity. Second, Philostratus moves Apollonius outside the sphere of Roman *imperium* into a space where Greek identity can be expressed without a negotiation with Rome.

II. Eastern Sages and Greek Ambivalence

Philostratus devotes so much energy to Apollonius' Indian travels because they are the primary reason for accusations of magic made against him.[24] In the opening of the biography, Philostratus laments, "some, because of his association with the *magoi* of Babylon, the Indian Brahmans, and the *Gymnoi* (Naked Ones) in Egypt, consider him a *magos*[25] and forcefully slander the sage" (οἱ δέ, ἐπειδὴ μάγοις Βαβυλωνίων καὶ Ἰνδῶν

[24] I examine the second reason for the accusation, Apollonius' foreknowledge, in chapter three.
[25] Because of the term's double appearance in this passage, I choose to render *magos* by transliterating the Greek word, instead of translating it as "magician." This avoids the confusion that one finds in Jones

Βραχμᾶσι καὶ τοῖς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Γυμνοῖς συνεγένετο, μάγον ἡγοῦνται αὐτὸν καὶ διαβάλλουσιν ὡς βιαίως σοφόν, *VA* 1.2).[26] Apollonius' accusers place him in a list of "others" in Greek culture: Babylonians, Indians, and Egyptians. For Philostratus, what is at stake is Apollonius' claim to a Greek identity despite his foreign travels and foreign associations.

I argued in the introduction that *magos* emphasizes cultural otherness.[27] The repetition of the word *magos* by Philostratus reveals the discursive range of the word. *Magos* is an "orientalizing" term; it both identifies and homogenizes.[28] First, the term identifies a specific group of Babylonian (i.e. Persian)[29] priests, who had various religious and pedagogical roles in their society.[30] By itself, the first use of *magos*

(2005), who translates the phrase "because of his associations with Babylonian *magicians* . . . some think him a *sorcerer*" (emphasis added). Later, he translates the same word as "Magi" (e.g. *VA* 1.29). *Magos* can have the semantic range that Jones suggests, but it is odd that he uses both "magician" and "Magi" when no negative valence appears in the text. I argue below that Philostratus uses the term more consistently.

[26] The phrase διαβάλλουσιν ὡς βιαίως σοφόν is difficult to render into English. Most recently, Jones (2005) couples it with the preceding phrase, μάγον ἡγοῦνται αὐτὸν, and translates both together as "misrepresent him as a philosophical imposter." Conybeare (1969) translates the phrase as "spread the calumny that he was a sage of an illegitimate kind." Both translations take ὡς βιαίως as modifying σοφόν, but it more likely functions adverbially with the verb διαβάλλουσιν. Philostratus implies the lengths to which his accusers have to (and do) go to slander him .

[27] *Supra*, pp. 4-5.

[28] Cf. Edward Said (1978): 21, where he calls Aeschylus' *Persians* "a highly artificial enactment of what a non-Oriental has made into a symbol for the whole Orient." See further Said (1978), esp 31-73; for a good summary of Said's work and later critiques of it, see Ashcroft and Ahluwalia (2001): 49-83.

[29] Naming the Babylonian sages as *magoi*, as opposed to the more frequent appellation of Chaldeans, is somewhat odd given that ancient testimonia usually associates the *magoi* with Persia. However, Babylon came under Persian control under Cyrus and Darius the Great, where it remained a capital city through Alexander the Great and the later Parthian and Sassanid Empires. It is therefore not surprising that Philostratus would conflate Babylon and Persia.
On Babylonian Chaldeans: Democr. D-K A 16 (=Ael. *VH* 4.20, where he distinguishes between Chaldeans of Babylon and *magoi*; both were teachers of Democritus); Dichaerchus 16, 55-56 (Werhli); Hdt. 1.182-3; Ctesias 688 F 1b (=Diod. Sic. 2.24.2); Diod. Sic. 1.28.1; closer to Philostratus' time, Diog. Laert. 1.1, where he associates the *magoi* with Persians, and the Chaldeans with Babylonians or Assyrians.
On Persian *magoi*: Democr. *ibid*; Protagr. D-K A 2 (= Philost. *VS* 494, note that Philostratus himself elsewhere labels the *magoi* as Persian); Hdt. 1.132; Ctesias, *ibid.*; Strabo 15.3.15; Dio Chrsys. 36.40.3; Ael. *VH* 2.17.

[30] Cf. Hdt. 1.140; 7.43; 7.113-4; 7.119; Strabo 15.3.13-15; see further de Jong (1997); Burkert (2004): 117-123, Collins (2008): 54-58.

remains a neutral category. The appearance of the term a second time activates the sense of "otherness" that developed after the Persian wars.[31] It is not a matter of simple equivalence, i.e. Apollonius associated with *magoi*, so he must be a *magos*. Rather, Apollonius' critics associate all three groups of Eastern sages – *magoi*, Brahmans, Naked Ones – with the sense of otherness that *magos* alone carries. They dislocate the Brahmans and Naked Ones from their specific geographical and cultural contexts, thereby homogenizing the list into a generically dangerous East.

Philostratus initially frames the accusations made against Apollonius as an issue of cultural otherness, despite the reader's and his own awareness that the charges made against Apollonius center around his alleged practice of magic. In *VA* 1.2 quoted above, *magos* does not refer to the figure of the magician or sorcerer, an individual on the fringes of Greco-Roman society who engaged in unsanctioned religious activity.[32] When Apollonius finally comes under religious and legal accusations, Philostratus uses the term *goēs*, which signals the actual accusation of being a magician.[33] It first appears at *VA* 4.18, when a priest refuses Apollonius entrance into the Eleusinian Mysteries.[34] *Goēs* and *goēteia* appear throughout books seven and eight and always within a religious or legal context. *Magos*, on the other hand, only appears in book one. With the one exception of Philostratus' reference to Apollonius' critics, the term *magos*

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[31] E. Hall (1989); J. Hall (2002): 172-228.
[32] Graf (1997): 26-27; Bremmer (1999): 10; on the magic-religion binary in scholarship, see Versnel (1991).
[33] Phrynichus, in his *Praeparatio Sophistica* notes *goēs* as "more Attic than *magos*" (γόης: Ἀττικώτερον τοῦ μάγος, 56.8). Phrynichus' suggestion makes Philostratus' use of the term *magos* in *VA* 1.2 all the more striking, since Julia Domna "commissioned [him] to rewrite these discourses and pay attention to their diction" (μεταγράψαι τε προσέταξε τὰς διατριβὰς ταύτας καὶ τῆς ἀπαγγελίας αὐτῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι, *VA* 1.3). On Phrynichus, see Swain (1996): 53-54. On Atticism in the Second Sophistic more generally, see Swain (1996): 43-64.
[34] On which, see chapter 4.

never appears in a pejorative context[35] and consistently occurs in specific reference to the Babylonian sages.[36] By avoiding the term *goēs* in the beginning of his work, Philostratus allows himself time to "familiarize" the actual Babylonian *magoi*, causing the term to lose all negative connotations, and to establish the Hellenistic credentials of his protagonist before he faces accusations of being a magician.

Because *magos* refers to ethnic identity and not magical practices, the stakes are Apollonius' claim to an authentic Greek identity. Philostratus begins his defense of Apollonius by employing historical *exempla* of unquestionably Greek philosophers consorting with Eastern sages.

> Empedocles, Pythagoras himself, and Democritus, although they consorted with *magoi* and said many inspired things, were not at all seduced by the art. And Plato went to Egypt, and although he mixed many things from the prophets and priests there with his discourses, just like a painter adding colors to his outlines, he was not yet thought to be a *magos*, although he was envied the most of all men for his wisdom.
>
> Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε γὰρ καὶ Πυθαγόρας αὐτὸς καὶ Δημόκριτος ὁμιλήσαντες μάγοις καὶ πολλὰ δαιμόνια εἰπόντες οὔπω ὑπήχθησαν τῇ τέχνῃ, Πλάτων τε βαδίσας ἐς Αἴγυπτον καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἐκεῖ προφητῶν τε καὶ ἱερέων ἐγκαταμίξας τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ λόγοις καὶ καθάπερ ζωγράφος ἐσκιαγραφημένοις ἐπιβαλὼν χρώματα οὔπω μαγεύειν ἔδοξε καίτοι πλεῖστα ἀνθρώπων φθονηθεὶς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ (*VA* 1.2).

Philostratus accomplishes several things in this passage. The *exempla* draw upon the Greek past and associate Apollonius' activities with those of notable philosophers before him. Philostratus demonstrates that associating with and learning from Eastern sages does not make one a *magos*.[37] In fact, the East is an object of desire for the philosophers mentioned. They travel there for the knowledge that later informs their own philosophies; the East is the source of Greek wisdom.

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[35] Cf. Cassius Dio 77.18.4, quoted and discussed in the introduction, pp. 3-5.
[36] Aside from the two appearances in *VA* 1.2, *magos* also appears in 1.18, 1.25, 1.26 (four times), 1.29, 1.32, 1.40, and 1.41.
[37] This passage contains the one use of the verb *mageuein* in the entire *VA*. Given the context of associations with Eastern sages and my previous statements about the term *magos* in the text, it is better to construe *mageuein* literally as "to be a *magos*."

If Philostratus aims to reframe the accusation against Apollonius on cultural, and not religious or magical, terms, he slips in his *exempla*. He acknowledges a seductive *technē* that exists in the East, which can be nothing other than the art of magic. Even if he acknowledges the existence of magic as *technē* of the East, his *exempla* demonstrate the ability of a philosopher to avoid the lure of this *technē*. Greek wisdom and its antithesis (magic) exist simultaneously in the East, creating both desire and repulsion for the East in Greek thought. The tension between desire and repulsion speaks to the "double vision" or ambivalence in Greek thought about the East.[38] Philostratus exploits this ambivalence by using it as an opportunity to reconstruct the East to his own ends. The ambivalence creates the conditions in which the hagiography of these philosophers can be written. Magic is the Siren song that these philosophers can avoid. Their superiority stems directly from their ability to make the journey to the East and learn from Eastern wise men without succumbing to magical practices.[39]

Philostratus has no *exemplum* of a philosopher associating with Brahmans, though such traditions did exist prior to his work. A fragment of Alexander Polyhistor dating to the first century BCE notes that Pythagoras studied with the Brahmans.[40] Closer to Philostratus' time, Apuleius makes a similar association (*Flor.* 15).[41] For Philostratus, however, Pythagoras learned only from the Egyptians (*VA* 3.19). Apollonius alone studied with the Brahmans, whom Philostratus reveals as the source of even Egyptian wisdom (*VA* 3.19-20; 6.11). Apollonius thus journeys to the fount of

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[38] Borrowing the phrase from Homi Bhabha's discussion of mimicry; (1994): 126.
[39] Cf. *VA* 5.12, where Philostratus specifically states that Apollonius did not attempt to imitate the magical tripods of the Indians.
[40] *FGrH* 273 F 94 = Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1.70.1.
[41] Interestingly, the tradition that Pythagoras studied with Indian sages does not appear in any of the biographies written after Philostratus (Iamblichus, Porphyry, Diogenes Laertius).

all wisdom and is unique because he is the only philosopher to have studied with the Brahmans.

Philostratus uses the *magoi* and the Naked Ones to demonstrate Apollonius' superior wisdom. When initially describing his plan to go to India, Philostratus refers to the *magoi* as a *heurēma*, an unexpected discovery (εὕρημα δὲ τοὺς μάγους ἐποιεῖτο, *VA* 1.18). He later mentions a sacrifice the Babylonian king performs under the supervision of the *magoi*, "for offerings are sacrificed under their supervision" (τὰ γὰρ ἱερὰ ὑπ' ἐκείνοις δρᾶται, *VA* 1.29). Philostratus' *magoi* are Persian religious functionaries, much like those found in Herodotus.[42] Apollonius seeks the *magoi* for their wisdom and, after his interviews with them, tells Damis that "they are wise, but not entirely" (σοφοὶ μέν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάντα, *VA* 1.26). Even though Apollonius has yet to reach complete spiritual and intellectual maturity, he is still capable of judging the value of the *magoi* and finds their wisdom lacking. True spiritual and intellectual enlightenment resides further east. Though his stay in Babylon lasts one year and eight months, it is merely a side venture on his greater quest for the Brahmans.

While the *magoi* preface Apollonius' later education with the Brahmans, the Naked Ones offer him an opportunity to demonstrate the knowledge he gained in India. In Egypt, Apollonius meets with Vespasian and engages in a debate with Dio and Euphrates over the best form of government. After Vespasian decides that Apollonius' arguments for kingship are the strongest, he invites the sage to travel with him as a companion. Apollonius declines because he "had not yet conversed with the Naked Ones, since he was very eager to compare Egyptian with Indian wisdom" (τοῖς τε

[42] Cf. Hdt. 1.140; 7.43; 7.113-4; 7.119.

Γυμνοῖς οὔπω ἀφῖχθαι ἐς λόγον μάλα ἐσπουδακὼς σοφίᾳ Ἰνδικῇ ἀντικρῖναι Αἰγυπτίαν, *VA* 5.37). When he reaches them, the Naked Ones agree to an interview "should they find the time" (ἢν σχολὴν ἄγωσι, *VA* 6.8). Damis calls the Naked Ones "arrogant" (τῦφος, *VA* 6.9) in their behavior. Philostratus reveals to the reader that Euphrates, Apollonius' philosophical adversary, had sent someone to slander him to the Naked Ones (*VA* 6.7). Euphrates himself reveals a certain veneration of the Naked Ones, since he takes the trouble to discredit Apollonius to them. Philostratus records the entire debate between the Naked Ones and Apollonius (*VA* 6.10-11), in which he explains his choice of the Pythagorean life (*VA* 6.11.2-7) and his decision to travel to India rather than Egypt (VA 6.11.10). Apollonius reveals his knowledge that the Naked Ones were originally Indians (*VA* 6.11.13) who were expelled from the land for killing their king (told to Apollonius by Iarchas at *VA* 3.20). The Naked Ones "were so affected by Apollonius' discourse that Thespesion [the leader of the Naked Ones], although he was dark, visibly blushed" (ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν τοῦ Ἀπολλωνίου λόγων οὕτω διατεθῆναι τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους, ὡς τὸν Θεσπεσίωνα μὲν καίτοι μέλανα ὄντα κατάδηλον εἶναι, ὅτι ἐρυθριᾷη, *VA* 6.12). Apollonius wins the philosophical debate with the Naked Ones, and one of them even decides to become his disciple (*VA* 6.12).

The *magoi* and the Naked Ones provide book ends to Apollonius' trip to India. Apollonius demonstrates how far he has already come in wisdom through his time spent with the *magoi*, and he further reveals the superiority of the Indian wisdom to that of Egypt through his interviews with the Naked Ones. However, Philostratus ultimately devalues both groups and their importance for Apollonius' spiritual and intellectual development.

III. Apollonius' "Passage to India"

1. From Antioch to the Zeugma

Apollonius' journey to India and back is as follows: he starts his journey to India from Antioch, first arriving at "ancient Nineveh" (ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τὴν ἀρχαίαν Νῖνον, *VA* 1.19), where Damis joins him as a disciple. Together, they cross the Zeugma (1.20) and journey on to Babylon. Vardanes, the Parthian king, whose reign dates roughly from 45 to 49 CE, welcomes Apollonius (1.31), and after a stay of one year and eight months (1.22), they continue on their journey to India. They cross the Indus (2.18) and arrive at Taxilla (2.20), the seat of the Indian king Phraotes, whose philosophical lifestyle (2.26) and fluent Greek (2.27) Apollonius admires. After a short stay, the pair continue by crossing the Hydraotes and Hyphasis rivers (2.43), across which they encounter a monument marking the limit of Alexander's empire (*ibid.*). They transverse the Hindu Kush (3.4) and eventually arrive at Paraca (3.9), the home of the Indian Brahmans and a land no Greek had ever reached before (3.16). Apollonius and Damis stay four months in Paraca (3.50) and engage in many long philosophical discussions with Iarchas, the leader of the Brahmans (3.18-3.25, 3.30, 3.34-3.35, 3.41-45). After this time passes, Apollonius travels south until he reaches an unnamed port (3.52). He sails past the mouth of the Indus and follows Nearchus' route to the Euphrates (3.53). After a second visit to Vardanes, he travels back to Ionia via Nineveh, Seleucia, and Cyprus (3.58). He then begins his journeys through Ionia, the Greek mainland, and Rome (book four).

The Greece Apollonius leaves behind is already in decline, due in part to the existence and acceptance of Roman culture. We may observe this in Philostratus'

presentation of the city of Antioch, where Apollonius makes a final stop before he decides to travel to India. The historical record attests to the fusion of Greek and Roman culture in this city. Antioch had become a free city under Julius Caesar, who began Romanizing the topography of the city: he erected a basilica named the Kaisarion, a public bathhouse, an aqueduct to serve the city and the baths, and statues of himself and the *Tyche* of Rome.[43] The statues themselves attest to Caesar's attempts to reappropriate Hellenistic ruler cult for Roman means, a process which Augustus continued through his implementation of official worship to Roma and himself.[44] Hellenism, however, remains strong in Antioch. In his defense of Archias, Cicero lauds Antioch as "overflowing with the most educated men and most noble studies" (*eruditissimis hominibus liberalissimisque studiis adfluenti*, *Pro Arch.* 4). When Germanicus becomes ill in Antioch, Piso "assailed with his lictors the sacrifices conducted, the sacrificial equipment, and the festive population of Antioch" (*admotas hostias, sacrificalem apparatum, festam Antiochensium plebem per lictores proturbat*, Tac. *Ann* 2.69). The scene Tacitus depicts reminds the reader, as Fergus Millar notes, "that the primary context of the activity of Roman officials in the East was that of the communal life of the Greek cities."[45]

Consequently, the Antioch Apollonius reaches is a borderland, filled with a mix of Greek and barbarian cults and a strong Roman presence. Apollonius finds "no serious pursuits but semi-barbarous and uncultured men" (σπουδὴν δ'ἐν αὐτῷ οὐδεμίαν, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπους ἡμιβαρβάρους καὶ ἀμούσους, *VA* 1.16). Philostratus' use of

[43] Malalas 9.216-7.
[44] Downey (1963): 76, with notes.
[45] Millar (1993): 54.

"semi-barbarous" to describe Antioch already suggests the cultural miscegenation occurring there. While Apollonius finds both Greek and barbarian cults throughout the area, he pays particular attention to the Greek cults. He, "calling together the priests, would discourse to them about the gods and set them straight, if at any point he supposed that they had turned away from the established customs" (ξυγκαλῶν ἂν τοὺς ἱερέας ἐφιλοσόφει περὶ τῶν θεῶν καὶ διωρθοῦτο αὐτούς, εἴ που τῶν νομιζομένων ἐξαλλάττοιεν, *ibid.*). Apollonius' interest is in returning to traditional Greek religious practices ignored by the cults of Antioch.

The decline of traditional practices among Greek cults may be due in part to the interaction between Greeks and barbarians. However, Philostratus specifically relates Antioch's decline to the existence and acceptance of Roman cultural institutions. Apollonius further rebukes the people of Antioch for using the public bathhouses, calling them "the old age of men" (γῆρας ἀνθρώπων, *ibid.*). The bathhouses (τὰ βαλανεῖα) impugn the virility and, by extension, the Greekness of men. Apollonius chooses instead to anoint himself with oil, performing a traditional Greek act. When the emperor closes the baths, he states, "the emperor has added years to your life, despite your faults" (ὁ βασιλεὺς κακοῖς οὖσι βιῶναι πλείονα ἔτη, *ibid.*). In both religious and cultural spheres, Apollonius seeks a return to the traditional practices that existed prior to the coming of Rome. Philostratus concludes the section by labeling the people of the region "completely without culture" (ἀμουσοτάτους, *ibid.*).

Antioch represents the extreme periphery, a place where Greek culture survives but is in decline, suffering from the extension of the Roman Empire and its cultural

institutions. It is in Antioch that Apollonius decides to travel to India, a journey beyond the periphery and into the unknown.

> After these things, having proposed to himself a plan for a greater journey (ἀποδημίας μείζονος), his mind was directed (ἐνθυμεῖται) toward the Indian race and the wise men among them, those said to be the Brahmans and Hyrcanians; for he said it is fitting for a young man to go abroad (ἀποδημεῖν) and to take up foreign travel (ὑπερορίῳ αἴρεσθαι).
>
> Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λογισμὸν ἑαυτῷ διδοὺς ἀποδημίας μείζονος, ἐνθυμεῖται τὸ Ἰνδικὸν ἔθνος καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ σοφούς, οἳ λέγονται Βραχμᾶνές τε καὶ Ὑρκάνιοι εἶναι, προσήκειν φήσας νέῳ ἀνδρὶ ἀποδημεῖν τε καὶ ὑπερορίῳ αἴρεσθαι. (*VA* 1.18)

The terms ἀποδημίας, ἀποδημεῖν, and ὑπερορίῳ αἴρεσθαι privileges the δῆμος as the point of departure.[46] An ἀποδημία is a movement *from* a centralized and known location, namely the Greek city. The phrase ὑπερορίῳ αἴρεσθαι emphasizes movement into the unknown, since ὑπερόριος signifies space beyond one's own land, a crossing into alien territory.[47] In the initial presentation, Philostratus describes a journey away from the center into an unknown and dangerous periphery.[48] The start of the journey already prefaces moving into the discourse of the traveler's tale and ethnography.

Apollonius engages in a self-imposed exile from Greece. Other Second Sophistic authors, such as Musonius Rufus, Dio Chrysostom, and Favorinus, use exile to construct their philosophical authority.[49] These exiled philosophers suffered their fates under the rule of Nero and Vespasian, and exile provides an opportunity for the philosophers both to represent a struggle with Roman imperial domination and to engage with and reconstruct the Classical Greek past.[50] Though the omnipresence of

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[46] Montiglio (2005): 2-3.
[47] *LSJ* s.v. ὑπερόριος, II.
[48] The disciples' response, persuading him not to go, furthers the presentation of the travel as journey into unknown and dangerous areas. Damis, Apollonius' disciple, shows the same fear at *VA* 1.23.
[49] On which see the insightful discussion of Whitmarsh (2001a): 133-180, which is largely the same as Whitmarsh (2001b).
[50] It is not, however, a matter of simple nostalgia, as Tim Whitmarsh notes. The engagement with Classical Greek traditions involved a "breaking into a closed, centripetal tradition from outside (and the problem was

Rome motivates Apollonius to leave Greece, he is not directly exiled by a Roman emperor. In fact, when Nero and Domitian exile philosophers from Rome, Apollonius chooses to face the tyrants directly by going *to* Rome, despite the recommendations of his disciples and other philosophers.[51] Apollonius leaves Greece in order to find the people "wiser and by far more divine" (σοφώτερά τε ἡγοῦμαι τὰ ὑμέτερα καὶ πολλῷ θειότερα, *VA* 3.16); he leaves Greece to find a place which preserves Greek culture and philosophy. Apollonius' travels are a journey to the past and a search for wisdom.

Travel is thus a recurring and important theme in the *VA*. Apollonius' travels to and through India allow for both his spiritual development and his eventual mastery of spiritual matters.[52] From Homer's Odysseus onwards, travel in Greek literature frequently pairs with the acquisition of knowledge and the viewing and describing of unfamiliar places, peoples, and customs. Odysseus "saw the cities of many men, and he knew their minds" (πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω, *Od.* 1.2).[53] Travel provides the opportunity for ethnography, and ethnography in turn allows the writer to reflect on the values of his own culture through the description of the other.[54]

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redoubled in the case of an Etruscan, a Prusan, and a Gaul). It involved a painstaking process of education and imitation of cultural paradigms, but also (crucially) a transformation and reconfiguration of these paradigms into something new" (2001a, 179).

[51] Philolaus attempts to dissuade Apollonius from visiting Rome during Nero's reign (*VA* 4.36-37), but Apollonius nevertheless decides to face the tyrant (*VA* 4.39). Demetrius the Cynic likewise encourages Apollonius not to enter Domitian's Rome (*VA* 7.10-13), to which Apollonius gives a long soliloquy on the necessity of true philosophers to face tyrants (*VA* 7.14).

[52] On which, see Elsner (1997), esp. 26-32; Elsner and Rubiés (1999): 11-12; Montiglio (2005): 213-220.

[53] On ethnography in Homer's Odyssey, see Dougherty (2001). The other classic example is Herodotus' Solon, whose "wisdom and travels" (σοφίης τῆς σῆς καὶ πλάνης, Hdt. 1.30.2). See further Dougherty (*ibid*): 3-4.

[54] Herodotus is of course the classic example of ancient ethnographic writing, particularly in books one through four. On Herodotean ethnography, see Hartog (1988), particularly 212-259; Thomas (2002); on Herodotus' account of Egypt see Vasunia (2001): 75-135

Philostratus depends partly on the traditional account of Indian *thaumata* that date back to Herodotus and Ctesias in the fifth century BCE, but these accounts are frequently called into question.[55] Philostratus, following the Herodotean model, authorizes his ethnography through Apollonius' autopsy. Unlike Herodotus, who in his ethnography of Egypt states that Egyptian customs are the reverse of those practiced in the rest of the world (2.35), the further east Apollonius travels, the more Greek culture he encounters. Movement away from the center thus represents a movement backwards in time, where encounters with Greek mythology and culture become more and more prevalent.

Apollonius and Damis first encounter Greek culture at the Zeugma, the main crossing point of the Euphrates, where the tax collector asks them "what they were exporting" (ὅ τι ἀπάγοιεν, *VA* 1.20). Apollonius replies with a list of Greek virtues (σωφροσύνην, δικαιοσύνην, ἀρετὴν, ἐγκράτειαν, ἀνδρείαν, ἄσκησιν, *ibid.*), which the tax collector mistakes for female slaves. Christopher Jones notes that during Hadrian's reign, the Palmyra tax-law imposed duties to be paid for slaves.[56] Philostratus borrows a detail from his own life, which was possibly true in Apollonius' lifetime also. Two key points emerge from the exchange between the tax-collector and Apollonius. First, whether or not the tax-law was in effect during Apollonius' life, Philostratus presents the power of the Roman Empire reaching at least to the Euphrates. Second, though Rome is present, Greece is not. The tax-collector can follow exportation laws written

[55] For example, the "martichora," a creature with the head of a man, the body of a lion, and shoots thorns from its tail, dates back to Ctesias' *Indika* (*FGrH* 688 F 45) and continues to be part of the Indian menagerie through Pausanius (9.21.4). Iarchas denies the existence of this creature (*VA* 3.45).
[56] Jones (2001): 191, following Matthews (1984): 175-6.

under the Roman Empire, but he fails to understand the Greek language and, by extension, Greek values. What at first reading appears to be a humorous misunderstanding reveals itself to be a sad commentary on Greece's inability to keep up with the Roman Empire.

As noted in section one, proficiency in the Greek language was a major marker of Second Sophistic Greek identity. The tax-collector, with his incomplete understanding of Greek, bridges two worlds: the "real" Greece to the west, where Greek culture is in decline, and the imaginary lands to east, where Apollonius finds Greek language and culture preserved.

2. Babylon: The Greek Past and the Roman Present

When Apollonius first arrives in Babylon, a guard asks him to bow before the statue of the king. Philostratus remarks about "the simple-minded duties exercised by satraps among the barbarians" (σατραπεύεται παρὰ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὰ οὕτως εὐήθη, *VA* 1.27). He continues to name the persons Apollonius encounters as barbarians, who speak to him through interpreters (*ibid.*). Apollonius impresses the Babylonian officials by refusing to do obeisance, and quickly news spreads "that a wise man, a Greek and a good counselor, was standing at the king's doors" (ὅτι ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ ταῖς βασιλέως θύραις ἑστήκοι σοφός τε καὶ Ἕλλην καὶ ξύμβουλος ἀγαθός, *VA* 1.28). Apollonius is a Greek among barbarians, and because of his wisdom and Greek heritage, he is welcomed into Vardanes' court.

When he meets the Parthian king, Vardanes "greets him in the Greek tongue and urges him to sacrifice with him" (προσεῖπέ τε ὁ βασιλεὺς φωνῇ Ἑλλάδι καὶ δὴ ἐκέλευσε

θύειν μετ' αὐτοῦ, *VA* 1.31).[57] Apollonius asks Vardanes, "Do you know the Greek language completely or a little perhaps in order to be easy to communicate with and not to seem rude, should some Greek arrive?" (τὴν φωνὴν τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν γιγνώσκεις, ἢ σμικρὰ αὐτῆς ὑπὲρ τοῦ εὐξυμβόλου ἴσως καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀηδὴς δοκεῖν, εἴ τις ἀφίκοιτο Ἕλλην; *VA* 1.32). Apollonius has reservations about the king's Greek, since he had been conversing through interpreters. The king reassures him that he knows it just as well as he knows the native languages. This affords Apollonius the opportunity to explain his desire to meet the Indian sages and to flatter Vardanes and the Babylonian *magoi* (*ibid.*). Vardanes exceeds the tax-collector in knowledge of Greek, and this fluency predicates his conversations with and fondness for Apollonius (*VA* 1.33). Apollonius in turn shows admiration for the king and says to Damis "I suppose you see

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[57] Vardanes "was intending to sacrifice to the Sun a white horse of the finest Nisaean breed , dressed with metal ornaments, as for triumphal procession (ἐς πομπήν)" (λευκὸν δὲ ἄρα ἵππον τῶν σφόδρα Νισαίων καταθύσειν ἔμελλε τῷ Ἡλίῳ φαλάροις κοσμήσας, ὥσπερ ἐς πομπήν, *ibid.*). Philostratus may be preserving an authentic Parthian ritual, particularly given the abundance of Nissaean horses in the region. In more general terms, the horse, following man, has been argued to be the highest order of victims in Indo-European sacrificial practices, see Puhvel (1978). Vardanes' sacrifice could reflect the *aśvamedhá*, the horse sacrifice described in the *Yajurveda* (YV TS 7.1-5; YV VSM 22-25) and *Rig Veda* (1.162-163). In those texts, a king performs the *aśvamedhá* to acquire power and glory and to bring about the general prosperity of his kingdom.

Of course the Greco-Roman reader would have associated the horse sacrifice to a different set of beliefs. Initially, it harkens back to the Archaic Greek practice of sacrificing a horse to Poseidon (Paus. 8.7.2, see Burkert [1979]: 113). However, stronger Roman associations come through. Vardanes sacrifices to the sun, which one can associate with Apollo. The horse was sacred to Apollo Atepomarus, a Celtic deity also associated specifically with the sun, see further Adkins (1996): 14. The horse, particularly since he is adorned "as if for a triumphal procession," recalls Jupiter Optimus Maximus, who is depicted on a four-horse chariot on the pediment of his temple. The triumphal general would ride exactly such a chariot during his triumph. In one sense, the sacrifice of the horse would represent a break with Roman customs that venerated the animal.

The Greco-Roman reader might also recall the October Equus, the one attested time when horse-sacrifices occurred in Roman culture. In a festival to Mars, one of the winning horses of the chariot race was sacrificed with a javelin, see Burkert (*ibid.*) and Dumézil (1996): 215-228.

Strong Roman religious and cultural allusions emerge, specifically through the reference to triumphal procession (ὥσπερ ἐς πομπήν). Regardless if the sacrifice is ultimately pious or not, Apollonius refuses to take part in it because of his Pythagorean way of life. Moreover, this sacrifice is too reminiscent of Roman practices and further suggests that Rome has succeeded in extending their influence in a place where the Greeks have not.

that he is a good man and too great for ruling barbarians" (χρηστὸν γάρ που ὁρᾷς αὐτὸν καὶ κρείττω ἢ βαρβάρων ἄρχειν, *VA* 1.40). Shared language underwrites the friendship between Apollonius and Vardanes, and the king even makes the journey to India possible by providing camels and a guide (*VA* 1.41).

Vardanes' ability to speak Greek does not completely equate him with Greek values and culture. Their shared language allows Apollonius to instruct him, thereby truly bringing to the king the virtues, which the tax-collector mistook for slaves. When Vardanes became ill, Apollonius "went through so many and such divine things about the soul that the king recovered and said to those present, 'Apollonius has made me unconcerned not only about my kingdom but also about death,'" (τοσαῦτά τε καὶ οὕτω θεῖα περὶ ψυχῆς διεξῆλθεν, ὡς τὸν βασιλέα ἀναπνεῦσαι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας εἰπεῖν, ὅτι "Ἀπολλώνιος οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῆς βασιλείας μόνης ἀφροντιστεῖν εἴργασταί με, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ θανάτου," *VA* 1.38). There are any number of possibilities as to what Apollonius said specifically about the soul (metempsychosis is a likely candidate, given Apollonius' adherence to Pythagoreanism). Regardless of what he said, Apollonius' healing of the king through his discourses speaks to the therapeutic effects of Greek philosophy.

Apollonius also reconciles the king with the Eretrians, one time Greek prisoners brought to the land by Darius. Upon reaching Cissia, near Babylon, Apollonius receives a dream-vision (δόξα ἐνυπνίου ἐφοίτησεν, *VA* 1.23) of fish exiled on to land, begging the aid of a dolphin swimming nearby, and "wailing like men in a foreign land" (ὥσπερ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ ἐν τῇ ξένῃ κλαίοντες, *ibid.*). Damis equates the fish

with themselves and urges Apollonius to end their journey. Apollonius laughs at Damis and provides the true interpretation of the dream:

> Eretrians, who were brought here out of Euboea five hundred years ago by Darius, live in this Cissian land . . . The gods seem to command me to go to them and take care of them, if I am able. Perhaps even the souls of the Greeks, who obtained their lot here, are urging me to the aid of their land.
>
> Ἐρετριεῖς γὰρ τὴν Κισσίαν ταύτην χώραν οἰκοῦσιν οἱ ἐξ Εὐβοίας ποτὲ Δαρείῳ ἀναχθέντες ἔτη ταῦτα πεντακόσια . . . οἱ θεοὶ κελεύειν με ἐς αὐτοὺς παρελθόντα ἐπιμεληθῆναι σφῶν, εἴ τι δυναίμην. ἴσως δὲ καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἵπερ ἔλαχον τὴν ἐνταῦθα μοῖραν, ἐπάγονταί με ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ τῆς γῆς. *ibid.*

Philostratus brings the reader back to an episode from the Persian Wars, when Darius, after defeating the Eretrians, brought them back as prisoners (Hdt. 6.119). Philostratus' account of the Eretrians agrees and diverges from Herodotus in notable ways. In Herodotus' account, Darius holds a bitter grudge against the Eretrians. After he defeats them, Darius ends his anger and "settled them in Cissia in a section of his own land called Ardericca" (σφεας τῆς Κισσίης χώρης κατοίκισε ἐν σταθμῷ ἑωυτοῦ τῷ οὔνομάἐστι Ἀρδέρικκα, *ibid.*). Herodotus ends by noting that the Eretrians "have held this land up to my own day, preserving their former language" (μέχρι ἐμέο εἶχον τὴν χώρην ταύτην, φυλάσσοντες τὴν ἀρχαίην γλῶσσαν, *ibid.*). The Eretrians are an isolated community within the Persian Empire; they hold on to Greek culture even when settled in the Persian king's own land.

Five hundred years later, Philostratus resumes the story where Herodotus had left off. The Eretrians remain isolated from the rest of the Cissia both geographically and culturally. Geographically, the Eretrian territory occupies "the middle of the rest of the lands, and is surrounded by the trench of the river, which they themselves are said to have dug around the village, making it a wall against the barbarians in Cissia" (ἡ δὲ

τῶν Ἐρετριέων οἰκεῖται μὲν τῶν ἄλλων μέση, περιβέβληται δὲ ποταμοῦ τάφρον, ἣν αὐτοὶ βαλέσθαι περὶ τῇ κώμῃ λέγονται τεῖχος αὐτὴν ποιούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ Κισσίᾳ βαρβάρους, *VA* 1.24). Philostratus places the Eretrians in the middle of a place inhabited largely by barbarian nomads. Moreover, since Herodotus relates the importance the Eretrians placed in defending their city walls (Hdt. 6.101), Philostratus' Eretrians recreate the city wall which was lost through their use of the river.

The Eretrians essentially establish a Greek city in the Persian lands. Philostratus mentions that they "build Greek temples and an agora, which was sufficiently large" (ἱερά τε ἐδείμαντο Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ ἀγοράν, ὁπόσην εἰκὸς ἦν, *VA* 1.24). While Herodotus notes the Eretrians' preservation of the Greek tongue, Philostratus emphasizes the decay that has occurred over the centuries. First, along with the Greek temples, the Eretrians "had built two altars to Darius, one to Xerxes, and more to Daridaeus[58]" (βωμούς τε ἱδρύσαντο Δαρείῳ μὲν δύο, Ξέρξῃ δὲ ἕνα, Δαριδαίῳ δὲ πλείους, *ibid.*). Philostratus implies that even though the community had been isolated, they had accepted Persian rule, albeit through Greek religious practices. Second, the Greek language, which Herodotus claims to have been preserved up until his time, has changed in signification. "Up to the reign of Daridaeus, eighty-eight years after their capture, they continued to write in the Greek manner, and their ancient tombs are inscribed 'so-and-so, the son of so-and-so.' The letters are Greek, but not the same" (διετέλεσαν δὲ ἐς Δαριδαῖον ἔτη μετὰ τὴν ἅλωσιν ὀκτὼ καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα γράφοντες τὸν Ἑλλήνων τρόπον, καὶ οἱ τάφοι δὲ οἱ

[58] An otherwise unattested Persian king. It could perhaps refer to Darius II (424-404), whose dates would closely match up with the eighty-eight years from the Eretrians' capture.

ἀρχαῖοι σφῶν "ὁ δεῖνα τοῦ δεῖνος" γεγράφαται, καὶ τὰ γράμματα Ἑλλήνων μέν, ἀλλ' οὔπω ταὐτά, *ibid.*).

Apollonius has the opportunity to play the role of city benefactor. He restores the ancient tombs and "poured libations and made offerings to them, as many as are customary" (χέασθαί τε καὶ ἐπενεγκεῖν σφισιν, ὁπόσα νόμιμα, *VA* 1.24). Later, after he has arrived in Babylon and befriended the Parthian king, he reconciles Vardanes with the Eretrians who reside there. When Vardanes presents Apollonius with ten gifts, he refuses and begins to give an account of the Eretrians, starting with Datis, Darius' admiral who sacked Eretria in 490 BCE. Apollonius asks that the Eretrians be allowed to enjoy the land given to them by Darius (*VA* 1.36). Vardanes responds:

> "Up until yesterday, the Eretrians," he said, "were enemies to me and my forefathers, since they once took up weapons against us. We ignored them, so that their race would be destroyed. But from here on, they will be registered as friends, and a good man will govern them, who will do their land justice."
>
> "Ἐρετριεῖς," εἶπεν, "ἐς μὲν τὴν χθὲς ἡμέραν ἐμοῦ τε πολέμιοι καὶ πατέρων ἐμῶν ἦσαν, ἐπειδὴ ὅπλων ποτὲ ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἦρξαν, καὶ παρεωρῶντο, ὡς τὸ γένος αὐτῶν ἀφανισθείη, λοιπὸν δὲ φίλοι τε ἀναγεγράψονται καὶ σατραπεύσει αὐτῶν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, ὃς δικαιώσει τὴν χώραν." (*ibid.*)

Robert Penella notes that "Vardanes expresses a hatred and scorn of them, the intensity of which is out of place five centuries after the Persian War."[59] Of course one can think of numerous instances where ethnic tensions have persisted over many centuries.[60] What is surprising about Vardanes' expression of hatred is not that it has existed for five hundred years but that it derives directly from Darius' initial hatred of the Eretrians. Philostratus represents a static and unchanging attitude towards this

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[59] Penella (1974): 296.

[60] Anti-Semitism particularly comes to mind. However, the difference between anti-Semitism and Vardanes' hatred of the Eretrians is that anti-Semitic feelings are constantly renewed and reappropriated in the contemporary historical situation. Vardanes' hatred of the Eretrians, however, is monumentalized in one act that occurred five centuries prior.

community starting from Darius and continuing all the way to Vardanes. He makes a highly rhetorical move that emphasizes the accomplishment of Apollonius in reconciling Vardanes with the Eretrians. In making this move, he places himself in a complex relationship with Herodotus. On the one hand, Apollonius justifies the Eretrians' claim to their land because Darius had given it to them, thus following the account of Herodotus. On the other hand, Vardanes' hatred of the Eretrians stems directly from Darius, whereas Herodotus' Darius ends his hatred of these people after they have been conquered. In fact, Darius settled the Eretrians in Cissia to mark the end of his hatred. The reconciliation between Vardanes and the Eretrians creates a split in historical memory. Remembering the past allows Apollonius to plead the Eretrians' case; breaking with the past makes Apollonius' accomplishment all the more impressive.

Vardanes displays an appreciation of Greek culture. Indeed, Vardanes' knowledge of Greek must be predicated upon actual contact with other Greeks instead of through indigenous learning. However, Rome still looms large in this region. Its power and influence over this region reveals itself twice. First, Philostratus notes that Roman ambassadors are the only individuals who do not have to obeisance to the statue of the king, signifying their exceptional status even in front of a king (*VA* 1.27). Second, Apollonius himself acknowledges Roman power. The governor of Syria sends an embassy to Vardanes, insisting that some of the villages around the Zeugma belong to Rome and not him (*VA* 1.38). Vardanes seeks Apollonius' counsel on the matter and notes that the villages had been given to his ancestors by Antiochus and Seleucus themselves (*ibid.*). He remarks that the Romans "as if they have forgotten this

completely are undertaking a new injustice" (οἱ δ' ὥσπερ ἐκλαθόμενοι τούτου καινῶν τε καὶ ἀδίκων ἅπτονται, *VA* 1.38). Past and present collide in this conflict. Vardanes' claim to the land comes from an act of generosity dating back to the Hellenistic kingdoms. The Romans' competing claim depends upon the reach of their present power. Apollonius advises the king to cede to the Romans' demands. Apollonius replies, "My lord, it is tolerable (*metrios*) and fair (*epieikēs*) if they prefer to receive with your consent what, being in their own territory, they could take without it" ("μέτριος, ὦ βασιλεῦ," ἔφη, "καὶ ἐπιεικής, εἰ, ἃ δύνανται καὶ ἄκοντος ἔχειν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν ὄντα, βούλονται παρ' ἑκόντος εὑρίσκεσθαι μᾶλλον," *ibid.*). Apollonius must acknowledge the power of the Roman Empire, and while their claim might not be "to the letter of the law," which *epiekēs* suggests, it is still "within limit." His language is deliberate; he accepts their actions as tolerable but does not go so far as to praise them for not resorting to warfare.

3. To Taxilla: Apollonius' Mythic and Historic Journey

After staying in Babylon for one year and eight months, Apollonius and Damis continue their journey to India with provisions and a guide presented to them by Vardanes (*VA* 1.41-2.1). As he travels eastward, Apollonius continually discovers monuments to Greek culture. Through references to Greek mythology and Alexander's Indian conquests, Philostratus entwines India into the mythological and historical traditions of Greece.

Apollonius reaches the Caucasus mountain range at the start of the second book.[61] Philostratus follows the geography of the Alexander historians, who also named the Indian mountain range the Caucasus. The "flatterers" of Alexander, according to Strabo, "transferred the Caucasus into the region of the Indian mountains and of the eastern sea which lies near those mountains from the mountains which lie above Colchis and Euxine" (οἷον τὸ τὸν Καύκασον μετενεγκεῖν εἰς τὰ Ἰνδικὰ ὄρη καὶ τὴν πλησιάζουσαν ἐκείνοις ἑῴαν θάλατταν ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπερκειμένων τῆς Κολχίδος καὶ τοῦ Εὐξείνου ὀρῶν, 11.5.5; tr. Jones).[62] The myths associated with the Caucasus, particularly the punishment of Prometheus, "led writers to suppose that they would be doing the king a favor if they transferred the name Caucasus to India" (χαριεῖσθαί τι τῷ βασιλεῖ ὑπέλαβον τοὔνομα τοῦ ὄρους μετενέγκαντες εἰς τὴν Ἰνδικήν, *ibid.*). Strabo highlights the "false" geography being promulgated by those seeking to venerate the deeds of Alexander. Philostratus follows the model of the Alexander historians for precisely the reason Strabo suggests. He seeks not only to venerate Apollonius but also to weave India into Greek mythological history. Through the story of Prometheus' punishment, Philostratus makes India into the location of an originary moment in human history.

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[61] Philostratus states that "we should consider [the Caucasus] as the origin of the Taurus, which runs through Armenia and Cilicia to Pamphylia and Mycale. Here it ends at the sea where the Carians live, which should be considered the end of the Caucasus, and not, as others say, the beginning" (τὸ δὲ ὄρος τοῦτο ἀρχὴν ποιώμεθα Ταύρου τοῦ δι' Ἀρμενίας τε καὶ Κιλίκων ἐπὶ Παμφύλους καὶ Μυκάλην στείχοντος, ἣ τελευτῶσα ἐς θάλατταν, ἣν Κᾶρες οἰκοῦσι, τέρμα τοῦ Καυκάσου νομίζοιτ' ἄν, ἀλλ' οὐχ, ὡς ἔνιοί φασιν, ἀρχή, *VA* 2.2). The others to whom he refers include Strabo, who specifically places the beginning of the Taurus in Caria and Lycia (11.12.2). Philostratus goes further in his geographic rewriting by doubling the Taurus: "By means of a second Taurus, the Caucasus surrounds all of Scythia which shares a border with India" (περιβάλλει δὲ Ταύρῳ ἑτέρῳ καὶ τὴν ὅμορον τῇ Ἰνδικῇ Σκυθίαν πᾶσαν, *VA* 2.2). He concludes by stating that "the Caucasus divides the Indian and Median lands, but comes down to the Red Sea by another bend" (ὁ δὲ Καύκασος ὁρίζει μὲν τὴν Ἰνδικήν τε καὶ Μηδικήν, καθήκει δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν Ἐρυθρὰν θάλατταν ἑτέρῳ ἀγκῶνι, *VA* 2.2). Strabo, on the other hand, locates the Caucasus in the isthmus between the Euxine and Caspian Seas (11.2.15). Philostratus extends the Caucasus to form a border against the entire eastern portion of the world, namely India.

[62] On this transference, see Stoneman (1994), esp. 99-102.

> Myths are told by the barbarians about the mountain, which even the Greeks sing in their poems, that Prometheus was bound there because of his love of man. Another Heracles, for they do not mean the Theban, could not bear this and shot down the bird whom Prometheus nourished with his entrails.
>
> μυθολογεῖται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων τὸ ὄρος, ἃ καὶ Ἕλληνες ἐπ' αὐτῷ ᾄδουσιν, ὡς Προμηθεὺς μὲν ἐπὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ δεθείη ἐκεῖ, Ἡρακλῆς δὲ ἕτερος, οὐ γὰρ τὸν Θηβαῖόν γε βούλονται, μὴ ἀνάσχοιτο τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τοξεύσειε τὸν ὄρνιν, ὃν ἔβοσκεν ὁ Προμηθεὺς τοῖς σπλάγχνοις. (*VA* 2.3)

Philostratus borrows from the Alexander historians in both relocating the Caucasus to India and placing the punishment of Prometheus on the borders of India. He thus marks Apollonius' arrival into Indian space with a myth located in the farthest reaches of antiquity. Prior to arriving in India proper, Apollonius must cross not merely an ancient space, but *the most ancient* of spaces, one associated with the very beginnings of human history. Just as in the case of the Eretrians and Vardanes, Philostratus collapses the distance between the past and the present. The tribes "living by the Caucasus consider the bird, an eagle, hateful" (τὸν δὲ ὄρνιν τὸν ἀετὸν οἱ τῷ Καυκάσῳ προσοικοῦντες ἐχθρὸν ἡγοῦνται, *VA* 1.3) and hunt the eagle "saying that they are avenging Prometheus, to such an extent do they give way to the myth" (τιμωρεῖν τῷ Προμηθεῖ φάσκοντες· ὧδε γὰρ τοῦ μύθου ἥττηνται, *ibid.*).[63] The past and the present are indistinguishable through the depiction of the Caucasus.

Apollonius continues to encounter the mythic history of Greece after he crosses the Caucasus and the river Cophen. After crossing the river, they enter the land ruled by the Indian king Phraotes (*VA* 2.8). Immediately, they come upon Mount Nysa, finding there a temple of Dionysus:

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[63] Though the eagle has been associated with Prometheus' punishment since Hesiod (*Theog.* 523-525), one can't help but wonder if Philostratus makes an allusion to the Roman standard.

> They say they happened upon a temple of Dionysus, which Dionysus erected for himself, with laurel trees surrounding it in a circle, covering as much of the land as is sufficient for a moderate temple. He also surrounded the ivy and grape vines with laurels, and inside he set up a statue of himself, knowing that time would make the trees grow together and would provide a kind of roof from them . . . The statue resembles an Indian youth and is carved out of white stone.
>
> ἀνελθόντες οὖν ἱερῷ Διονύσου ἐντυχεῖν φασιν, ὃ δὴ Διόνυσον ἑαυτῷ φυτεῦσαι δάφναις περιεστηκυίαις κύκλῳ, τοσοῦτον περιεχούσαις τῆς γῆς, ὅσον ἀπόχρη νεῷ ξυμμέτρῳ, κιττόν τε περιβαλεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ ἀμπέλους ταῖς δάφναις, ἄγαλμά τε ἑαυτοῦ ἔνδον στήσασθαι γιγνώσκοντα ὡς ξυμφύσει τὰ δένδρα ὁ χρόνος καὶ δώσει τινὰ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὄροφον . . . τὸ δὲ ἄγαλμα εἴκασται μὲν ἐφήβῳ Ἰνδῷ, λίθου δὲ ἔξεσται λευκοῦ. (*VA* 2.8)

The temple contains all the traditional icons of Dionysus, including the laurel tree, grape-vines, and ivy. Since Dionysus is said to have built the temple himself, it comes from the farthest antiquity, stretching back into the mythic history of Greece. Though Dionysus had been long considered a foreign god assimilated into the Greek pantheon, here Dionysus specifically becomes an Indian.

Philostratus provides three stories about Dionysus' relationship to India: the Greek version, the first Indian version (told by those living by the Caucasus and the river Cophen), and the second Indian version, (told by those living beyond the Indus and Hydraotes and the land reaching to the Ganges). Philostratus orders the three stories in a movement from east to west. The Greeks "say that the Theban Dionysus travelled to the Indians as both a general and a Bacchant" (ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ τὸν Θηβαῖον ἐπ' Ἰνδοὺς ἐλάσαι φαμὲν στρατεύοντά τε καὶ βακχεύοντα, *VA* 2.9). The Greek version venerates Dionysus' military and religious victory over the Indians. Philostratus adduces a dedication at Delphi of a disc made of Indian silver to support the veracity of the Greek story. The first group of Indians say, "that he was an Assyrian visitor, who came knowing the deeds of the Theban" (ἐπηλύτην Ἀσσύριον αὐτόν φασιν ἐλθεῖν τὰ τοῦ Θηβαίου εἰδότα, *ibid.*). The first Indian story implicitly denies that the Theban Dionysus ever reached India.

However, the Assyrian appropriates the Theban's knowledge, thereby revealing that he is a mere imitation of the original.

The second group of Indians offer a completely different story:

> They say that Dionysus was born the son of the river Indus. The famous Theban, after having visited him, took up the thyrsus and established the orgies. Having said that he was the son of Zeus and had lived in his father's thigh in order to come to birth, the Theban obtained from him mount Meros, to which Nysa ascends. In honor of [the Indian] Dionysus, he planted a slip of a grapevine which he brought from Thebes on Nysa, where Alexander held celebrations.
>
> Διόνυσον γενέσθαι ποταμοῦ παῖδα Ἰνδοῦ λέγουσιν, ᾧ φοιτήσαντα τὸν ἐκ Θηβῶν ἐκεῖνον θύρσου τε ἅψασθαι καὶ δοῦναι ὀργίοις, εἰπόντα δέ, ὡς εἴη Διὸς καὶ τῷ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐμβιῴη μηρῷ τόκου ἕνεκα, Μηρόν τε εὑρέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ ὄρος, ᾧ προσβέβηκεν ἡ Νῦσα, καὶ τὴν Νῦσαν τῷ Διονύσῳ ἐκφυτεῦσαι ἀπάγοντα ἐκ Θηβῶν τὸ γόνυ τῆς ἀμπέλου, οὗ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ὀργιάσαι. (*VA* 2.9)

The second group of Indians proposes two individuals named Dionysus. The original was an Indian god, born of the river Indus. The Theban Dionysus took up the thyrsus and established his revelries only after having visited the Indian Dionysus. Both acts imply that objects and rites traditionally associated with Dionysus originated in India. Mount Meros itself is a gift given to the Theban Dionysus from the Indian. The divinity of the Indian Dionysus is unquestionable, whereas the Theban Dionysus merely reports his divine parentage. The one aspect of Dionysus that is authentically Greek is the grapevine. Given Apollonius' negative opinion of alcohol, it is not surprising that the grapevine remains attached to the Greek mythology. Though Apollonius considers wine a pure drink (τὸν οἶνον καθαρὸν μὲν ἔφασκεν εἶναι πῶμα, *VA* 1.8), "it unsettles the mental balance, muddying the ether in the soul" (ἐναντιοῦσθαι δὲ τῇ τοῦ νοῦ συστάσει διαθολοῦντα τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αἰθέρα, *ibid.*). The grapevine is a gift from the Theban Dionysus in honor of the Indian Dionysus. Furthermore, the Theban Dionysus has no militaristic motive to travel to India; his is purely a spiritual quest, thereby providing a

model for Apollonius' own journey. Overall, the second Indian story provides a hierarchy in which the Theban is a disciple of the Indian.

Philostratus provides no commentary on these three stories, but one can still ascertain their relative truth-value. The Greek and second Indian versions are given the most space and are the most developed. The first Indian version is a mere sentence. Philostratus provides a full Greek version of the story, complete with evidence that corroborates its truth, partly because his Greek audience would have been the most familiar with this version and would expect this version to be included in any discussion of Dionysus in India. The second Indian version provides a counterpoint to the Greek story. In this account, Philostratus replaces militarism with spirituality, an important move in a biography about a pagan holy man. The story also derives from people who live beyond the Indus and up to the Ganges. As I shall demonstrate in the next section, this space has never been reached by a Greek and preserves "pure" Hellenism. Essentially, the second Indian story comes from the Brahmans, and since they are Apollonius' ultimate teachers, their narrative is the one Philostratus privileges.

Philostratus marks Apollonius' entrance into the Indian lands through two encounters with Greek mythology, thereby entwining the Indian land into the Greek mythological system. His privileging of the second Indian version of the Dionysus story further allows him to represent Greece's indebtedness to India.

Philostratus ends the second Indian story of Dionysus with a reference to Alexander. He makes a seamless transition from mythology to Hellenistic history. However, just as he rewrote the Dionysus myth, he introduces the story of Alexander in

Nysa in order to provide a different version, one based on the direct reports of the Nyseans.

> Those inhabiting Nysa say that Alexander did not ascend the mount. Though he started to, since he was ambitious and unable to resist antiquarian lore, he feared that the Macedonians, having come to grapevines, which they had not seen for some time, would be overcome by a desire for those left at home or regain their desire for wine after having grown accustom to water. So he passed by Nysa, after praying to Dionysus and making sacrifices. I know that writing these things will not be pleasing to some, but those campaigning with Alexander did not write down these things with regard to the truth. But at least for me, there is need for the truth. If these writers had respected it, they would not have deprived Alexander of this praise. For rather than ascending the mountain and holding a reveal, which these writers say, I consider it a greater deed not to have ascended the mountain for the sake of the endurance of the army.
>
> οἱ δὲ τὴν Νῦσαν οἰκοῦντες οὔ φασι τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἀνελθεῖν ἐς τὸ ὄρος, ἀλλ' ὁρμῆσαι μέν, ἐπειδὴ φιλότιμός τε ἦν καὶ ἀρχαιολογίας ἥττων, δείσαντα δὲ μὴ ἐς ἀμπέλους παρελθόντες οἱ Μακεδόνες, ἃς χρόνου ἤδη οὐχ ἑωράκεσαν, ἐς πόθον τῶν οἴκοι ἀπενεχθῶσιν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν τινὰ οἴνου ἀναλάβωσιν εἰθισμένοι ἤδη τῷ ὕδατι, παρελάσαι τὴν Νῦσαν, εὐξάμενον τῷ Διονύσῳ καὶ θύσαντα ἐν τῇ ὑπωρείᾳ. καὶ γιγνώσκω μὲν οὐκ ἐς χάριν ταῦτα ἐνίοις γράφων, ἐπειδὴ οἱ ξὺν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ στρατεύσαντες οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἐς τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀνέγραψαν, δεῖ δὲ ἀληθείας ἐμοὶ γοῦν, ἢν εἰ κἀκεῖνοι ἐπῄνεσαν, οὐκ ἂν ἀφείλοντο καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ ἐγκωμίου τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον· τοῦ γὰρ ἀνελθεῖν ἐς τὸ ὄρος καὶ βακχεῦσαι αὐτόν, ἃ ἐκεῖνοι λέγουσι, μεῖζον, οἶμαι, τὸ ὑπὲρ καρτερίας τοῦ στρατοῦ μηδὲ ἀναβῆναι. (*VA* 2.9)

Philostratus accomplishes two things in this passage. First, he rewrites Alexander's history to emphasize his adherence to endurance, one of the virtues Apollonius transports with him when crossing the Zeugma. In Philostratus' history, Alexander is a paradigm of Greek culture and virtue. He has interest in antiquity but cares more about the endurance of his army than his own personal curiosity. Second, Philostratus equates Apollonius' journey to India with Alexander's. This equation works again to "normalize" India within Greek history. Joining Apollonius to a select group of Greeks who have journeyed to India negates the part of the accusation of magic that relates to his associations with India. Moreover, Apollonius surpasses Alexander in that he is capable of ascending Nysa, whereas Alexander had to avoid it.

4. Taxilla: The Limits of Empire and the Limits of Hellenism

Apollonius continues to encounter traces of Alexander's conquest as he reaches Taxilla, the seat of the Indian king. In Taxilla, Apollonius sees a temple with paintings of Alexander and Porus. Philostratus comments on what is depicted:

> The character of the painting was also pleasing. For, though Porus had dedicated them after the death of the Macedonian, in them the Macedonian is the victor. He gains the friendship of the wounded Porus and he presents him with the Indian land, since it was now his own. Porus is said to have mourned Alexander's death and to have lamented the king as a noble and good man. When Alexander was alive, after his departure from the Indian land, Porus neither said anything like a king, although Alexander allowed this, nor did he order the Indians around, but as a satrap, he was full of moderation and did everything for the favor of this man.
>
> ἡδὺ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἦθος τῆς γραφῆς· ἀναθεὶς γὰρ ταῦτα μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Μακεδόνος τελευτὴν ὁ Πῶρος νικᾷ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁ Μακεδὼν καὶ τὸν Πῶρον ἀνακτᾶται τετρωμένον καὶ δωρεῖται τὴν Ἰνδικὴν ἑαυτοῦ λοιπὸν οὖσαν. Λέγεται δὲ καὶ πενθῆσαι τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἀποθανόντα ὁ Πῶρος ὀλοφύρασθαί τε ὡς γενναῖον καὶ χρηστὸν βασιλέα, ζῶντός τε Ἀλεξάνδρου μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἰνδικῆς ἀναχώρησιν μήτε εἰπεῖν τι ὡς βασιλεὺς καίτοι ξυγχωροῦντος, μήτε προστάξαι τοῖς Ἰνδοῖς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ σατράπης σωφροσύνης μεστὸς εἶναι καὶ πράττειν ἐς χάριν τὴν ἐκείνου πάντα. (*VA* 2.20)

The painting reminds the reader that the Indian land was for a moment held under Greek power. However, militarism is once again placed aside. Though Alexander had conquered the part of India where Apollonius now stands, he had returned it to the Indians in an act of friendship. Alexander gives the land to Porus when he is already wounded. This merciful act wins him Porus' eternal friendship and respect. Alexander is once again depicted as a model of Greek virtue. Though Porus gains back the Indian lands, he continues to rule it as a satrap, acknowledging Greek rule over India. Philostratus further describes Porus as "full of moderation" (σωφροσύνης μεστὸς), once again giving the Indian a characteristically Greek virtue.

Taxilla is a place once conquered by the Greeks and ruled by an Indian with Greek virtue. This remains true when Apollonius arrives at the city. Even the city's topography recalls Greece. The city "is symmetrically fortified, like a Greek city"

(τετειχίσθαι δὲ ξυμμέτρως, ὥσπερ αἱ Ἑλλάδες, *VA* 2.20) and the city "was divided into orderly and Attic-style narrows" (ὡς εὐτάκτως τε καὶ Ἀττικῶς τοὺς στενωποὺς τέτμηται, *VA* 2.23). The palace is simply laid out, and "they admired this order rather than the extravagance in Babylon" (τὸν κόσμον τοῦτον ἀγασθῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ ἐν Βαβυλῶνι φλεγμαίνοντα, *VA* 2.25). Based on the design of Taxilla and the simplicity of the palace, "the Indian seemed to Apollonius to be a philosopher" (ἔδοξεν οὖν τῷ Ἀπολλωνίῳ φιλοσοφεῖν ὁ Ἰνδὸς, *VA* 2.26). Apollonius asks whether moderation was introduced by the king or is the custom of the land. The king responds, "We are moderate by custom, and I observe it even more moderately" ("σωφρόνως," ἔφη, "νενομισμένῳ σωφρονέστερον χρῶμαι," *ibid.*). Phraotes, the king, continues to explain his philosophical lifestyle, which includes abstention from eating meat (*ibid*).

When Apollonius first meets Phraotes, he speaks to him through an interpreter. Nevertheless, Phraotes displays Greek cultural values through his practice of moderation, and philosophical values through his abstention from animal food. Just as shared Greek language created the friendship between Apollonius and Vardanes in Babylon, so too does it function for Apollonius and Phraotes. Phraotes orders the interpreter to leave and asks Apollonius in Greek if he will make him a "drinking partner" (συμπότην, *VA* 2.27). Apollonius marvels at Phraotes' knowledge of Greek. More marvelous is the king's knowledge of Greek symposiastic culture. Later, the reader learns that the king "trained himself in the javelin and discus after the Greek manner" (ἀκοντίῳ τε καὶ δίσκῳ τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν τρόπον ἑαυτὸν ἐξήσκει, *ibid.*). At one point, Phraotes even refers to reading *The Children of Heracles* (*VA* 2.32). The king appears Greek in his fluency of language, in his philosophical way of life, in his athletic practices, and even in his choice of

literature. However, when Apollonius asks the king why he did not speak Greek from the beginning, the king responds:

> "I feared," he said, "to seem bold, neither 'knowing myself,' nor that to Fate it seems good that I be a barbarian. But having yielded to you, since I see that you delight in me, I could not hide my true self, that I am competent in the language of the Greeks, which I will reveal in many ways."
>
> "ἔδεισα," ἔφη, "θρασὺς δόξαι μὴ γιγνώσκων ἐμαυτόν, μηδ' ὅτι βάρβαρον εἶναί με δοκεῖ τῇ τύχῃ, σοῦ δὲ ἡττηθείς, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὲ ὁρῶ ἐμοὶ χαίροντα, οὐκ ἠδυνήθην ἐμαυτὸν κρύπτειν, ὡς δὲ μεστός εἰμι τῆς Ἑλλήνων φωνῆς, ἐν πολλοῖς δηλώσω." (*VA* 2.27)

Of all the characters Apollonius has met thus far, Phraotes displays the most Greek cultural learning; he even knows the famous Greek maxim "know thyself." Nevertheless, he considers his fate to be a barbarian. For Phraotes, the cultural markers of Greek identity, so important in the Second Sophistic, are irrelevant when compared to racial descent.

Apollonius' movement eastward correlates with a movement backwards in time. His encounters with famous moments in Greek mythology and history are coupled with archaic notion of ethnicity. Phraotes, living further east than Antioch and thus further back in time, does not have to deal with the realities of the Roman Empire.

This regressive movement, however, also involves a shift to when ethnicity was based solely upon racial descent. Phraotes' knowledge of Greek language and culture cannot supersede his barbarian identity. In contrast, Damis, whom Apollonius met in Antioch (i.e. further west than Taxilla), understands the transformative power of culture. During an interview with the Brahmans, Damis explains:

> I thought by accompanying him I would seem a wise man instead of a common and unwise one, cultured instead of a barbarian, and in his company and sharing his pursuits I would see the Indians and I would see you [the Brahmans], and I would have dealings with Greeks, having become a Greek by him

> ξυγγενόμενος αὐτῷ σοφὸς μὲν ᾠήθην δόξειν ἐξ ἰδιώτου τε καὶ ἀσόφου, πεπαιδευμένος δὲ ἐκ βαρβάρου, ἑπόμενος δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ ξυσπουδάζων ὄψεσθαι μὲν Ἰνδούς, ὄψεσθαι δὲ ὑμᾶς, Ἕλλησί τε ἐπιμίξειν Ἕλλην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενόμενος. (*VA* 3.43)

Unlike Phraotes, Damis understands the transformative power of Greek culture. Merely by associating with Apollonius, he believes that he can become Greek. The use of the term *pepaideumenos*, frequently applied to the sophists of this period, situates Damis in the world of the Second Sophistic. Phraotes exists elsewhere, in a place where culture does not transcend racial descent.

Philostratus presents Taxilla as a former part of Alexander's Empire, as discussed above and further evidenced by the statues of Alexander and Porus described at *VA* 2.24. Apollonius nevertheless expresses astonishment at Phraotes' command of Greek language and philosophy. He asks, "How is it that you have such a command of the Greek language, and from where did your philosophy come here? For I do not think that you will appeal to your teachers, since it is unlikely that there are any teachers of this in India" (πόθεν οὕτως ἔχεις φωνῆς Ἑλλάδος φιλοσοφία τε ἡ περὶ σὲ πόθεν ἐνταῦθα; οὐ γὰρ ἐς διδασκάλους γε οἶμαι ἀναφέρειν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ εἶναί τινας ἐν Ἰνδοῖς εἰκὸς διδασκάλους τούτου, *VA* 2.29). Apollonius considers the existence of Greek language and culture an anomaly in India. Phraotes explains that his father, who lost his kingdom to usurpers, was sent to the Brahmans at a young age. They "gave him a share of their own wisdom and willingly educated him" (προσδοῦναί οἱ τῆς αὐτῶν σοφίας καὶ προθύμως ἐπαίδευον, *VA* 2.31). Phraotes' father in turn gave him a Greek education and brought him to the Brahmans, "who accept anyone knowing the Greek language and are especially fond of them, as they are already akin to them [the Brahmans] since they share a common

character" (οὓς γὰρ ἂν ὑποδέξωνται τὴν Ἑλλήνων φωνὴν εἰδότας, ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐς τὸ ὁμόηθες αὐτοῖς ἤδη προσήκοντας, *ibid.*).[64]

Phraotes reveals to Apollonius that Greek is in fact not indigenous to Taxilla. Greek learning comes not from Greece but from further east in the land of the Brahmans. Apollonius mistakes these "wise ones" (Phraotes never specifically labels them Brahmans in his story) for a group of sages who, after being conquered by Alexander, philosophized about heaven.[65] Phraotes corrects Apollonius' misconception:

> "Those were the Oxydrakae," he said, "and this tribe acts like free men and always prepare for war. They say that they pursue wisdom but do not know the good. The truly wise men lie between the Hyphasis and Ganges, and Alexander did not reach this land, not because he feared what is in this land but, I think, because the sacrifices were unpropitious for him. But even if he did cross the Hyphasis and was able to seize the land surrounding them, he would never have subdued the castle, where these men live, even if he had ten thousand Achilles and thirty thousand Ajaxes. For they do not fight those approaching, but they drive them away by hurling thunder and lightning, since they are divine and loved by the gods.
>
> "Ὀξυδράκαι," ἔφη, "ἐκεῖνοι ἦσαν, τὸ δὲ ἔθνος τοῦτο ἐλευθεριάζει τε ἀεὶ καὶ πολεμικῶς ἐξήρτυται, σοφίαν τε μεταχειρίζεσθαί φασιν οὐδὲν χρηστὸν εἰδότες· οἱ δὲ ἀτεχνῶς σοφοὶ κεῖνται μὲν τοῦ Ὑφάσιδος καὶ τοῦ Γάγγου μέσοι, τὴν δὲ χώραν ταύτην οὐδὲ ἐπῆλθεν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος, οὔτι που τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ δείσας, ἀλλ', οἶμαι, τὰ ἱερὰ ἀπεσήμηνεν αὐτῷ. εἰ δὲ καὶ διέβη τὸν Ὕφασιν καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοὺς γῆν ἠδυνήθη ἑλεῖν, ἀλλὰ τήν γε τύρσιν, ἣν ἐκεῖνοι κατοικοῦσιν, οὐδ'ἂν μυρίους μὲν Ἀχιλλέας, τρισμυρίους δὲ Αἴαντας ἄγων ποτὲ ἐχειρώσατο· οὐ γὰρ μάχονται τοῖς προσελθοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ διοσημίαις τε καὶ σκηπτοῖς βάλλοντες ἀποκρούονται σφᾶς ἱεροὶ καὶ θεοφιλεῖς ὄντες." (*VA* 2.33)

Phraotes highlights both the unique nature of the Brahmans and Alexander's failure to reach them. Philostratus had previously characterized Alexander as a philosopher-conqueror. He showed a concern for endurance in choosing not to ascend Nysa, and he showed moderation in sparing Porus' life and giving him back India. Phraotes reveals here that Alexander had failed in the ultimate quest for knowledge; he failed to reach the

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[64] It is during his stay with the Brahmans that Phraotes reads *The Children of Heracles* (*VA* 2.32). After Phraotes finishes telling his life story, Apollonius calls it "a true *Return of the Children of Heracles*" (*VA* 2.33).

[65] The story that Apollonius seems to be referencing is that of Alexander's interviews with the gymnosophists, recounted in Plutarch *Alexander* 54 and Arrian *Anabasis* 7.1-3. For a survey of Indian sages in the Alexander historians, see Appendix II.

Brahmans. He had merely captured imposters, whose claim to wisdom, according to Phraotes, is dubious at best. Moreover, the Brahmans are an unconquerable people due to their divinity and beloved status with the gods.

Apollonius stays with Phraotes for only three days, since this is the amount of time allotted by law for strangers to stay in the city (*VA* 2.23; *VA* 2.40). Two days' journey past Taxilla, they come across the plain where Alexander and Porus supposedly did battle (*VA* 2.42). After they cross the Hydraotes and Hyphasis rivers, they come to an altar and a bronze tablet. The altar is inscribed "To my father Ammon, my brother Heracles, Athena of Forethought, Olympian Zeus, the Cabiri of Samothrace, the Indian Sun, and Apollo of Delphi" (ΠΑΤΡΙ ΑΜΜΩΝΙ ΚΑΙ ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙ ΑΔΕΛΦΩΙ ΚΑΙ ΑΘΗΝΑΙ ΠΡΟΝΟΙΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΙ ΟΛΥΜΠΙΩΙ ΚΑΙ ΣΑΜΟΘΡΑΙΞΙ ΚΑΒΕΙΡΟΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΙΝΔΩΙ ΗΛΙΩΙ ΚΑΙ ΔΕΛΦΩΙ ΑΠΟΛΛΩΝΙ, *VA* 2.43). The tablet is inscribed "Alexander stopped here" (ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΣ ΕΝΤΑΥΘΑ ΕΣΤΗ, *ibid.*). Philostratus states that the altar was erected by Alexander to mark the limit of his empire, while the tablet was dedicated by the Indians who lived beyond the Hyphasis to express their pride that Alexander had gone no further. After Apollonius crosses these landmarks, he enters into a land beyond Alexander's Empire. The landmarks not only end the second book of the *VA* but they also set the limits of empire and the limits of the known. Past them lies a land into which no Greek has ever entered.

5. Paraca: Correctives in an Antique Land

Though the land of the Brahmans had never been reached by any Greek traveler prior to Apollonius, Philostratus populates the land with people who are profoundly Greek in

culture. When they arrive in Paraca, the land of the Brahmans, they are greeted by a messenger in Greek. Apollonius is not surprised by this since "all the inhabitants of the village spoke the Greek language" (τοὺς ἐν τῇ κώμῃ πάντας ἀπὸ Ἑλλήνων φθέγγεσθαι, *VA* 3.12). Language is the first marker of the Greek identity of Paraca, but Philostratus also makes note of the Pythagoreanism practiced by the Brahmans. The messenger invites Apollonius to the castle of the Brahmans, saying that "they themselves command it" (κελεύουσι γὰρ αὐτοί, *ibid.*). The use of the word *autoi* "seemed Pythagorean to Apollonius, and he followed happily" (τὸ μὲν δὴ αὐτοὶ Πυθαγόρειον ἤδη τῷ Ἀπολλωνίῳ ἐφάνη καὶ ἠκολούθει χαίρων, *VA* 3.13).[66] Even before formally introducing the Brahmans, Philostratus emphasizes their Greek language and practice of Greek philosophy.

Though Apollonius was surprised by Phraotes' knowledge of Greek, he is not at all surprised to find Greek in Paraca, the source of Phraotes' Greek education. However, the question of how the Brahmans came to learn Greek still remains. History can once again provide an answer. The movement eastward correlated with a movement into the past, so that Damis could understand the cultural construction of ethnicity, while Phraotes understood it purely on racial lines. Since Apollonius crosses the marker of Alexander's Empire at the end of book two, he has entered a land beyond the limits of Greek experience and Greek history. In reaching Paraca, Apollonius has entered a land that exists so far east that it even exists outside of the history of colonization and territorial and imperial expansion. This history is completely effaced and what remains is what is

[66] Christopher Jones (2005) *ad loc.* notes that Pythagoreans frequently used *autos* to refer to the sayings of Pythagoras.

natural to man himself. Paraca is a Golden Age utopia. Since Greek exists in an area untouched by Greeks and untouched by history, Philostratus suggests the superiority and priority of Greek language and culture, asserting its inherent existence in pure and wise men. The land of the Brahmans is Greece in its purest form. It neither exists because of the imperial conquests of Alexander nor is it bastardized through contact with Rome.

As with Taxilla, the topography of Paraca reflects its Greek identity. The hill where the Brahmans live is equated in height with the Acropolis at Athens (Τὸν δὲ ὄχθον, ἐφ' οὗ οἱ σοφοὶ ἀνῳκισμένοι εἰσίν, ὕψος μὲν εἶναι κατὰ τὴν Ἀθηναίων φασὶν ἀκρόπολιν, *VA* 3.13) and "natural rock surrounding it in a circle similarly fortifies it" (εὐφυᾶ δὲ ὁμοίως πέτραν ὀχυροῦν αὐτὸν κύκλῳ περιήκουσαν, *ibid.*). The Brahmans further "say that they live in the middle of India and they consider the mound the navel of this hill" (φασὶ δ' οἰκεῖν τὰ μέσα τῆς Ἰνδικῆς. καὶ τὸν ὄχθον ὀμφαλὸν ποιοῦνται τοῦ λόφου τούτου, *VA* 3.14). Philostratus explicitly equates Paraca with Athens and by referring to the mound as the *omphalos* he creates an implicit connection with Delphi. The Acropolis and the *omphalos* have been moved from Greece to the furthest reaches of India.

The allusion to Delphi adds a religious dimension to the Brahmans' Greek identity. In fact, Philostratus makes the allusion when Apollonius sees the statues of the gods worshipped by the Brahmans:

> They say that they happened upon statues of gods. There was nothing incredible if they were Indian or Egyptian, but they also saw the most ancient of gods worshiped by the Greeks. There were statues of Athena Polias, Apollo of Delos, and Dionysus of Limnae and of Amyclae, and all others of similar antiquity. These the Indians set up and worship with Greek rites.

> θεῶν δὲ ἀγάλμασιν ἐντυχεῖν φασιν, εἰ μὲν Ἰνδοῖς ἢ Αἰγυπτίοις, θαῦμα οὐδέν, τὰ δέ γε ἀρχαιότατα τῶν παρ' Ἕλλησι τό τε τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τῆς Πολιάδος. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ Δηλίου καὶ τὸ τοῦ Διονύσου τοῦ Λιμναίου καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἀμυκλαίου καὶ ὁπόσα ὧδε ἀρχαῖα, ταῦτα ἱδρύεσθαί τε τοὺς Ἰνδοὺς τούτους καὶ νομίζειν Ἑλληνικοῖς ἤθεσι. (*VA* 3.14)

Philostratus once again makes a movement backwards in time to the most archaic moments of Greek history. By placing the most ancient gods in Paraca, Philostratus implies that their cults originated there; India is highlighted as the source of Greek culture. Moreover, the specific gods mentioned create an imaginary map of Archaic Greece by invoking the places to which they are associated: Athena Polias to Athens, Apollo of Delos to Ionia, and Dionysus of Limnae and Amyclae to Sparta. Attica, Ionia, and the Peloponnese all come together to form a singular Greek religious identity in Paraca.

Delphi plays another important role in constructing the Brahmans' Greek identity. The famous maxim of "know thyself" found at Delphi is a fundamental tenet of the Brahmans' philosophy. Apollonius asks Iarchas, the leader of the Brahmans, if they had self-knowledge, "thinking that he, like the Greeks, would consider that to know oneself is a difficult thing" (οἰόμενος αὐτόν, ὥσπερ Ἕλληνες, χαλεπὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ ἑαυτὸν γνῶναι, *VA* 3.18). Iarchas surprises Apollonius by replying, "We know everything because we first know ourselves. Not one of us would apply himself to this philosophy if he did not first know himself" ("ἡμεῖς," ἔφη, "πάντα γιγνώσκομεν, ἐπειδὴ πρώτους ἑαυτοὺς γιγνώσκομεν, οὐ γὰρ ἂν προσέλθοι τις ἡμῶν τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ ταύτῃ μὴ πρῶτον εἰδὼς ἑαυτόν," *ibid.*). In essence, Iarchas provides a major corrective to Greek philosophy by making that which is considered the hardest thing to achieve among the Greeks, self-knowledge, the starting point of their own philosophy.

Iarchas provides further correctives to Greek thought. Initially, he complicates a major point of Greek ethnography and geography by stating that the Ethiopians were originally from India. Traditional Greek geography places the Ethiopians and the Indians at the extreme limits of the world and conceives of these limits as utopian paradises.[67] However, Iarchas informs Apollonius that there was "a time when the Ethiopians, an Indian race, dwelt here, and when Ethiopia did not yet exist" ("ἦν τοίνυν," ἔφη, "χρόνος, ὅτ' Αἰθίοπες μὲν ᾤκουν ἐνταῦθα, γένος Ἰνδικόν, Αἰθιοπία δ'οὔπω ἦν," *VA* 3.20). However, when the Ethiopians slew their king, Ganges, "neither did they seem pure to the rest of the Indians, nor did the earth allow them to remain" (οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἰνδοῖς καθαροὶ ἔδοξαν, οὔτε ἡ γῆ ξυνεχώρει αὐτοῖς ἵστασθαι, *ibid.*).

Iarchas' revelation not only makes the Ethiopians subordinate to Indians but even labels them a flawed type of Indian, who lacks the ethical behavior found in the rest of the race. Once again, India is the source of an originary moment in human history; the geography and ethnography of the world as the Greeks conceive of it exists because of events in ancient Indian history. India also gains a primacy over Ethiopia as a utopian vista. Ethiopia is the land of exile, of defiled Indians, whereas India remains a land of purity and ethical behavior. Furthermore, the "fall" of the Ethiopians results in a movement from the east to the west, suggesting that that while time moves backwards when one travels east, civilization moves forward.[68]

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[67] Romm (1992), 38-41. For Ethiopia specifically, 49-60; For India, 82-120.

[68] Iarchas tells what amounts to the beginning of a colonization story. Carol Dougherty (1998) has suggested that colonization in Archaic Greece consisted of a murder, the exiling of the murderer, and the murderer seeking purification from Delphi in order to found a new colony. Iarchas provides the first two parts of this pattern. The Ethiopians murder their king and are exiled. However, they never receive purification, implying that their new "colony" will always be defiled and corrupted.

The Brahmans not only provide correctives to Greek thought but are even critical of the Greeks themselves. Iarchas finds Greek morality to be wanting and links the poor morality with their submission to the Roman Empire:

> "You seem to think," he said, "that not being unjust is justice, and I believe that all Greeks think this. For I once heard from the Egyptians who had come here that governors from Rome regularly come to you having raised their naked axes against you, not yet knowing if they rule bad men. But you say that they are just if they do not sell their justice."
>
> "ἔοικας," ἔφη, "τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν δικαιοσύνην ἡγεῖσθαι, τουτὶ δὲ οἶμαι καὶ πάντας Ἕλληνας· ὡς γὰρ ἐγώ ποτε Αἰγυπτίων δεῦρο ἀφικομένων ἤκουσα, φοιτῶσι μὲν ὑμῖν ἀπὸ τῆς Ῥώμης ἡγεμόνες γυμνὸν ἡρμένοι τὸν πέλεκυν ἐφ' ὑμᾶς, οὔπω γιγνώσκοντες, εἰ φαύλων ἄρξουσιν, ὑμεῖς δέ, εἰ μὴ πωλοῖεν τὰς δίκας οὗτοι, φατὲ αὐτοὺς δικαίους εἶναι." (*VA* 3.25)

Apollonius himself is subject to this criticism. Earlier, he had advised Vardanes to give up to the Romans land that had belonged to his line for generations. Apollonius believed that since the Romans did not use force in seeking this land, thereby acting moderately, Vardanes should give the land to them. The Romans were not being unjust, and Apollonius took this as justice. Iarchas would have considered this a completely foolish, if not unethical, act on Apollonius' part.

Iarchas continues by noting that this flawed conception of justice comes from the Greek misinterpretation of mythical figures:

> For Minos, who exceeded all men in cruelty and who enslaved both those living by the sea and on islands, they [the Greek poets] honor him with the scepter of justice and set him in Hades to judge souls. Yet for Tantalus, although he was a good man and gave a share of the immortality bestowed to him by the gods, they deny him food and drink. There are those who hang stones over him and terribly insult this godly and good man.
>
> τὸν γὰρ Μίνω τὸν ὠμότητι ὑπερβαλόμενον πάντας καὶ δουλωσάμενον ταῖς ναυσὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ τε καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ δικαιοσύνης σκήπτρῳ τιμῶντες ἐν Ἅιδου καθίζουσι διαιτᾶν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τὸν δ' αὖ Τάνταλον, ἐπειδὴ χρηστός τε ἦν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις τῆς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτῷ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀθανασίας μετεδίδου, ποτοῦ τε εἴργουσι καὶ σίτου. εἰσὶ δὲ οἳ καὶ λίθους αὐτῷ ἐπικρεμάσαντες δεινὰ ἐφυβρίζουσι θείῳ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ἀνδρί. (*VA* 3.25)

Iarchas' knowledge of Greek mythology is at this point not surprising, given how Philostratus represents so much of Greek culture to originate from India, though it

would still impress a Greek reader. Iarchas corrects traditional Greek views of justice by inverting the interpretation of the two characters. This passage would confuse a Greek audience, since Iarchas venerates Tantalus, one of the greatest sinners in Greek mythology, while scorning Minos. However, Iarchas reinterprets the myths so that Tantalus becomes the *exemplum* of philanthropic action while Minos becomes the *exemplum* of imperialistic pursuits. Greek acceptance of imperialism, whether that of Alexander or the Romans, has led them to a corrupted view of justice and a servile state.[69]

The criticism of Greek imperialism extends all the way back to Homer. Once again, Iarchas reinterprets a traditional story, but here he also provides an Indian alternative. He counterpoints the militarism of Achilles with the humanitarianism of Ganges, a former king of India:

> Since Homer brings Achilles to Troy because of Helen, and tells that he seized twelve cities by the sea and eleven on land, and that he flew into a rage when a woman was taken from him by the king, so that he showed himself to be merciless and cruel, let us examine an Indian facing similar things. Now he [King Ganges] became the founder of sixty cities, which are the most excellent of those in this land. There is no one who thinks destroying cities a better claim to fame than colonizing a city. He also repulsed the Scythians from above the Caucasus who once advanced with an army against this land. To be manifestly a good man by liberating your own country is by far better than to bring slavery to a city because of a woman, who was likely not unwilling to be carried off. Since he formed an alliance with the king of the country, which Phraotes now rules, and although that one most unlawfully and most lasciviously took away his wife, he did not break his oath, saying that he had so firmly sworn the oath that he would not harm him, even when he was wronged.

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[69] Alexander's own imperialism was not able to bring him to the Brahmans, nor could he have taken their castle, had he arrived there. It is only Apollonius, who makes friends and seeks to help those he encounters, who could penetrate the Brahman's castle.

> ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα Ὅμηρος ἄγει μὲν ὑπὲρ Ἑλένης ἐς Τροίαν, φησὶ δὲ αὐτὸν δώδεκα μὲν πόλεις ἐκ θαλάττης ᾑρηκέναι, πεζῇ δὲ ἕνδεκα, γυναῖκά τε ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως ἀφαιρεθέντα ἐς μῆνιν ἀπενεχθῆναι, ὅτε δὴ ἀτεράμονα καὶ ὠμὸν δόξαι, σκεψώμεθα τὸν Ἰνδὸν πρὸς ταῦτα· πόλεων μὲν τοίνυν ἑξήκοντα οἰκιστὴς ἐγένετο, αἵπερ εἰσὶ δοκιμώτατοι τῶν τῇδε, τὸ δὲ πορθεῖν πόλεις ὅστις εὐκλεέστερον ἡγεῖται τοῦ ἀνοικίζειν πόλιν οὐκ ἔστι. Σκύθας δὲ τοὺς ὑπὲρ Καύκασόν ποτε στρατεύσαντας ἐπὶ τήνδε τὴν γῆν ἀπεώσατο. τὸ δὲ ἐλευθεροῦντα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γῆν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεσθαι πολλῷ βέλτιον τοῦ δουλείαν ἐπάγειν πόλει καὶ ταῦθ'ὑπὲρ γυναικός, ἣν εἰκὸς μηδὲ ἄκουσαν ἡρπάσθαι. ξυμμαχίας δὲ αὐτῷ γενομένης πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς χώρας, ἧς νῦν Φραώτης ἄρχει, κἀκείνου παρανομώτατά τε καὶ ἀσελγέστατα γυναῖκα ἀφελομένου αὐτὸν οὐ παρέλυσε τοὺς ὅρκους, οὕτω βεβαίως ὀμωμοκέναι φήσας, ὡς μηδὲ ὁπότε ἠδικεῖτο λυπεῖν αὐτόν. (*VA* 3.20)

By critiquing the Greek veneration of Homer, the Brahmans suggest a break from the Homeric model of heroism. The difference between the Greek *Iliad* and its Indian counterpart is that the former values the conquest of cities and offensive action, much in the same way Minos was also venerated for his imperialistic actions, while the latter values the establishment of cities and defensive action. It is this preference of colonizing over imperial aggression that points back to earlier periods of Greek history when the *oikistēs* were the most important heroes of the Greek world. However, the point when imperialism was placed above colonizing marks for the Brahmans the time when the Greek world turned down the wrong path, for it is easier to protect one city than to maintain an entire empire. The Brahmans' own history proves this, for they were capable of holding back Dionysus, Heracles, Alexander, and all others who had imperialistic designs on their land. On the other hand, Taxilla, the one-time seat of Porus' empire, fell to Alexander, whose own empire disintegrated shortly after his death. The veneration of Homer's militarism and imperialism is the source of the Greek ethical decay, and it is this ethical decay that is linked to their submission to the Roman Empire.

Travel to the land of the Brahmans allowed Apollonius to experience a spiritual transformation. At the same time, the account of this travel transforms the land itself

into a space of Greek culture. Apollonius' time with the Brahmans has improved him and helped him achieve spiritual maturity. After his stay with the Brahmans, Apollonius travels through Greece and territories of the Roman Empire, correcting Greek religious practices and critiquing Greek behavior. He is capable of doing this precisely because he has been educated in a space where the Roman Empire does not exist. The Hellenism that the Brahmans impart to him is a Hellenism uncompromised by the political realities of Rome. Damis even reflects that Apollonius "improved after meeting this Indian, and whenever he sat down to deliver a discourse, for he did this often, he resembled Iarchas" (ἐπιδοῦναι μετὰ τὸν Ἰνδὸν τοῦτον, καὶ ὅπου καθήμενος διαλέγοιτο, θαμὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἔπραττε, προσεοικέναι τῷ Ἰάρχᾳ, *VA* 3.36). Apollonius himself affects a transformation. Apollonius' fate as Hellenistic reformer and benefactor rests upon him first becoming a Brahman.

Chapter 3
What Wisdom Reveals: Apollonius and Foreknowledge

At the climax of the *VA*, Apollonius faces the emperor Domitian and delivers a long apology against several charges brought against him. The chief accusation is that he had performed human sacrifice in order to divine the future of the imperial line. His response to that charge follows:

> But to what a depth of folly and inconsequence should I have descended if I, when I have discoursed so much about divination and the manner in which it does or does not have strength, who understands better than anyone that the gods reveal their intentions to holy and wise men even when they are not practicing divination, made myself guilty of bloodshed, by meddling with the entrails of victims, as unacceptable to myself as they are ill-omened? After such deeds, the voice of my spiritual being (ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ὀμφὴ) would have deserted me as unclean.
>
> ἀνοίας δ' ἂν ποῖ ἤλαυνον,ἵνα πλεῖστα μὲν ὑπὲρ μαντικῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ ὅπη ἔρρωται ἢ μή, ἄριστα δ' ἀνθρώπων ἠσθημένος, ὅτι τὰς αὐτῶν βουλὰς οἱ θεοὶ τοῖς ὁσίοις τε καὶ σοφοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶ μὴ μαντευομένοις φαίνουσι, μιαιφονίας ἅπτωμαι καὶ σπλάγχνων ἀθύτων ἐμοὶ καὶ ἀκαλλιερήτων; ἐφ' οἷς ἀπέλιπεν ἄν με καὶ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ὀμφὴ μὴ καθαρὸν ὄντα. (*VA* 8.7.30)[1]

Apollonius' response introduces the complexity of his thought on divination, the second reason for the accusations of magic. While he expresses interest in *mantikē* (divination), his rhetoric reveals his repulsion by it. Ultimately, he states that wise and holy men receive divine revelation without divination. Philostratus' Apollonius relies on *prognōsis*, or foreknowledge, instead.[2] His accusers perceive his foreknowledge as "the Magian art" (*magōi technēi*, *VA* 1.2) and label him a *magos*.[3] For Philostratus, the stakes

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[1] I follow the subdivisions of Apollonius' Apology given by Jones (2005). (VA 8.7.1-50)

[2] I transliterate *prognōsis*, *sophos/sophia*, and *mantikē/manteia* due to their frequency in this chapter. All other quotations of Greek texts remain untransliterated.

[3] I render *magos* as "magos" or "Magian" instead of magician. For the magician as a fringe figure, see Graf (1997): 61-88, esp. 64. Recently, Sarah Iles Johnston (2008) has demonstrated that though "people apply the word 'magic' to practices that they consider to be abnormal or marginal – even illegal or immoral. . . . the practices in which magicians engage are often quite similar to those of 'mainstream' religion" (146). Despite the similarities between the practices of magic and religion, the accusation of magic still functions to marginalize a person within a society, as in the case of Apuleius. On magic in Roman law, see Graf, (ibid); Bradley (1997); Rives (2003); Collins (2008): 132-165.

of the defense remain Apollonius' claim to a Hellenic identity.[4] By focusing on the contexts and theory of *prognōsis* developed in the *VA*, I will show how Philostratus asserts Apollonius' Greek identity. Philostratus equates Apollonius to illustrious Greek thinkers of the Classical and Archaic age through the strategic use of historical *exempla*. He also constructs a theory of *prognōsis* that engages with the major issues of Middle Platonic physics and ethics and with Greek religious rituals. By relating Apollonius' foreknowledge to Hellenistic thought and culture, Philostratus effectively defends Apollonius against the charges of magic.

I. *Prognōsis* and Divination in *The Life of Apollonius*

I begin with a study of how the term *prognōsis* appears in Philostratus' text and argue that it is a discrete topic of interest for Apollonius. It allows for the same panoptic knowledge that divination provides. However, it is strictly separated from divination, which comes too near to magical practices. Philostratus goes to great lengths to insist

[4] Daniel Ogden (2007): 462 suggests that though Philostratus makes defending Apollonius the programmatic point of the opening chapters, the reader should take this point ironically given the fictionalizing nature of the narrative. However, it is hard to find irony in the programmatic second chapter, especially since Apollonius had already developed a negative reputation by Philostratus' time, a point Ogden himself admits. Ogden also does not account for the other passages in which Philostratus states his goal of educating the ignorant about Apollonius' life (*VA* 5.39; 6.35). Furthermore, one can explain the fictionalizing element of the biography without recourse to irony. The *bios* was not a completely stable genre in Greco-Roman antiquity and often overlapped the genres of history, encomium, philosophy, and religious teaching; see Burridge (2004): 59-67. A common theme in *bioi*, however, was the depiction of a famous individual as a paradigm of a certain set of cultural values. This gave the individuals portrayed static personalities; the *bios* represented an exemplamatic type of individual rather than a real individual whose character develops and changes through the course of his life. As stated by David Aune (1988): 110, "the idealistic approach to biographical writing combined with the rhetorical purpose in portraying the subject as a model of virtue inevitably led to distortion and the inclusion of an indeterminate amount of fictional elements." See further Momigliano (1971), Edwards and Swain (1997), and specifically on the *VA*, Swain (1999): 178-180.

that Apollonius is neither a diviner (*mantis*) nor practices divination (*mantikē*). He instead relates Apollonius' foreknowledge to wisdom (*sophia*).

Philostratus includes *prognōsis* as a specific topic on which Apollonius lectures and Damis records in his memoirs. Philostratus states that "Damis studied with Apollonius and recorded his journeys, on which he claims to have accompanied him, his opinions, his discourses, and whatever he said concerning foreknowledge" (οὗτος τῷ Ἀπολλωνίῳ προσφιλοσοφήσας ἀποδημίας τε αὐτοῦ ἀναγέγραφεν, ὧν κοινωνῆσαι καὶ αὐτός φησι, καὶ γνώμας καὶ λόγους καὶ ὁπόσα ἐς πρόγνωσιν εἶπε, *VA* 1.3).[5] Philostratus again mentions *prognōsis* as a topic of interest to Apollonius in his discourses with Iarchas, the leader of the Indian Brahmans. Philostratus introduces Iarchas' theory of *prognōsis*, which I will deal with in detail in a subsequent section, by stating that "a discussion concerning *prognōsis* once arose among them, because Apollonius was both dedicated to this wisdom and turned the majority of their discussions to this" (περὶ δὲ προγνώσεως λόγου αὐτοῖς ποτε ὄντος καὶ τοῦ

[5] Christopher Jones and F.C. Conybeare translate the entire phrase ὁπόσα ἐς πρόγνωσιν εἶπε as "predictions" and "prophecies" respectively. Their translations suggest an instrumental force to the phrase ἐς πρόγνωσιν, i.e. "whatever he said through his foreknowledge." ἐς, however, is only used in reference to place (direction towards), time (a certain limit or period), a non-temporal measure or limit, or a relation in regards to something. See *LSJ* s.v. ἐς, I (place); II (time); III (measure or limit); IV (relation in regards to). It is in the last sense that Philostratus uses ἐς. Philostratus thus refers not to the predictions or prophecies themselves, but rather to what Apollonius "said with regard to *prognōsis*." One can compare the given title of Philostratus' work to find the same use of ἐς: Τὰ ἐς τὸν Τυανέα Ἀπολλώνιον, best translates to *On Apollonius of Tyana*, as both Jaap-Jan Flinterman (forthcoming: n.1) and Christopher Jones (2005: 3 with n.1) himself notes. Here ἐς functions to indicate the subject matter of the work. In support of his translation of the title, Jones references *VA* 1.3, which mentions the four books of Moeragenes on Apollonius (οὐ γὰρ Μοιραγένει γε προσεκτέον βιβλία μὲν ξυνθέντι ἐς Ἀπολλώνιον τέτταρα). The use of ἐς πρόγνωσιν in the context of Damis' writings (ἀναγέγραφεν) further supports the reading of it as the subject matter about which Apollonius spoke and Damis recorded. Philostratus thus refers not to the predictions or prophecies themselves, but rather to Apollonius' discourses on *prognōsis*.

Ἀπολλωνίου προσκειμένου τῇ σοφίᾳ ταύτῃ καὶ τὰς πλείους τῶν διαλέξεων ἐς τοῦτο ξυντείνοντος, *VA* 3.42). It is worth noting that Philostratus already labels *prognōsis* as a type of wisdom.

One might expect *prognōsis* to refer to knowledge of the future, since the prefix *pro-*, when used with verbs, denotes "beforehand."[6] However, *prognōsis*, as it appears in the *VA*, has a panoptic range. It reveals any hidden knowledge, regardless of whether that knowledge refers to past, present, or future time. In regards to present time, Iarchas asks for the letter of recommendation from Phraotes, the Indian king of Taxilla, and mentions the singular letter missing in the epistle. Apollonius "marvels at the *prognōsis*" (θαυμάσαντος δὲ τοῦ Ἀπολλωνίου τὴν πρόγνωσιν, *VA* 3.16). Apollonius himself demonstrates knowledge of the past by knowing the sordid past of Timasion, the Egyptian youth who leads Apollonius and his companions to the Naked Ones of Egypt. "Apollonius pressed his question often, just as if he had not used any *prognōsis* in regards to him" (θαμὰ ἤρειδε τὴν ἐρώτησιν, ὥσπερ οὐδεμιᾷ προγνώσει ἐς αὐτὸν κεχρημένος, *VA* 6.3). He also uses *prognōsis* to reveal the future. When he is denied initiation into the mysteries of the Epidauria, "Apollonius states 'I will be inducted at a later time, and this man will induct me,' using *prognōsis* with regard to the next priest, who took over the temple after four years" (ὁ δὲ Ἀπολλώνιος "μυήσομαι" ἔφη "αὖθις, μυήσει δέ με ὁ δεῖνα" προγνώσει χρώμενος ἐς τὸν μετ' ἐκεῖνον ἱεροφάντην, ὃς μετὰ τέτταρα ἔτη τοῦ ἱεροῦ προΰστη, *VA* 4.18).

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[6] *LSJ* s.v. πρό, D.III.5. The *LSJ* specifically references "foresight," as in the verbs προνοέω and προοράω.

The panoptic nature of *prognōsis* makes it similar to divination (*mantikē*),[7] but, the three examples cited above reveal that *prognōsis* lacks any markers of traditional divinatory activity. Philostratus neither mentions a message sent directly from the divine, as in natural divinatory methods, nor the decoding of a sign embedded within nature, as in artificial divinatory methods. Apollonius' unique method of exercising foreknowledge has received scant attention in the scholarship on divination.[8] August Bouché-Leclerq, in the second volume of his compendious *Histoire de la divination dans l'antiquité*, is the first to categorize him specifically among the intuitive, i.e. natural, diviners (chresmologues). Bouché-Leclerq states that for Apollonius "the mantic enthusiasm is not a product of abrupt assaults or sudden ecstasies, but is often likened to a personal science and is constantly effective."[9] Later scholars of religion and philosophy have labeled him a prophet or theurgist, thereby avoiding the question of his divination.[10]

Scholars' difficulty interpreting Apollonius' foreknowledge stems from a lack of recognition of the terms used by Philostratus. Philostratus differentiates *prognōsis* from *manteia* in describing Apollonius' studies with the Brahmans. While Damis was present for certain discussions with them, he "says that Apollonius studied the sacred subjects

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[7] For divination as panoptic, consider Homer's Calchas, "the best seer by far / who knows what is, what will be, and what was" (οἰωνοπόλων ὄχ' ἄριστος, / ὃς ἤδη τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα, *Il.* 1.69-70).

[8] The notable recent exceptions are Flinterman (forthcoming) and Fromentin (1997). Both note the relationship between Apollonius' Pythagorean asceticism and his foreknowledge, which will be discussed below. Flinterman suggests that Philostratus had little interest in philosophical discourse and thus provides conflicting accounts of Apollonius' foreknowledge. These various accounts, according to Flinterman, can be linked to Philostratus' program of defending Apollonius. See particularly 10-17.

[9] Bouché-Leclerq (1879): 126, "chez Apollonios, l'enthousiasme mantique ne procède pas par brusques assautes, par extases soudaines, mais est souvent assimilé à une science personnelle et sans cesse agissante."

[10] Prophet, see Dillon (1996): 341, where he chooses not to include Apollonius of Tyana in his discussion of Neopythagoreanism, considering him "much more of a prophet than a philosopher." Theurgist, see Johnston (2008): 171.

alone with Iarchas, in which they considered astrology and studied *prognōsis*, and they engaged in sacrifices and invocations in which the gods delight" (τὰς δὲ ἀπορρήτους σπουδάς, αἷς ἀστρικὴν μαντείαν κατενόουν καὶ τὴν πρόγνωσιν ἐσπούδαζον θυσιῶν τε ἥπτοντο καὶ κλήσεων, αἷς θεοὶ χαίρουσι, μόνον φησὶν ὁ Δάμις τὸν Ἀπολλώνιον ξυμφιλοσοφεῖν τῷ Ἰάρχᾳ, *VA* 3.41). Philostratus separates astrology (ἀστρικὴν μαντείαν) from *prognōsis*, yet classifies both as "sacred pursuits" (ἀπορρήτους σπουδάς). The phrase "ἀπορρήτους σπουδάς" could suggest something secretive and forbidden, but the inclusion of sacrifices and invocations, specifically marked as things in which the gods delight, inflects the phrase positively. The category of "sacred pursuits" frames *prognōsis* and traditional divination both as theological topics, while the main verb (ξυμφιλοσοφεῖν) adds a philosophical dimension.

Despite these two shared characteristics, Philostratus ultimately separates *prognōsis* from divination. He names two works that Apollonius wrote based on his private interviews with Iarchas: "four books on astrology" (περὶ μαντείας ἀστέρων βίβλους τέτταρας, *VA* 3.41) and a work "on sacrifices, and how one should sacrifice appropriately and acceptably to each god" (περὶ θυσιῶν καὶ ὡς ἄν τις ἑκάστῳ θεῷ προσφόρως τε καὶ κεχαρισμένως θύοι, ibid.).[11] Though Philostratus finds the "On Sacrifices" (περὶ θυσιῶν) "in many temples, cites, and homes of wise men" (τὸ δὲ περὶ θυσιῶν ἐν πολλοῖς μὲν ἱεροῖς εὗρον, ἐν πολλαῖς δὲ πόλεσι, πολλοῖς δὲ ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν οἴκοις, ibid.), and continues to praise its compositional style, he quickly rejects the

[11] The περὶ θυσιῶν may be an authentic work of the historical Apollonius. At *VA* 4.19, Philostratus again mentions Apollonius discoursing on proper sacrifices to the gods. Porphyry likely quotes the περὶ θυσιῶν in *De Abstentia* 2.34.2. In *Praep. Evang.* 4.12-13, Eusebius specifically mentions Porphyry using Apollonius' work and provides a quote very similar to the one in *De Abstentia*. The Suda entry on Apollonius of Tyana (A 3420) further mentions the περὶ θυσιῶν as a work written by him

authenticity of the work on astrology. He "considers astrology and all similar divination beyond human nature" (τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἀστέρων καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην μαντικὴν πᾶσαν ὑπὲρ τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἡγοῦμαι φύσιν, ibid.). Astrology was a particularly suspect activity under the Roman Empire. Tacitus attests to at least two expulsions of astrologers from Rome, though it likely occurred at least ten times from the reign of Augustus to Domitian.[12] Tiberius, for example, executed foreign astrologers and diviners and exiled those who were Roman citizens.[13] Philostratus' haste reflects his desire to keep his protagonist far removed from any activity that one could construe as magical and subversive.

It is not merely astrology that is suspect in the *VA* but divination in general. During Apollonius' visit to Rome during the reign of Nero, a sickness came down upon the city. Apollonius had earlier stated that "something great is going to happen and not to happen" ("ἔσται τι," ἔφη, "μέγα καὶ οὐκ ἔσται," *VA* 4.43), predicting the thunderbolt that hits Nero's drinking cup. Upon hearing this, Tigellinus, the prefect of the Praetorian Guard, summons Apollonius to court "to answer a charge of impiety against Nero" (ὡς ἀπολογήσαιτο μὴ ἀσεβεῖν ἐς Νέρωνα, *VA* 4.44). Tigellinus asks Apollonius if he would perform a divination (μαντεύσαιο δ' ἄν; ibid.), to which Apollonius replies, "How can I, not being a diviner?" ("πῶς," εἶπεν, "ὅ γε μὴ μάντις ὤν;" ibid.). Tigellinus responds by asking if he had predicted the thunderbolt. Apollonius does not deny this but tells him not "to ascribe it to divination, but rather to the wisdom, which God reveals to wise men"

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[12] Tac. *Ann.* 2.32; 12.52; see further MacMullen (1966): 128-162.

[13] Cass. Dio. 57.15.7-8. Immediately prior to his execution and expulsion of astrologers, Tiberius takes the astrologer Thrasyllus as his own advisor and confidant. Tac. *Ann.* 6.21 and Suet. *Tib.* 14.4 suggest that Tiberius attempted to keep concealed his relationship with the astrologer. See further Dickie (2001): 195-196.

(τοῦτο δὲ μὴ μαντικῇ προστίθει, σοφίᾳ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἣν θεὸς φαίνει σοφοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ibid.). As if rehearsing for his later trial in front of Domitian, Apollonius rejects any claim to divinatory ability and ascribes his foreknowledge to wisdom.

II. Wisdom and Historical Exempla

The importance of wisdom to Philostratus' discussion of *prognōsis* can be seen as early as the programmatic second chapter of the book. In *VA* 1.2, wisdom takes first position, followed closely by the use of historical *exempla.* Philostratus applies historical *exempla* to establish both Apollonius' Hellenistic credentials and a relationship between wisdom and foreknowledge. Foreknowledge and wisdom, or *sophia*, are related terms in the *VA* that counterpoint divination. Philostratus creates an important relationship between *prognōsis* and wisdom that answers the accusations made against his protagonist. Apollonius' foreknowledge arises from wisdom, and not, as his accusers would have it, magic.

Philostratus asserts that Apollonius "applied himself to wisdom more divinely than Pythagoras" (θειότερον ἢ ὁ Πυθαγόρας τῇ σοφίᾳ προσελθόντα, *VA* 1.2). He continues by lamenting that "people do not yet know him for the truthful wisdom which he cultivated philosophically and virtuously" (οὔπω οἱ ἄνθρωποι γιγνώσκουσιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθινῆς σοφίας, ἣν φιλοσόφως τε καὶ ὑγιῶς ἐπήσκησεν, ibid.). He proceeds to discuss Apollonius' foreknowledge as coming from wisdom:

> Nor should the many presentiments and prognostications discredit Apollonius from this wisdom, or Socrates will be discredited by those things which he prognosticated from his spiritual being and Anaxagoras by those things which he foretold. . . . and while they credit these things to the wisdom of Anaxagoras, they deny Apollonius the foreknowledge coming from wisdom and say he accomplished these things with the Magian art.
>
> οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ προαισθέσθαι πολλὰ καὶ προγνῶναι διαβάλλοι ἂν τὸν Ἀπολλώνιον ἐς τὴν σοφίαν ταύτην, ἢ διαβεβλήσεταί γε καὶ Σωκράτης ἐφ' οἷς παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου προεγίγνωσκε καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ἐφ' οἷς προὔλεγε. . . . καὶ σοφίᾳ ταῦτα τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου προστιθέντες ἀφαιροῦνται τὸν Ἀπολλώνιον τὸ κατὰ σοφίαν προγιγνώσκειν καί φασιν, ὡς μάγῳ τέχνῃ ταῦτ' ἔπραττεν. (ibid.)

Philostratus begins his defense with a strategy typical to Second Sophistic writers, namely to validate his subject by recalling the Greek past.[14] Of course the use of *exempla*, or rather *paradeigmata*, is common in historical and rhetorical writing from the Classical period onwards. Philostratus follows the Aristotelian model of placing the *exempla* at the beginning of his work.[15] The opening of the work itself provides a short *bios* of Pythagoras in order to set up the model which Apollonius himself will follow. Pythagoras forms the general model of Apollonius' life, and Philostratus constantly references him throughout the work. Socrates and Anaxagoras provide the model for understanding Apolloinus' foreknowledge, and Anaxagoras specifically relates *prognōsis* to wisdom. Neither, however, gained ill-repute or faced charges for their foreknowledge. The *exempla* recall the past in order to direct present opinion and action. Like his illustrious predecessors, Apollonius should be recognized as a legitimate philosopher who has gained foreknowledge through his wisdom and not be impugned as a charlatan.

Several scholars have noted that Socrates serves as a particularly important model for Philostratus' Apollonius.[16] Like Socrates, Apollonius gains followers (*VA* 1.18, 1.19, 4.1, etc.), engages in dialogues (*VA* 2.5, 2.11-15, 2.22, etc), and delivers a speech of

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[14] See Bowie (1970); Swain (1996): 65-100; Whitmarsh (2001): 41-89; Whitmarsh (2005): 66-70.
[15] Cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 2.20.1-4.
[16] Lenz (1964): 98; Döring (1979): 138-9; Du Toit (1999): 152-3 with n. 17; Flinterman (forthcoming): 15.

defense when brought to the emperor by rival philosophers (*VA* 8.7). A further parallel could be made between Philostratus' Apollonius and the portrait of Socrates found in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. In a comparison of *The Gospel of Mark* with Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Sean Freye notices three stages in the both works: "the teacher does what he teaches others; the teacher interacts with others to impart the system of thought and action that he embodies; and, the teacher transmits this system to the next generation."[17] The same pattern emerges for Philostratus' Apollonius throughout the *VA*. Apollonius continually models appropriate ethical behavior to his followers, such as deciding to remain silent for five years (*VA* 1.14) and rejecting date wine (*VA* 2.7). He further interacts with others as a teacher, especially during his tour through Greece in book four. Finally, he transmits his philosophy to Damis near the end of the work, saying, "Damis, should you practice philosophy by yourself, behold me" (ὦ Δάμι, κἂν ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ φιλοσοφῇς, ἐμὲ ὅρα, *VA* 8.28).

Socrates and Anaxagoras provide particularly useful *exempla* for Apollonius' Apology. He begins his Apology by referencing Socrates' trial, stating that "I run a risk that not even Socrates, whom his accusers thought invented divine things but neither called or thought a demon, faced in Athens" (ἐγώ τε δαιμόνια ἡγοῦντο, δαίμονα δὲ οὔτε ἐκάλουν οὔτε ᾤοντο, *VA* 8.7.1).[18] The *exemplum* of Socrates emphasizes that δαίμων, as

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[17] Freye (2006): 66.

[18] Cf. Plat. *Apol.* 24b8-c1. If the purpose of an *exemplum* is to use past history to direct the course of the present, then Apollonius seems to choose an odd *exemplum*, since Socrates ultimately lost his trial. In contrast, consider Apuleius' use of Sophocles ad. *Apol.* 37.1-3. Apuleius relates the story of the accusation of senility made against Sophocles. Sophocles was acquitted after reading from the *Oedipus at Colonus*. Apuleius expects the same outcome in his trial after a reading from his works. Here the *exemplum* used directly models the outcome Apuleius desires. See McCreight (2004). However, considering the *exemplum* in relation to Apollonius' audience, namely Domitian, its use becomes clear. After he is put to death, Socrates' stature grows through the works of Plato and their later reception. See Cic. *Amic.* 10; *De*

opposed to δαιμόνιος, carries a negative connotation. When referencing Socrates' "spiritual being," Apollonius specifically calls it δαιμόνιος, the term found throughout the literature on Socrates from Plato through Plutarch.[19] The divine sign is "something god-like and spiritual" (θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον, Plat. *Apol.* 31d1-1), but it is neither a god nor a δαίμων proper. In fact, throughout the *VA* Philostratus uses δαιμόνιος positively, while δαίμων generally carries a negative connotation.[20] Philostratus uses the term twenty-five times, seventeen times in reference to evil demons and demon possession.[21] He does give the term a positive connotation in a few occasions: three times in regards to beings that control weather and nature,[22] twice specifically in reference to Apollonius,[23] once as Apollonius' guide, [24] and once in reference to the tomb of "unknown gods (δαιμόνων)" in

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Or. 3.16.60; *Tusc.* 5.4.10; on the death of Socrates and its later reception, see now Wilson (2007), esp. 89-140. Socrates' death echoes through history as a wrongful conviction by an unjust jury. In Diogenes Laertius' account, the Athenians regret their decision and honor Socrates with a bronze statue. They banish all the accusers, save Meletus, whom they put to death. (Diog. Laert. 2.43) Through the *exemplum*, Apollonius gives his trial the same importance as that of Socrates. Furthermore, he suggests to Domitian *not* to convict him as Socrates' jury did, for Domitian will be remembered throughout history in the same light as Socrates' accusers.

[19] See Plat. *Apol.* 31d1-2; Plut. *Mor.* 575bff ; Maximus of Tyre, *Orat.* 9.

[20] There are twenty-two uses of the word δαιμόνιος in the *VA*. The word tends to refer to spiritual or superhuman matters (e.g. *VA* 1.2, 4.18, 4.19, 4.43, 4.44, 8.23, etc.). A particularly telling passage occurs in the end of the work, when Philostratus states that he has never found a tomb of Apollonius, but he has found "spiritual tales about him everywhere." (λόγοις δὲ πανταχοῦ δαιμονίοις, *VA* 8.31) Philostratus uses the phrase λόγοις δαιμονίοις to emphasize that the other tales he has heard about Apollonius are in line with his own spiritual hagiography.

[21] δαιμῶν as demon: *VA* 1.21, 3.38, 3.56, 4.10, 4.44 (twice), 5.9, 6.27, 7.32 (twice), 8.7. Specifically in reference to demon possession: *VA* 3.38 (three times), 4.20(three times),

[22] *VA* 6.26 (twice, in regards to the source of the Nile), 2.19 (with regard to the climate in India).

[23] *VA* 1.4, in which "Proteus came to his mother in the guise of an Egyptian *daimōn*" (τῇ μητρὶ φάσμα ἦλθεν Αἰγυπτίου δαίμονος ὁ Πρωτεὺς), and tells her she is going to give birth to an incarnation of him; *VA* 1.19, where Damis, in his first meeting with Apollonius, "regarded him as if he were a *daimōn*." (ὥσπερ δαίμονα ἔβλεπε).

[24] In regards to his journey to India, Apollonius states that he "must go where wisdom and the *daimōn* lead me" (ἐμοὶ δὲ βαδιστέα,οἶ σοφία τε καὶ δαίμων με ἄγει, *VA* 1.18).

Athens.[25] The majority of the evidence, however, links δαίμων with some sort of evil, supernatural being.[26]

Later in the speech, Apollonius asks "what then will Socrates say about those things which he said he learned from the spiritual being?" (τί οὖν ἐνταῦθα ἐρεῖ Σωκράτης ὑπὲρ ὧν ἔφασκε τοῦ δαιμονίου μανθάνειν, *VA* 8.7.26). He concludes that had he committed blood sacrifice, "the voice of my spiritual being would have deserted me as unclean" (ἀπέλιπεν ἄν με καὶ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ὁμφὴ μὴ καθαρὸν ὄντα, *VA* 8.7.30). The *exemplum* of Socrates suggests a model of divination that depends upon daemonic inspiration. David du Toit adduces this passage, along with the reference to going "where wisdom and the spiritual being leads me" (οἳ σοφία τε καὶ δαίμων με ἄγει, *VA* 1.18), to suggest that Apollonius' foreknowledge depends upon messages received from a "Begleitdämon," an accompanying supernatural assistant.[27] Du Toit uses Plutarch's *De genio Socratis* as a major point of comparison. In that work, Plutarch states "souls set

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[25] *VA* 6.3. Here, Timasion states "it is wiser to speak well of all gods, even at Athens, where altars of unknown *daimons* have been established" (σωφρονέστερον γὰρ τὸ περὶ πάντων θεῶν εὖ λέγειν καὶ ταῦτα Ἀθήνησιν, οὗ καὶ ἀγνώστων δαιμόνων βωμοὶ ἵδρυνται).

[26] All of the seven cases of δαίμων carrying a positive connotation can be explained through the literary allusions Philostratus employs and the contexts in which they occur. On Proteus, Philostratus, alluding to both Homer specifically and poetry in general, highlights Proteus' wisdom and notes how he had the capacity of foreknowledge (ὅστις μὲν δὴ τὴν σοφίαν ὁ Πρωτεὺς ἐγένετο, τί ἂν ἐξηγοίμην τοῖς γε ἀκούουσι τῶν ποιητῶν, ὡς ποικίλος τε ἦν καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλος καὶ κρείττων τοῦ ἁλῶναι, γιγνώσκειν τε ὡς ἐδόκει καὶ προγιγνώσκειν πάντα; *VA* 1.4). He also makes an allusion to Pindar's poetry when he references the δαιμόνες who control the flow of the Nile (πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων ᾄδουσιν, οἷα καὶ Πινδάρῳ κατὰ σοφίαν ὕμνηται περὶ τοῦ δαίμονος, ὃν ταῖς πηγαῖς ταύταις ἐφίστησιν ὑπὲρ ξυμμετρίας τοῦ Νείλου, *VA* 6.26). He further situates the altar to the unknown δαιμόνες within an allusion to Euripides' *Hippolytus* (καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ διαβεβλῆσθαι πρὸς ὀντιναδὴ τῶν θεῶν, ὥσπερ πρὸς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην ὁ Ἱππόλυτος, οὐκ ἀξιῶ σωφροσύνης, *VA* 6.3). Apollonius decides to call Timasion Hippolytus "on account of the eyes with which he looked upon his step-mother" (διὰ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, οἷς τὴν μητρυιὰν εἶδεν, ibid.). Philostratus further associates positively-valenced δαιμόνες with wisdom (Proteus is known for his σοφία, *VA* 1.4; Apollonius references the δαίμων along with σοφία as his guides, *VA* 1.18). The one context this leaves is the reference to the fertile climate in India having been made by a δαίμων. However, Philostratus' India is a utopian space, so it is only natural that even δαιμόνες can carry positive connotations. See the previous chapter for Philostratus' utopian depiction of India.

[27] Du Toit (1999); cf. Du Toit (1997): 302-9.

free from generation and henceforth released from the body, as if wholly free to wander, are, as Hesiod says, daemons attentive of men" (αἱ δ' ἀπηλλαγμέναι γενέσεως ψυχαὶ καὶ σχολάζουσαι τὸ λοιπὸν ἀπὸ σώματος, οἷον ἐλεύθεραι πάμπαν ἀφειμέναι, δαίμονές εἰσιν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελεῖς καθ' Ἡσίοδον, *Mor.* 593d). Socrates was particularly receptive of the messages from the δαίμων due to his mind (νοῦς), which was "pure and free from passion" (καθαρὸς ὢν καὶ ἀπαθής, *Mor.* 588d). Du Toit argues that Apollonius, like Socrates, has a Begleitdämon, whose divine revelation is dependant upon maintaining Pythagorean *askēsis*.[28]

While Du Toit offers an attractive argument for understanding Apollonius' foreknowledge, it leaves several problems unanswered. I have already demonstrated that Philostratus makes a clear distinction between δαίμων and δαιμόνιος, whereas Plutarch uses both words indiscriminately. At the very least, this raises some doubts as to the usefulness of Plutarch's text for explaining the *VA*. Furthermore, as Jaan-Jap Flinterman has noted, Du Toit's argument assumes that the "voice of the spiritual being" (ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ὀμφὴ, *VA* 8.7.30) is the intermediary who sends the divine message to Apollonius, an assumption for which the *VA* gives no direct evidence.[29] Flinterman notes a tension in the *VA* "between the notion of a 'guardian spirit' [Begleitdämon] on the one hand and the personal association with the gods claimed for Pythagoras (1.1) and Apollonius (1.32) on the other."[30] He finds the same tension in Plutarch's text and

[28] See Du Toit (1999): 153-161.
[29] Flinterman (forthcoming): 15.
[30] Ibid.

concludes that the *VA* provides multiple theories of foreknowledge, which Philostratus does not synthesize.[31]

Flinterman suggests that the inconsistent picture of foreknowledge in the *VA* stems partly from the fact that Philostratus "was interested only to a limited extent in the finer points of philosophical discourse."[32] He notes, however, that the Apology echoes the same use of Socrates in *VA* 1.2: the *exemplum* serves to respond to the accusation of engaging in magical practices. However, the *exemplum* occurs at *VA* 1.2 and 8.7 within highly rhetorical and apologetic contexts. The daemonic model of foreknowledge echoed between the two passages is merely a strategy that, as Flinterman notes, "amounts to claiming for Apollonius the respect owed to Socrates."[33]

Philostratus' theory of foreknowledge can be found, however, by looking at the other *exempla* that he and his protagonist employ, namely that of Anaxagoras and Thales. They provide a second model of foreknowledge, which is more fully developed in the text. Even Apollonius' critics recognize Anaxagoras' wisdom as the basis of his foreknowledge (καὶ σοφίᾳ ταῦτα τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου προστιθέντες, *VA* 1.2). Anaxagoras sets up a model of foreknowledge that arises from wisdom (*sophia*). The term *sophia* and the related adjective *sophos* are central to an understanding of Apollonius' foreknowledge, yet Flinterman, Du Toit, and Fromentin do not comment upon their importance and frequency in the text. When Apollonius repeats the *exempla*, he further adds Thales to the list of philosophers who had foreknowledge. The inclusion of the Ionian philosophers accomplishes more than Flinterman's suggestion of "obfuscating the

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[31] Ibid.: 15-16.
[32] Ibid.: 16.
[33] Ibid.

difference between foreknowledge owing to divine or 'demonic' inspiration, on the one hand, and predictions based on an understanding of the workings of nature, on the other."[34] It further strengthens Apollonius claim to a Greek philosophical pedigree by bringing it all the way back to the first Greek philosopher.[35] Moreover, all three philosophers faced various charges in court, but Apollonius asks why "nowhere within the charges is it said that they were sorcerers since they had foreknowledge" (καὶ οὐδαμοῦ τῶν αἰτιῶν εἴρηται γόητας εἶναι σφᾶς ἐπειδὴ προγιγνώσκουσι, *VA* 8.7.26). He states that such a charge would "have seemed laughable, and not even in Thessaly, where women had a bad reputation for drawing down the moon, would it have been possible to bring charges against the wise men" (καταγέλαστον γὰρ τοῦτο ἐδόκει καὶ οὐδ' ἐν Θετταλίᾳ πιθανὸν κατ' ἀνδρῶν λέγεσθαι σοφῶν, οὗ τὰ γύναια κακῶς ἤκουεν ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς σελήνης ἕλξει, ibid.). Anaxagoras already provided an explicit link between wisdom and foreknowledge. Here, Apollonius extends that link by calling all three philosophers wise men (*sophōn*).

Thales adds another dimension to the wisdom/foreknowledge relationship. In a version of the story of Bathycles' cup, Diodorus Siculus records a response of the Pythian oracle, which states that the cup "shall come to the house of a man / who by his wisdom has foreseen both the things that are and the things that will be" (καὶ ἐς δόμον ἀνδρὸς ἵκηται / ὃς σοφίᾳ τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα προδέδορκεν, Diod. Sic. 9.3.2). Though Diodorus uses a different verb, his account of the Pythian oracle nevertheless makes

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[34] Ibid.: 16 with n. 85. Flinterman adduces Apul. *Apol.* 27.3, Tert. *An.* 1.4-5, and *Apol.* 22.1 as evidence for daemonic inspiration equated with magical practices.
[35] For Thales as the first philosopher, see Diog. Laert. 1.13.

wisdom the source of foreknowledge. Moreover, only the wisest of the Seven Sages will have this type of foreknowledge. In Diodorus Siculus' version of the story, the cup first goes to Thales, who states he is not the wisest. The cup travels to the other six Sages, until it finally reaches Solon. Solon dedicates the cup to Apollo, "since he was wiser than all of them" (τοῦτον γὰρ εἶναι σοφώτερον πάντων, Diod. Sic. 9.3.3). There are two possible implications: either Thales has the foreknowledge granted by his wisdom, since the cup first comes to him, or this type wisdom belongs solely to Apollo, making it a purely divine trait.

Indeed, the theoretical discussion of foreknowledge that Apollonius has with Iarchas, the leader of the Brahmans, marks it as a divine trait. Interestingly, Iarchas begins the discussion of *prognōsis* using the language of divination, stating, "those delighting in divination (*mantikēi*), my good Apollonius, both become divine by it and act for the salvation of mankind" ("οἱ μαντικῇ," ἔφη, "χαίροντες, ὦ χρηστὲ Ἀπολλώνιε, θεῖοί τε ὑπ' αὐτῆς γίγνονται καὶ πρὸς σωτηρίαν ἀνθρώπων πράττουσι," *VA* 3.42). The theory of divination Iarchas proposes links divination to divinization and salvation.

Philostratus moves from *prognōsis* to *sophia* to *mantikē*. One could infer from Philostratus' vocabulary that *prognōsis* is a type of *sophia* and that it is synonymous with *mantikē*. However, while *sophia* and *prognōsis* are often interchangeable – both reveal hidden knowledge to the practitioner – *mantikē* frequently appears in opposition to them. *Mantikē* appears in numerous different contexts throughout the work; all of them, with the one exception of Iarchas' theory of *prognōsis*, refer to divination as it is traditionally

understood. Philostratus uses *mantikē* to refer to hepatoscopy,[36] divination through dreams,[37] oracular divination,[38] and divination through the reading of smoke.[39] *Mantikē* generally appears in a negative context in contrast to the knowledge of wise men (*sophoi*), which comes from wisdom (*sophia*). I have already discussed Apollonius' disavowal to Tigellinus of being a *mantis*.[40] He makes a similar statement to Domitian when charged with conducting human sacrifice to divine the future for Nerva. He asks, "How could I still be skilled (*sophos*) to interpret the intentions of a man if I put my faith in divination (*mantikē*) and distrusted *sophia*?" (ἢ πῶς ἔτ' ἐγὼ σοφὸς γνώμην ἑρμηνεύειν ἀνδρὸς μαντικῇ μὲν πιστεύων, ἀπιστῶν δὲ σοφίᾳ; *VA* 8.7.32). Apollonius states the superiority of *sophia* over *mantikē,* since it is *sophia* that grants him foreknowledge.

III. The Theory of *Prognōsis* and Middle Platonic Physics

I now turn specifically to Philostratus' theory of *prognōsis*, which he roots in Greek philosophical traditions. In the theoretical discussion of *prognōsis*, Philostratus engages with and expands on issues relevant to discussions of Middle Platonic physics. At the same time, a comparison with Cicero's thoughts on divination will also reveal a strong Academic and Peripatetic pedigree. By asserting the existence of ether as the fifth element, Philostratus enters into the debate about the structure of the universe, the soul, and the divine. Furthermore, ether provides the link between man and the divine and gives the human soul the capacity to participate in divine knowledge, namely *prognōsis*.

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[36] *VA* 8.7 (several occurrences), 7.11.
[37] *VA* 2.37.
[38] *VA* 4.14.
[39] *VA* 5.25.
[40] Supra.

The theoretical discussion of *prognōsis* occurs during Apollonius' interviews with the Indian Brahmans. I quote the passage in full:

> A discussion concerning foreknowledge once arose among them, because Apollonius was both dedicated to this wisdom and turned the majority of their discussions to this topic. Praising him, he [Iarchas] said, "Those delighting in divination, my good Apollonius, both become divine by it and work towards the salvation of mankind. For there is that, which requires going to the [temple] of the God to make a discovery. On the other hand, my good man, these things – to foresee by oneself and to foretell to others those things which they do not yet know – I consider to belong to a thoroughly blessed person, equaling himself to the Delphic Apollo. Since the art commands those resorting to the temple of the God for an oracular response to enter walking in purified, or they will be told, "Leave the temple," it thus seems to me that even the man who will prognosticate be pure himself and neither have a single stain assault his soul nor the scars of sin be imprinted in his thought. And this man will interpret his own prophecies purely, hearing himself and the tripod within his breast. He will thus pronounce his oracles more clearly and truthfully. Wherefore, it is unnecessary that you be amazed even if you comprehend this skill so well, as you have so much ether in your soul."
>
> περὶ δὲ προγνώσεως λόγου αὐτοῖς ποτε ὄντος καὶ τοῦ Ἀπολλωνίου προσκειμένου τῇ σοφίᾳ ταύτῃ καὶ τὰς πλείους τῶν διαλέξεων ἐς τοῦτο ξυντείνοντος, ἐπαινῶν αὐτὸν ὁ Ἰάρχας "οἱ μαντικῇ," ἔφη, "χαίροντες, ὦ χρηστὲ Ἀπολλώνιε, θεῖοί τε ὑπ' αὐτῆς γίγνονται καὶ πρὸς σωτηρίαν ἀνθρώπων πράττουσι. τὸ γάρ, ἃ χρὴ ἐς θεοῦ ἀφικόμενον εὑρέσθαι, ταῦτα αὖ, ὦ χρηστέ, ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ προιδέσθαι προειπεῖν τε ἑτέροις, ἃ μήπω ἴσασι, πανολβίου τινὸς ἡγοῦμαι καὶ ταὐτὸν ἰσχύοντος τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ Δελφικῷ. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τέχνη τοὺς ἐς θεοῦ φοιτῶντας ἐπὶ τῷ χρήσασθαι καθαροὺς κελεύει βαδίζοντας φοιτᾶν, ἢ 'ἔξιθι τοῦ νεὼ' πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐρεῖ, δοκεῖ μοι καὶ τὸν προγνωσόμενον ἄνδρα ὑγιῶς ἑαυτοῦ ἔχειν καὶ μήτε κηλῖδα προσμεμάχθαι τῇ ψυχῇ μηδεμίαν μήτε οὐλὰς ἁμαρτημάτων ἐντετυπῶσθαι τῇ γνώμῃ, καθαρῶς δὲ αὐτὸν προφητεύειν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοῦ περὶ τῷ στέρνῳ τρίποδος συνιέντα. γεγωνότερον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ἀληθέστερον τὰ λόγια ἐκδώσει· ὅθεν οὐ χρὴ θαυμάζειν, εἰ καὶ σὺ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ξυνείληφας τοσοῦτον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φέρων αἰθέρα." (*VA* 3.42)

At first glance, Iarchas seems to propose a form of natural divination. He uses oracular divination as a foil to *prognōsis* and equates the practitioner of *prognōsis* with the Delphic Apollo. The practitioner, like the seeker of an oracular response, must be pure. Furthermore, he gives his oracles (*ta logia*) from the tripod within his breast, recalling the tripod from which the Pythia pronounces her responses.

Iarchas, however, devalues oracular divination; he notes that the individual can accomplish *prognōsis* by himself and does not need to go to the temple of a god. Moreover, Iarchas refers to oracular divination as a *technē*, the term usually used for artificial divination. Ancient theorists categorize all divination as either technical or

natural, and oracular divination always falls into the category of natural divination.[41] Natural divination occurs when the divinity sends a message directly to the individual, who is himself in an altered psychic state. Hence Plato states in the *Timaeus* "no one in his right mind engages in inspired and truthful divination, but only when his power of judgment has been bound either in sleep or sickness or when he has changed through some sort of inspiration" (οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔννους ἐφάπτεται μαντικῆς ἐνθέου καὶ ἀληθοῦς, ἀλλ' ἢ καθ' ὕπνον τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως πεδηθεὶς δύναμιν ἢ διὰ νόσον, ἢ διά τινα ἐνθουσιασμὸν παραλλάξας, *Tim.* 71e).

Technical divination, on the other hand, depends upon the reading of signs embedded within nature and does not require an altered psychic state. Plato refers to it as "the study of the future by those in their right minds" (τήν γε τῶν ἐμφρόνων, ζήτησιν τοῦ μέλλοντος, *Phdr.* 244c). He concludes:

> To the extent, then, that prophecy, *mantic*, is more perfect and more admirable than sign-based prediction, *oiōnistic*, in both name and achievement, madness (*mania*) from a god is finer than self-control of human origin, according to the testimony of the ancient language-givers." (tr. Nehemas)
>
> ὅσῳ δὴ οὖν τελεώτερον καὶ ἐντιμότερον μαντικὴ οἰωνιστικῆς, τό τε ὄνομα τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔργον τ'ἔργου, τόσῳ κάλλιον μαρτυροῦσιν οἱ παλαιοὶ μανίαν σωφροσύνης τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ τῆς παρ' ἀνθρώπων γιγνομένης. (*Phdr.* 244d)

Plato shows a higher regard, echoed by other writers, for the god-sent natural divination to technical divination. He therefore praises the madness of those in a prophetic trance. Subsequently, when Iarchas refers to oracular divination as a *technē*, he devalues it. He does so specifically to suggest that *prognōsis* is an even greater form of divination than the responses of the oracles.

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[41] See for example Cic. *De Div.* 1.6.11-12.

Iarchas notes one final way by which *prognōsis* surpasses oracular divination. Since practitioners of oracular divination must be out of their normal, rational minds when they deliver their pronouncements, they do not have any sense of what they say. As Plato states, "while the madness remains on him, he is incapable of judging the things seen and said by him" (τοῦ δὲ μανέντος ἔτι τε ἐν τούτῳ μένοντος οὐκ ἔργον τὰ φανέντα καὶ φωνηθέντα ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κρίνειν, *Tim.* 72a). Oracular divination thus depends upon two individuals: the diviner (*mantis*), who receives the message from the divinity, and the prophet (*prophētēs*), who interprets the utterances of the diviner.[42] In *prognōsis*, the individual assumes both roles. Iarchas calls the prognosticator the one "participating in the mantic art" (μαντικῇ χαίροντες, *VA* 3.42), suggesting his role as *mantis*. He states that "he [the prognosticator] prophesizes clearly" (καθαρῶς δὲ αὐτὸν προφητεύειν, literally "to be an interpreter," ibid.), specifically equating the prognosticator with the prophet, except that the prognosticator interprets his own oracles. Traditional oracular divination often speaks through obscure signs which require the intervention of a fallible human interpreter.[43] By conflating the diviner and the prophet into one individual who "will pronounce his oracles more clearly and truthfully" (γεγωνότερον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ἀληθέστερον τὰ λόγια ἐκδώσει, ibid.), Iarchas once again suggests the superiority of *prognōsis* to oracular divination.

Iarchas concludes the section by relating *prognōsis* to the soul of the practitioner. He does not break new ground by making such an association; Plato himself says "the

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[42] *Tim.* 72b; cf. Philo *De specialibus legibus* 4.48-9.

[43] Manetti (1993) 29ff. Classic examples of correct and incorrect interpretation can be found in Herodotus, such as Croesus misinterpreting the Pythia's oracle about his reign (1.55) and Themistocles' correctly interpreting the Pythia's oracle about Salamis (7.141ff).

soul is itself something divinatory" (ὡς δή τοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μαντικόν γέ τι καὶ ἡ ψυχή, *Phdr.* 242c). Theorists relate natural divination to the separation of the soul from the body. As Cicero states, "Indeed, never does the soul of man divine naturally, except when it is so detached and freed that there is absolutely no association with the body, which happens to seers and dreamers" (*Nec vero umquam animus hominis naturaliter divinat, nisi cum ita solutus est et vacuus ut ei plane nihil sit cum corpore, quod aut vatibus contingit aut dormientibus, De Div.* 1.50.113).[44] Iarchas builds upon the idea that divination rests upon the soul by providing a physical explanation for this connection: the soul, like the divine, is composed of ether. By making this assertion, Iarchas not only engages in a major question of Middle Platonism, but he also asserts the superiority of Apollonius to other men due to the amount of ether within his soul. Iarchas emphasizes the *quantity* of ether within Apollonius' soul, which suggests that ether does not totally compose the soul but is found within it. Apollonius holds a similar view even prior to travelling to India. He explains that though wine is pure, "it unsettles the mental balance, muddying the ether in the soul" (καὶ τὸν οἶνον καθαρὸν μὲν ἔφασκεν εἶναι πῶμα ἐκ φυτοῦ οὕτως ἡμέρου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἥκοντα, ἐναντιοῦσθαι δὲ τῇ τοῦ νοῦ συστάσει διαθολοῦντα τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αἰθέρα, *VA* 1.8). Apollonius anticipates Iarchas' view that ether exists within the soul and that one's way of life can change the quality of that ether.

Iarchas discusses ether when he explains the Brahmans' cosmology to Apollonius. He asserts that ether is the fifth element, and that the gods are generated from it.

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[44] Cf. *De Div* 1.50.114 and Plat. *Phdr.* 244bff.

> Apollonius asked them from what substance they consider the cosmos to be composed. They answered, "From the elements."
> "There are not only four of them, are there?" he asked.
> "Not four," responded Iarchas, "but five."
> "And what can the fifth be," Apollonius asked, "besides water, air, earth, and fire?"
> "The ether," he replied, "which we must consider to be the origin of the gods. For those things that derive from air are all mortal, but those that derive from ether are immortal and divine."
>
> ἤρετό τε ἐκ τίνων ξυγκεῖσθαι τὸν κόσμον ἡγοῖντο, οἱ δὲ ἔφασαν "ἐκ στοιχείων."
> "μῶν," ἔφη, "τεττάρων;"
> "οὐ τεττάρων," ἔφη ὁ Ἰάρχας, "ἀλλὰ πέντε."
> "καὶ τί ἄν," ἔφη, "πέμπτον γένοιτο παρὰ τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὸ πῦρ;"
> "ὁ αἰθήρ," εἶπεν, "ὃν ἡγεῖσθαι χρὴ γένεσιν θεῶν εἶναι, τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀέρος ἕλκοντα θνητὰ πάντα, τὰ δὲ τοῦ αἰθέρος ἀθάνατά τε καὶ θεῖα." (*VA* 3.34)[45]

Ether is the fifth element of the cosmos, and it constitutes divine beings. The soul of man is likewise divine since it too has ether within it. Ether within the soul thus forms a bridge between man and the divine, allowing man the capacity to perform prognostic acts and to gain the panoptic vision of the divine.

When Iarchas proposes ether as the fifth element, he enters into a significant debate of Middle Platonic physics. John Dillon, in his seminal work on the Middle Platonic philosophers, notes the amount of dispute about this question.[46] Plato's *Timaeus* left many unanswered questions for his successors, including whether the universe was composed of four or five elements. In the *Timaeus*, Plato associates the four elements traditionally thought to compose the universe with four solids: earth with the cube, air with the octahedron, water with the icosahedron, and fire with the tetrahedron.[47] A fifth solid remains, the dodecahedron, which Plato states "the God used for the whole

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[45] Jones (2005) and Conybeare (1969) both understand τοῦ ἀέρος ἕλκοντα to signify breathing air. Such a reading would require τοῦ ἀέρος to be accusative and not genitive (*LSJ* s.v. ἕλκω A.II.4). Given that Iarchas had just named the ether as the origin (γένεσιν) of the gods, it is much more likely that τοῦ ἀέρος signifies the source of creation, which works well with the definition of ἕλκοντα as "derive" (see *LSJ* s.v. ἕλκω A.II.10).
[46] See Dillion (1996): 49.
[47] *Tim.* 53c-55c.

universe, embroidering figures on it" (ἔτι δὲ οὔσης συστάσεως μιᾶς πέμπτης, ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς αὐτῇ κατεχρήσατο ἐκεῖνο διαζωγραφῶν, *Tim.* 55c). The question was whether this fifth solid necessitated the inclusion of a fifth element. Aristotle assigns ether to the heavens, as he argues that the heavens are uniquely different from all other matter.[48] While many Middle Platonists summarily rejected the inclusion of a fifth element and chose instead to follow the Stoics (who conceived of the heavens as a pure, rarified fire), others vacillated in one and the same text. Eudorus of Alexandria and Apuleius both take a Stoicizing position.[49] Albinus and Philo waver between the two camps.[50] Dillon notes however that all Middle Platonists agreed that the heavenly realm was fundamentally different from the mundane world, and that the agreement on this issue makes the question of four or five elements secondary.[51]

Though Aristotle names the fifth element as ether at *De Caelo* 270a, he makes no reference to it in the *De Anima*.[52] Nevertheless, later philosophers attributed to Aristotle, or at least to Aristotelians, both the naming of the fifth element as ether and the attribution of it to the composition of the soul. Thus Iamblichus can state in the third century CE "certain of the Aristotelians make the soul a body composed of ether" (Τινὲς μὲν τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν αἰθέριον σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν τίθενται, *De Anima* 9, Dillon and Finamore). Dillon and Finamore note that the earliest attribution of the soul to the fifth element comes from the Peripatetic philosopher Critolaus of Phaselis, dating to the second century BCE.

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[48] For Aristotle's fifth element, see *De Caelo* 1.2. For an excellent summary of Aristotle's argument and its reception in Neoplatonism, see Baltzly (2002).
[49] Apul. *De. Dog.* 7; cf. Dillon (1996): 129.
[50] Alb. *Didask.* 13; Phil. *De Platatione* 1-8; cf. Dillon (1996): 170; 286-7
[51] Dillon (1996): 49.
[52] Cf. Douglas (1985) *ad* 1.22.

Dillon does not, however, explore the relationship between a five-element cosmos, the composition of the soul, and divination. Those among the Middle Platonists who argued for a five-element cosmos frequently related such a cosmos to the composition of the human soul. Cicero associates the fifth element to the soul in his *Tusculan Disputations*, attributing this theory to Aristotle. He states that Aristotle "thought there to be a certain fifth element, from which the mind arises" (*quintam quandam naturam censet esse, e qua sit mens, Tusc. Disp.* 1.22).[53] Cicero continues to link the fifth element with specific human capacities:

> Certainly to think and to foresee, to learn and to teach, to discover something and to remember many other things, to love, to hate, to desire, to fear, to be troubled, to be glad, these and things similar he [Aristotle] thinks exists in none of these four elements. He adduces a fifth element, lacking a name, and thus calls the soul itself by a new name, *endelechia*, that is a certain continual and perpetual motion.
>
> cogitare enim et providere et discere et docere et invenire aliquid et tam multa [alia] meminisse, amare, odisse, cupere, timere, angi, laetari, haec et similia eorum in horum quattuor generum inesse nullo putat; quintum genus adhibet vacans nomine et sic ipsum animum ἐνδελέχειαν appellat novo nomine quasi quandam continuatam motionem et perennem. (*Tusc. Disp.* 1.22)[54]

A.E. Douglas states that *mens* should not be identified with the soul.[55] However, Douglas does not mention the semantic slip made by Cicero at *Tusc. Disp.* 1.22. He maintains that Aristotle links the fifth element to the mind (*mens*), but this is included in a larger discussion about the composition of the soul (*animus*).[56] After explaining the Aristotelian view on mind, he concludes "these are pretty much the opinions about the soul" (*haec sunt fere de animo sententiae, Tusc. Disp.* 1.22). He makes a similar slippage

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[53] Philo Judaeus also makes the soul composed of ether in *On Allegorical Interpretation* 3.161 and *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 88.

[54] Both Douglas (1985) and Dougan (1905) print ἐνδελέχειαν. Dougan notes that most of the manuscripts read ἐνδελέχειαν, whereas Aristotle uses the term ἐντελέχεια (*De Anima* 2.1.412a-b). Douglas states "the source of the apparent confusion between two very similar technical terms cannot now be traced. It may be C.'s [sic] own error or a development of the tradition in the long post-Aristotelian period." (*ad loc.*)

[55] Douglas (1985) *ad loc.*

[56] *Tusc. Disp.* 1.18-22.

later in the same work when quoting from his *Consolation*, which begins "no origin of souls can be discovered on earth." (*Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest*, *Tusc. Disp.* 1.66). Immediately after the excerpt, Cicero states "the human mind comes from this element and from the same nature" (*Hoc e genere atque eadem e natura est humana mens*, *Tusc. Disp.* 1.67). Cicero once again switches between *mens* and *animus* within the same passage, indicating the mutability of the two terms.

Cicero also attributes to the mind/soul specific abilities, including the capacity of foresight. He states that the capabilities of the mind/soul cannot exist within the traditional four elements and therefore must come from the fifth element. He begins his list with "*cogitare enim et providere.*"[57] At first glance, Cicero seems merely to provide a long list of the powers of the soul. However, Cicero creates the list with opposing pairs of powers. "*Docere*" (to teach) follows "*discere*" (to learn), "*multa meminisse*" (to remember many things, namely to recall something already learned) follows "*invenire aliquid*" (to discover something, namely to find something unknown, note also the contrast between the singular "aliquid" and the plural "multa"), "*odisse*" (to hate) follows "*amare*" (to love), "*timere*" (to fear, namely to be repelled from) follows "*cupere*" (to desire, namely to be attracted to), and "*laetari*" (to be glad) follows "*angi*" (to be troubled). Since Cicero pairs each term with its opposite, then "*cogitare*" (to think) and "*providere*" (to foresee) must also form another pair of opposites. "*Cogitare*" implies the mental and rational activity of thinking;[58] "*providere*" must signify its opposite, a non-

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[57] Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* 1.22.

[58] Varro, for example, emphasizes "cogitare" as the mental activity that preceeds action and speech. He notes that "there are three *actiones* 'actions,' and of these the first is the *agitates* 'motion' of the mind, because we must first *cogitare* 'consider' those things which we are *acturi* 'going to do,' and then

mental activity unrelated to thought.[59] One can simply translate *providere*, as I have done above, as "to foresee." Cicero uses the term *providere* in *De Divinatione* to define the soul's capacity to foresee the future when it breaks free from the body during sleep. He writes, "when in sleep the soul is separated from the society and contact of the body, then it remembers the past, senses the present, and foresees the future" (*Cum ergo est somno sevocatus animus a societate et a contagione corporis, tum meminit praeteritorum, praesentia cernit, futura providet*, *De Div.* 1.63). It is worth noting that in this passage *providere* does not carry the panoptic vision of *prognōsis*; in Cicero's account, the past belongs to memory, the present to the senses, and only the future to foresight. Nevertheless, Cicero counts sleep as one of the natural forms of divination, and he specifically defines foresight as a divinatory power of the soul.

Even if *providere* only refers to the acquisition of knowledge of the future, Cicero later ascribes memory, thought, and all knowledge of the past, present, and future to the soul. He further equates the soul to the gods by asserting, as Iarchas does to Apollonius, that both are composed of ether. He proclaims, "If however, there is a certain fifth nature, first introduced by Aristotle, this is the element of both gods and souls" (*Sin autem est quinta quaedam natura ab Aristotele inducta primum, heac et deorum est et animorum*, *Tusc. Disp.* 1.63). He provides support with another excerpt from his *Consolation*:

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thereafter say them and do them" (*Actionem trium primus agitates mentis, quod primum ea quae sumus acturi cogitare debemus, deinde tum dicere et facere*, *De Ling. Lat.* 6.42, tr. Kent).

[59] Varro finds the etymology of providere in the Greek verb προιδεῖν, "to see beforehand" (ibid., 6.96).

> In these elements [the traditional four] there is nothing which has the power of memory, intellect, or thought, nothing which holds things past, foresees things to come, and can embrace things present. These things belong to the divine alone, nor will there ever be discovered anywhere whence they are capable of coming to man except from the god. There is a certain unique nature and power of the soul, distinct from these familiar and known elements.
>
> his enim in naturis nihil inest, quod vim memoriae, mentis, cogitationis habeat, quod et praeterita teneat et futura provideat et complecti possit praesentia. quae sola divina sunt, nec invenietur umquam, unde ad hominem venire possint nisi a deo. singularis est igitur quaedam natura atque vis animi seiuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis. (Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* 1.66)

The powers of the soul are akin to divine powers and cannot be found within the traditional four elements. Panoptic vision belongs solely to the gods, but because of the sympathetic relationship between the human soul and the divine, this vision becomes accessible to humans through divination. Cicero, like Iarchas, equates human souls with gods through the existence of ether as the common element between the two. Cicero argues that the power of divination arises from this relationship.

Comparing Iarchas' theory of *prognōsis* with accounts of divination from Plato and Cicero, who is himself highly dependent upon Plato and Aristotle, reveals the strong Greek philosophical pedigree of Apollonius' foreknowledge. The Middle Platonic debates on the soul and structure of the universe inform the theory of *prognōsis*, and Philostratus further includes Academic and Peripatetic resonances in it. Philostratus grounds Apollonius' foreknowledge in Greek philosophy in order to provide an answer to the accusation of being a magician that is both rationalistic and indicative of Apollonius' Hellenism.

IV. The Practice of *Prognōsis* and Traditional Greek Religion

In the previous section, I demonstrated how Philostratus' use of Middle Platonic physics to create a theory of *prognōsis* works to assert the Hellenism of Apollonius'

foreknowledge. I continue by examining the importance of ritual purity to the practice of *prognōsis.* By referencing traditional Greek religious practices, Philostratus transforms Apollonius' foreknowledge into a natural development of Greek religion. Purity, understood on both physical and metaphysical levels, is central to all sacred tasks in Greek religion. Apollonius achieves this purity through Pythagorean asceticism, which both prescribes specific ethical behavior, primarily the avoidance of animal products, and acts as a ritual that prepares the practitioner for the sacred task of *prognōsis*. By relating *prognōsis* to traditional Greek religion, Philostratus adds another leg to the defense of Apollonius' Hellenism.

As he expounds his theory of *prognōsis*, Iarchas emphasizes the importance of ritual purity for the act. He equates those seeking an oracular response to those practicing *prognōsis* by emphasizing the need to be pure (*katharos*). He transfers the prerequisites for oracular knowledge to *prognōsis*.[60]

> Since the art commands those resorting to the temple of the god for an oracular response to enter walking in purified, or they will be told, "Leave the temple," it thus seems to me that even the man who will prognosticate be pure himself and neither have a single stain assault his soul nor the scars of sin be imprinted in his thought.
>
> ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τέχνη τοὺς ἐς θεοῦ φοιτῶντας ἐπὶ τῷ χρήσασθαι καθαροὺς κελεύει βαδίζοντας φοιτᾶν, ἢ 'ἔξιθι τοῦ νεὼ' πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐρεῖ, δοκεῖ μοι καὶ τὸν προγνωσόμενον ἄνδρα ὑγιῶς ἑαυτοῦ ἔχειν καὶ μήτε κηλῖδα προσμεμάχθαι τῇ ψυχῇ μηδεμίαν μήτε οὐλὰς ἁμαρτημάτων ἐντετυπῶσθαι τῇ γνώμῃ. (*VA* 3.42)

Apollonius makes a similar remark in an earlier discussion with a temple priest about the benefits the gods grant to man.

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[60] By requiring the prognosticator to be ritually pure, Iarchas implies the universality of sacred space. I will argue in the final chapter that Iarchas' theory of *prognōsis* affects a move from a "locative" to a "delocalized" model of religious authority. See Smith (1978): 128ff. cf. Athanassiadi (1992).

> And so the gods, since they do things well, surely send away those whom they find to be healthy and unscarred by evil with crowns, not with crowns of gold but with crowns of all good things. They leave to justice whomever they see scarred and totally corrupted, and to the extent that they dared to enter the temple being impure, so far will the gods inflict their wrath upon them.
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> καὶ οἱ θεοὶ οὖν εὖ ποιοῦντες, ὃν μὲν ἂν ὑγιᾶ τε καὶ ἄτρωτον κακίας εὕρωσι, πέμπουσι δήπου στεφανώσαντες οὐ χρυσοῖς στεφάνοις, ἀλλ' ἀγαθοῖς πᾶσιν, ὃν δ' ἂν κατεστιγμένον ἴδωσι καὶ διεφθορότα, καταλείπουσι τῇ δίκῃ, τοσοῦτον αὐτοῖς ἐπιμηνίσαντες, ὅσον ἐτόλμησαν καὶ ἱερὰ ἐσφοιτᾶν μὴ καθαροὶ ὄντες. (*VA* 1.11)

Apollonius foreshadows Iarchas' later discussion on *prognōsis* and purity. He describes impurity on both physical (*katestigmenon* – scarred, deriving from the word for tattooing, compare Iarchas' use of *kēlida prosmemachthai* and *oulas hamartēmatōn*) and ethical (*diephthorota* – utterly corrupted) dimensions. The pure are *hugia*, which can refer to bodily health but here, in the religious context, refers to morality,[61] and *atrōton kakias*, which combines the word for physical invulnerability (*atrōton*) with the more abstract notion of evil.[62]

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[61] *Hugiōs* does appear in the *VA* for things done in a morally correct manner. Cf. *VA* 3.24, where Apollonius relates something he "did morally" (*hugiōs praxai*), referring specifically to a previous life in which he refuses to engage in piracy.

[62] Phraotes makes a similar statement about the purity requirements for those wishing to study with the Brahmans:

> It is necessary that a young man, when he reaches the age of eighteen, and this, I think, is the age of the Ephebe among you, cross the Hyphasis River to the men to whom you hasten, after first saying to the public that he will become a philosopher, so that he may be excluded by those wishing to exclude him, if he does not approach the study in a state of purity. By purity, first I mean in regards to his father and mother, that nothing disgraceful might be revealed about them, then their parents and up to the third generation, that there is no one who is lustful, immoderate, or an unjust businessman.
>
> χρὴ τὸν νέον, ἐπειδὰν ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη γεγονὼς τύχῃ, τουτὶ δ', οἶμαι, καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν ἐφήβου μέτρον, ὑπὲρ τὸν Ὕφασιν ποταμὸν ἐλθεῖν παρὰ τοὺς ἄνδρας, οὓς σὺ ὥρμηκας, εἰπόντα δημοσίᾳ πρότερον ὅτι φιλοσοφήσοι, ἵν' ᾖ τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐξείργειν αὐτόν, εἰ μὴ καθαρὸς φοιτῴη. καθαρὸν δὲ λέγω πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἐς πατέρα καὶ μητέρα ἥκον, μὴ περὶ αὐτοὺς ὄνειδός τι ἀναφαίνοιτο, εἶθ' οἱ τούτων γονεῖς καὶ τρίτον γένος ἐς ἄνω, μὴ ὑβριστής τις ἢ ἀκρατὴς ἢ χρηματιστὴς ἄδικος. (*VA* 2.30)

Phraotes reveals that the study of philosophy with the Brahmans requires an initial state of purity. He defines purity first and foremost on a genealogical level; the whole family up to the third generation must be pure. This suggests that the unjust actions of previous generations bear their marks upon future progeny. One can adduce any number of mythological *exempla* that follow a similar pattern, such as the House of

The metaphors of physical impurity bring *prognōsis* back to Classical and Archaic Greek religious practices. Robert Parker has demonstrated that the gods are repulsed by natural pollution, particularly those pollutions relating to birth and death.[63] Individuals affected by such pollutions are denied entry into temples until either a certain number of days have passed or they have performed certain purification rituals.[64] Pollution, as Parker notes, sets up a barrier between man and the divine. Andreas Bendlin states that the gods and the sacred realm in general are pure, whereas pollution can occur in the social world that surrounds the sacred.[65] Purity regulations therefore limit access to the sacred realm.[66] Likewise, the purity required for *prognōsis* limits

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Atreus or the family of Oedipus. In the mythical *exempla*, the original sin involved some act of murder. Phraotes, however, does not specify which actions cause impurity. Rather, he defines purity as not having "anything disgraceful" (*oneidos ti*), and not being "lustful, immoderate, or an unjust businessman" (*mē hubristēs tis ē akratēs ē chrēmatistēs adikos*). Only the last of these four terms denotes any specific action to avoid, here in the economic sphere. The other three terms are more general terms of ethical behavior. Even the final term, being an unjust businessman, is connected with the ethical term *adikos*. Throughout, the individual remains pure through ethical behavior.

[63] Parker (1983): 32ff.

[64] Parker (1983): 37 and n. 17 for examples. Cf. Burkert (1985): 78-9.
A limestone stele from a sanctuary in Megalopolis, dated to the third century BCE, states "whoever wishes to sacrifice shall enter the sanctuary, being pure" (Εἰσπορεύεσθαι εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τὸν βουλόμενον θύειν καθαρίζοντα, *SEG* XXVIII 421 = Lupu [2005] doc 7.3-5) The stele continues in lines six through seventeen by listing how many days must pass from each type of pollution.

[65] Bendlin (2007): 180.

[66]The Hippocratic *On the Sacred Disease* also differentiates between sacred and secular space, further indicating the purity requirements to enter sacred space:

> We ourselves both create boundaries of the temples and sacred precincts of the gods, so that no one may cross them unless he is pure, and entering them we purify ourselves with water, not as if we are defiled, but if we have any previous defilement, we purify ourselves from this.
>
> αὐτοί τε ὅρους τοῖσι θεοῖσι τῶν ἱερῶν καὶ τῶν τεμενέων ἀποδεικνύμενοι, ὡς ἂν μηδεὶς ὑπερβαίνῃ ἢν μὴ ἁγνεύῃ, εἰσιόντες τε ἡμεῖς περιῤῥαινόμεθα οὐχ ὡς μιαινόμενοι, ἀλλ' εἴ τι καὶ πρότερον ἔχομεν μύσος, τοῦτο ἀφαγνιούμενοι. (Hipp. *Morb. Sacr.* 1)

The author highlights how we create "boundaries" (*horous*) for temples and sacred precincts. The text provides evidence for the demarcation of sacred and secular space suggested above. The boundaries prevent the entry of one who is not pure (*mē hagneuēi*). Even those who do enter the space must purify themselves (*perirrhainometha*) from previous defilements (*proteron musos*). In Classical Greek religion, entry into a temple marks entry into sacred space and sacred time. For Classical religion, purification can

access to divine foreknowledge. Not only does Philostratus embed the functioning of *prognōsis* within Archaic and Classical Greek religious practices, but by making the purity required for *prognōsis* a limiting element, he emphasizes the superiority of his protagonist against other people.

Theophrastus' Superstitious Man provides an extreme example of religious practices. Purification allows for "temporary differentiation," as Andreas Bendlin refers to it, between sacred and secular time; water plays a key role in these purification rituals. Apollonius echoes the importance of water in a conversation with Phraotes, the Indian king of Taxilla (*VA* 2.35-37). Theophrastus ridicules the Superstitious Man for "washing his hands, sprinkling himself from temple fountains, and putting a laurel-leaf into his mouth and walks around thus the whole day long" (ἀπονιψάμενος τὰς χεῖρας καὶ περιρρανάμενος ἀπὸ ἱεροῦ δάφνην εἰς τὸ στόμα λαβὼν οὕτω τὴν ἡμέραν περιπατεῖν, Theophr. *Char.* 16.3-5).[67] The Superstitious man fails to differentiate between sacred and secular time and therefore constantly purifies himself for any reason.[68] Nevertheless, his

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simply be the symbolic act of washing oneself, hence the use of the verb *perirrhainometha*, which alludes to the special water basins, the *perirrhantēria*, placed at the entrances of temples and sacred precincts.

Susan Cole (1988) has demonstrated that the archaeological data corresponds to the literary data. Quoting the work done by Franz Glaser in *Antike Brunnebauten in Griechenland* (Diss., 1977), Cole notes that of the 95 examples of natural springs converted into fountains, 36 of them are found in sanctuaries and another 59 directly outside sanctuaries (161). Cole notes that the many different types of water installations are usually found outside temple buildings and had strict regulations that kept the sacred water unpolluted (ibid.).

[67] James Diggle (2004): 439 notes that the earliest attestations of *deisidaimōn* signify "conventional pietry." He adduces examples from Xen. *Ag.* 11.8 and Arist. *Pol.* 1314b38-1315a2. After Theophrastus, the term gains more pejorative connotations. (ibid) Diggle cites as examples Theophr. *Piet.* fr.8.8-9 Pötscher, D.S. 1.83.8, and Stob. 2.7.25. Diggle notes that in Plutarch's *Peri deisidaimonias*, the superstitious man "is a man who believes that the gods cause only harm and pain, and (much as in Theophrastus) sees the supernatural on every hand."

[68] As stated by Diggle (2004): 350, "what sets him apart is the obsessiveness and compulsiveness of his behavior." Cf. Jebb, ed. Sandys (1979): ad loc, "what is for others an extraordinary purification the Superstitious man performs daily."

"extraordinary purifications" speak to the necessity of physical purification in Classical Greek religious practice.

Water performs a central role in these purifications.[69] Susan Cole has noted that in Greek temple religion, water functions for purification, prophecy, healing, and initiation into certain mysteries.[70] Apollonius himself, in a discussion with King Phraotes, highlights the benefits of water, saying, "we who drink water gain an advantage in sleeping more sweetly" (πλεονεκτοῦμεν οἱ τὸ ὕδωρ πίνοντες πρὸς τὸ καθεύδειν ἥδιον, *VA* 2.36). He continues by discussing the advantages of drinking water for divination, specifically referencing the prophet Amphiaraus, an allusion that links Apollonius to one of the most ancient of Greek myths.

> "This man, my king," said Apollonius, "now divines in Attica, inducing dreams in those who consult him, and the priests, taking the man who is about to consult him, prevent him from eating food for one day and from wine for three days, so that he may draw in the oracular response into his soul, which is shining brightly. But if wine were a good drug of sleep, then Amphiaraus the wise would have commanded the consultants, having prepared themselves in the opposite manner, to be carried into his inner sanctuary full of wine, as if they were wine-jugs. And I could mention the many oracles, well-esteemed by both Greeks and barbarians, in which the priest, having drunk water and not wine, delivers his oracles from the tripod. So you may consider me, my king, and all those who drink water a fit vehicle for the God. For we are caught by nymphs and are Bacchic revelers of sobriety."
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> "οὗτος, ὦ βασιλεῦ," ἔφη, "μαντευόμενος ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ νῦν ὀνείρατα ἐπάγει τοῖς χρωμένοις, καὶ λαβόντες οἱ ἱερεῖς τὸν χρησόμενον σίτου τε εἴργουσι μίαν ἡμέραν καὶ οἴνου τρεῖς, ἵνα διαλαμπούσῃ τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν λογίων σπάσῃ· εἰ δὲ ὁ οἶνος ἀγαθὸν ἦν τοῦ ὕπνου φάρμακον, ἐκέλευσεν ἂν ὁ σοφὸς Ἀμφιάρεως τοὺς θεωροὺς τὸν ἐναντίον ἐσκευασμένους τρόπον καὶ οἴνου μεστούς, ὥσπερ ἀμφορέας, ἐς τὸ ἄδυτον αὐτῷ φέρεσθαι. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ μαντεῖα λέγοιμ' ἂν εὐδόκιμα παρ' Ἕλλησί τε καὶ βαρβάροις, ἐν οἷς ὁ ἱερεὺς ὕδατος, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ οἴνου σπάσας ἀποφθέγγεται τὰ ἐκ τοῦ τρίποδος. θεοφόρητον δὴ κἀμὲ ἡγοῦ καὶ πάντας, ὦ βασιλεῦ, τοὺς τὸ ὕδωρ πίνοντας· νυμφόληπτοι γὰρ ἡμεῖς καὶ βάκχοι τοῦ νήφειν." (*VA* 2.37)

Apollonius describes a very traditional model of Greek divinatory practices. It is worth noting that Apollonius is not talking about *prognōsis* at this point, since this topic first

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[69] Diggle (2004): ad 16.3 specifically notes that the *peri-* prefix in *perirrhanamenos* suggests ritual purification by water. cf. Pfiister, "Katharsis," *RE* Suppl. VI (1935): 149-151. See further n. 67.
[70] Cole (1988): 162-5.

comes up in his conversations with the Brahmans. Nevertheless, divination, even generally understood, forms a major component of the accusation of being a magician. This passage thus works to formulate traditional divination, which Apollonius will later reject, within a framework of Greek religion. Apollonius accomplishes this by highlighting the importance of water and mentioning the abstentions one must take before consulting an oracle, most notably the abstention from meat and wine. The fact that Apollonius mentions the specific amount of time for the abstentions reiterates purification as a temporary differentiation of the self, thereby relating this form of oracular divination to Archaic and Classical Greek religious thought.

In an earlier scene, Apollonius reveals a similar notion of purity as a temporary differentiation of the self. While in Aegae during his youth, he denounces the sacrifices offered to Asclepius by a Cilician. He argues, "to sacrifice before he has received anything from the God is not the behavior of a devotee, but of a man pleading to be excused from some wretched and savage acts" (καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ πρὶν εὑρέσθαί τι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πολυτελῶς θύειν οὐ θύοντός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παραιτουμένου σχετλίων τε καὶ χαλεπῶν ἔργων, *VA* 1.10). At the most basic level, Apollonius rejects the sacrifices of the Cilician because it does not follow the *do ut des* model of reciprocity. Traditionally, the suppliant promises a god hecatombs later in return for the god's favor now. The Cilician sacrifices for remission from some past crime, whereas Apollonius believes that the true devotee of a god approaches him and sacrifices to him in an already purified state.

Iarchas echoes Apollonius' initial thoughts on oracular divination, stating that it "commands those entering to be pure" (ἐπὶ τῷ χρήσασθαι καθαροὺς κελεύει βαδίζοντας,

VA 3.42). Once again, oracular divination requires a temporary differentiation of the self; the petitioner only has to be in a state of purity *before* entering the temple. When he turns to *prognōsis*, he makes no temporal differentiation. "The man who will prognosticate," Iarchas states, must "hold himself in a state of purity" (τὸν προγνωσόμενον ἄνδρα ὑγιῶς ἑαυτοῦ ἔχειν, *VA* 3.42). Iarchas uses *hugiōs* synonymously with *katharos*; both refer to the state of purity required for divination and *prognōsis*. When he speaks of *prognōsis*, he implies that the prognosticator must be in a continual state of purity. Apollonius himself has previously denounced the impurity of blood sacrifice as a threat to his prognostic ability (*VA* 8.7.30, supra).

While traditional oracular divination and Archaic and Classical Greek religious practices require a physical purification of the self, *prognōsis* depends upon an ethical system that underwrites the physical purification. Ethical purification is also found in Greek religious thought. By the later fifth century BCE, Greek writers began to introduce notions of mental and ethical purity that went in tandem with the discourses of physical impurity.[71] Bendlin adduces the Orphic-Bacchic gold lamellae, which promises salvation for the purified soul.[72] While earlier practices focused on the physical purity of the individual, by the fifth century BCE "the concern about pollution appears here inexplicably linked to a mental, psychological, and spiritual dimension of bodily purity."[73] Robert Parker notes that Plato, in the *Phaedo*, describes the asceticism of Socrates, which frees his soul from the taints of corporeality to arrive at a vision of true

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[71] See Bendlin (2007): 188-9; Cf. McPherran (2002) and (2004), and Chaniotis (1997): 152-172.
[72] Ibid., on which see now Graf and Johnston (2007).
[73] Ibid.

reality.[74] The ascetic soul escapes the corporeal world "pure," while the soul enmeshed in the world of sensation departs "polluted."[75] As Parker states "purification becomes the separation of the soul from the body, and in place of water, eggs, and the blood of pigs, its agents are self-restraint, justice, courage, and intellectual activity itself."[76]

An ascetic regiment leading to bodily purification is in fact what is found in the *VA*. The Platonic background, which I have already demonstrated connects asceticism with ethical purification, gains more and more Pythagorean elements throughout the first few centuries CE.[77] Apollonius himself takes up the Pythagorean way of life from an early age (*VA* 1.7). In his discussion with Thespesion, the leader of the Naked Sages, Apollonius specifically links Pythagorean asceticism with both purity and the ability to prognosticate. He describes his choice of the "mysterious form of wisdom, to which even Pythagoras at one time yielded" (εἶδον σοφίας εἶδος ἄρρητον, οὗ καὶ Πυθαγόρας ποτὲ ἡττήθη, *VA* 6.11.5). Apollonius refers specifically to Pythagoras' *sophia*, whom he personifies as a mistress "without pleasures and full of toils" (ἀηδὴς ἐγὼ καὶ μεστὴ πόνων, ibid.). She relates to him the requirements of her way of life:

> "If someone should come to my way of life, he must choose on the one hand to deny himself all meals consisting of living things, to forget wine so that he not muddy the mixing-vessel of Wisdom, which stands in the souls of the sober. Nor shall a cloak or wool, which has been shorn from a living thing, keep him warm. But I allow him sandals of bark and to sleep wherever he happens to be. And if I should see him being a slave of sexual pleasures, I have pits, down which Justice, the attendant of Wisdom, carries him and pushes him off. I am so harsh to my disciples that I have bonds for their tongues."

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[74] Parker (1983): 281.
[75] Ibid., with reference to Pl. *Phd.* 80d-81d.
[76] Parker (1983): 282, with reference to Pl. *Phd.* 67b, 67c, 69c.
[77] See Dillon (1996): 341-383; on the Pythagorean background to Apollonius specifically, see Swain (1999): esp. 163-174; cf. Flinterman (forthcoming).

> "εἰ γὰρ ἀφίκοιτό τις ἐς ἤθη τὰ ἐμά, τράπεζαν μέν, ὁπόση ἐμψύχων, ἀνῃρῆσθαι πᾶσαν ἔλοιτο, οἴνου δὲ ἐκλελῆσθαι καὶ τὸν σοφίας μὴ ἐπιθολοῦν κρατῆρα, ὃς ἐν ταῖς ἀοίνοις ψυχαῖς ἕστηκεν, οὐδὲ χλαῖνα θάλψει αὐτόν, οὐδὲ ἔριον, ὃ ἀπ' ἐμψύχου ἐπέχθη, ὑπόδημα δὲ αὐτοῖς βύβλου δίδωμι καὶ καθεύδειν ὡς ἔτυχε, κἂν ἀφροδισίων ἡττηθέντας αἴσθωμαι, βάραθρά ἐστί μοι, καθ' ὧν σοφίας ὀπαδὸς δίκη φέρει τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ὠθεῖ, χαλεπὴ δ' οὕτως ἐγὼ τοῖς τἀμὰ αἱρουμένοις, ὡς καὶ δεσμὰ γλώττης ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ἔχειν." (ibid.)

She continues by describing the benefits of her way of life:

> "But learn from me what there is for you who endure these things. At once you will have self-control and be just, and you will consider no one enviable. You will be formidable against tyrants rather than lie under their power. Your small sacrifices will appear sweeter to the gods than those spilling the blood of bulls for them. I will give you foreknowledge to you when you are pure and I will so fill your eyes with light that you will thoroughly discern the divine, know heroes, and censure the shadowy phantoms, whenever they falsely present themselves in the forms of humans."

> "ἃ δ' ἐστί σοι καρτερήσαντι ταῦτα, ἐμοῦ μάθε· σωφροσύνη μὲν καὶ δικαιοσύνη αὐτόθεν, ζηλωτὸν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι μηδένα τυράννοις τε φοβερὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπ' αὐτοῖς κεῖσθαι, θεοῖς τε ἡδίω φαίνεσθαι μικρὰ θύσαντα ἢ οἱ προχέοντες αὐτοῖς τὸ τῶν ταύρων αἷμα, καθαρῷ δὲ ὄντι σοι καὶ προγιγνώσκειν δώσω καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς οὕτω τι ἐμπλήσω ἀκτῖνος, ὡς διαγιγνώσκειν μὲν θεόν, γιγνώσκειν δὲ ἥρωα, σκιοειδῆ δ' ἐλέγχειν φαντάσματα, ὅτε ψεύδοιντο εἴδη ἀνθρώπων." (*VA* 6.11.6)

These two passages bring together the concepts of *sophia*, *prognōsis*, and purification. Philostratus thus adds another dimension to his defense of Apollonius. Not only does his foreknowledge come from wisdom, but it is also rooted within Greek religious thought and practices. Mistress Pythagoreanism sets forth the regulations for her way of life in the first passage, namely abstinence from meat, avoidance of wine, rejection of clothing made from animal products, and the keeping of silence. Many of these regulations mimic requirements for the temporary differentiation of the self in Archaic and Classical Greek religion. For Apollonius, following these regulations does not merely purify him but also grants him the ability of *prognōsis*.

Apollonius adopts the Pythagorean way of life even before he begins his journey to India. His tutor Euxenus asks him how he will begin. He responds, "where doctors begin, for they, by purifying the bellies, prevent some from being sick and heal others"

("ὅθεν περ οἱ ἰατροί," ἔφη, "καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι καθαίροντες τὰς γαστέρας τοὺς μὲν οὐδὲ νοσεῖν ἐῶσι, τοὺς δὲ ἰῶνται," *VA* 1.8). Apollonius emphasizes dietetics as a cornerstone of Pythagoreanism, and he continues to discuss his abstinence from meat and wine.

> And saying this, he declined the eating of living things, as it was impure and makes the mind dull. He ate dried fruits and vegetables, saying that whatever the earth gives forth herself is pure. And though he said wine to be a pure drink, coming to man from such a tame plant, he nevertheless said it to be opposed to the constitution of the mind, since it darkens the ether in the soul.
>
> καὶ εἰπὼν τοῦτο τὰς μὲν ἐμψύχους βρώσεις ὡς οὔτε καθαρὰς καὶ τὸν νοῦν παχυνούσας παρῃτήσατο, τραγήματα δὲ καὶ λάχανα ἐσιτεῖτο, καθαρὰ εἶναι φάσκων, ὁπόσα ἡ γῆ αὐτὴ δίδωσι, καὶ τὸν οἶνον καθαρὸν μὲν ἔφασκεν εἶναι πῶμα ἐκ φυτοῦ οὕτως ἡμέρου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἥκοντα, ἐναντιοῦσθαι δὲ τῇ τοῦ νοῦ συστάσει διαθολοῦντα τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αἰθέρα. (ibid.)

Apollonius shows that Pythagorean dietetics is greatly concerned with one's psychic state. He recognizes a connection between diet and the physics of the soul and mind. Flesh makes the mind dull, and wine, though it is a pure drink, darkens the ether in the soul. He follows dietary restrictions that prepare his soul for *prognōsis* and avoids wine to keep the ether within his soul in a state of purity.

Apollonius describes his vegetarianism in two ways: first with reference to animals having souls, and, secondly in reference to the lightness of his diet. He avoids food and clothing from "ensouled" (*empsuchos*) animals[78] and uses the word *ta empsucha* to refer to animals in a general sense.[79] This demonstrates how Philostratus models Apollonius after the *bios* of Pythagoras in the opening of the work. In his very first description of the Pythagorean way of life, Philostratus associates purity with abstention from meat. Pythagoras "declined clothing made from the flesh of animals and kept himself pure of meat, whichever ones were of the ensouled creatures, and of sacrifices"

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[78] On ensouled animals, see *VA* 1.8, supra. Apollonius repeats the term at 6.11.5. The same formulation is used of Pythagoras' vegetarianism at 1.1 and 6.11.3. On clothing coming from ensouled creatures see 6.11.5 and 8.7.16.

[79] *VA* 8.7.13 and 8.7.16.

(ἐσθῆτά τε τὴν ἀπὸ θνησειδίων παραιτοῖτο καὶ καθαρεύοι βρώσεως, ὁπόση ἐμψύχων, καὶ θυσίας, *VA* 1.1).

Ancient testimonia, particularly of Middle Comedy, frequently represented Pythagoreans avoiding food from ensouled animals (*ta empsucha*).[80] For example, a passage from Alexis' *Tarantinoi* describes the Pythagoreans: "For the Pythagoreans, as we hear / eat nothing cooked nor anything / ensouled, and they alone do not drink wine." (οἱ πυθαγορίζοντες γάρ, ὡς ἀκούομεν, / οὔτ' ὄψον ἐσθίουσιν οὔτ' ἄλλ' οὐδὲ ἓν / ἔμψυχον, οἶνόν τ' οὐχὶ πίνουσιν μόνοι, Alexis fr. 220 Kock = Athen. IV. 161B)[81] Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistae* preserves many other examples from Middle Comedy of Pythagoreans avoiding *ta empsucha*.[82] The evidence provided from the fragments of Middle Comedy reveals both the antiquity of the Pythagorean abstention from meat and the use of *ta empsucha* to refer to animals. This places Apollonius' Pythagoreanism, and the language he uses to describe it, into a larger Greek cultural context.

Neoplatonic writers of later antiquity continue to use the term *ta empsucha* in reference to Pythagorean vegetarianism. Porphyry, in his own *Life of Pythagoras*, relates that Pythagoras "not only abstained from ensouled things, but also never consorted with butchers and hunters" (ὡς μὴ μόνον τῶν ἐμψύχων ἀπέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ μαγείροις καὶ θηράτορσι μηδέποτε πλησιάζειν, *VP* 7). Iamblichus further describes Pythagorean vegetarianism in a manner very similar to Philostratus.[83] In the chapter on Pythagorean

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[80] For a full account of the ancient testimonia on Pythagorean vegetarianism, see Haussleiter (1935): 99ff.
[81] See also Antiphanes fr. 135 Knock = Athen. IV.161A.
[82] See further Haussleiter (1935): 101-104.
[83] Haussleiter (1935) notes "the acquisition of Pythagorean diet by the young Apollonius, as Philostratus describes it, exactly corresponds to what Apollonius himself reported to us in Iamblichus *VP* 13 of the young Pythagoras" (*Es ist bemerkenswert, daß die Übernahme der pythagoreischen Diät durch den jugenlichen Apollonios, wie Philostrat ihn schildert, genau dem entspricht, was uns Apollonos selbst in*

dietetics, Iamblichus states that Pythagoras "advised to guard against whatever impeded prophecy, or the purity and chastity of the soul, or the possession of self-control and virtue" (ὅσα δὲ εἰς μαντικὴν ἐνεπόδιζεν ἢ πρὸς καθαρότητα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἁγνείαν ἢ πρὸς σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀρετῆς ἕξιν, παρῄνει φυλάττεσθαι, *VP* 24[106]). Like Philostratus, Iamblichus creates a strong relationship between dietetics, purity, and divination. Iamblichus delineates between levels of vegetarianism amongst Pythagoras' followers.

> Separately, to the most contemplative of the philosophers, and especially to those at the highest levels, he absolutely denied the superfluous and unjust foods, instructing them never to eat ensouled creatures, nor ever to drink wine, nor to sacrifice living things to the gods, nor hurt them whatsoever, but most carefully to preserve justice towards them.
>
> ἰδίᾳ δὲ τοῖς θεωρητικωτάτοις τῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀκροτάτοις καθάπαξ περιῄρει τὰ περιττὰ καὶ ἄδικα τῶν ἐδεσμάτων, μήτε ἔμψυχον μηδὲν μηδέποτε ἐσθίειν εἰσηγούμενος μήτε οἶνον ὅλως πίνειν μήτε θύειν ζῷα θεοῖς μήτε καταβλάπτειν μηδ' ὁτιοῦν αὐτά, διασῴζειν δὲ καὶ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὰ δικαιοσύνην ἐπιμελέστατα. *VP* 24(107)

Iamblichus continues that "to those, however, whose life was not completely purified, holy, and philosophic, he permitted to partake of living things. And for these he established a certain time of abstinence" (τοῖς μέντοι ἄλλοις ἐπέτρεπέ τινων ζῴων ἅπτεσθαι, ὅσοις ὁ βίος μὴ πάνυ ἦν ἐκκεκαθαρμένος καὶ ἱερὸς καὶ φιλόσοφος· καὶ τούτοις χρόνον τινὰ ὥριζε τῆς ἀποχῆς ὡρισμένον, *VP* 24[109]). It is worth noting that for the lowest level Pythagorean initiates, there was still a *temporary* requirement of abstention. The individuals, described as "not completely purified, holy, and philosophic," live under a more archaic system of purification, one that is specifically temporally delimited. The implication is, of course, that the most advanced Pythagoreans take up a way of life

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Jamblichs VP13 über den jungen Pyhtagoras berichtet). Haussleiter of course assumes that Iamblichus *VP* 2-5(3-25) comes from the historical Apollonius' lost biography of Pythagoras. Regardless of the original source of Iamb. *VP* 13, it does not, however, refer to *ta empsucha*, but rather *kreōphagia apotaxamenos*. It does refer to a "light" (*leptos*) diet, a term which Philostratus' Apollonius uses in his defense speech to Domitian, which will be discussed below.

where sacred time and secular time were not differentiated; their purification, like Apollonius', is a constant state of being.

The use of the term *ta empsucha* to refer to animals is distinctly Pythagorean, as demonstrated by the above testimonia. By conceiving of animals as ensouled, Pythagoreans created an implicit link between vegetarianism and the theory of transmigration of souls. Ingvild Sælid Gilhus notes two reasons for vegetarianism: either because men and animals are "part of the same community," or because men live on a higher level than animals, making the eating of animals a source of pollution.[84] Pythagoreans subscribe to the former belief that animals and humans have souls. Xenophanes preserves a story in which Pythagoras recognizes the soul of a friend in a dog that is being beaten.[85] Philostratus' Apollonius himself encounters the soul of an Egyptian king in the body of a lion. Philostratus states that the lion:

> collected alms everywhere around the cities, and was even allowed entrance into temples, since it was a pure animal. For it never licked up the blood of sacrifices, nor pounced on them being flayed and cut up, but lived upon honeycakes, bread, dried fruit, and boiled meats; it was also possible to happen upon it drinking wine without losing its character.
>
> ἤγειρε μὲν πολλαχοῦ τῶν πόλεων, παρῄει δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰ ἱερὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ καθαρὸς εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ τῶν θυομένων αἷμα ἀνελιχμᾶτο, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τὰ δερόμενά τε καὶ ῥαχιζόμενα τῶν ἱερείων ἦττεν, ἀλλὰ μελιττούταις διήγετο καὶ ἄρτοις καὶ τραγήμασι καὶ κρεῶν τοῖς ἑφθοῖς, ἐντυχεῖν δὲ ἦν αὐτῷ καὶ οἶνον πίνοντι μὴ μεθισταμένῳ τοῦ ἤθους. (*VA* 5.42)

The lion behaves in a manner atypical for an animal but expected of the pious individual. The lion keeps himself pure, and it is the lion's behavior, along with his fawning upon Apollonius, that inspires Apollonius to see the soul of an Egyptian king within the lion. Apollonius sends the lion to Leontopolis, where it will be dedicated to the temple. He states that he "considers it wrong that a king, having been changed into the most kingly

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[84] Gilhus (2006): 65, following Dierauer (1977): 286-90.
[85] Xenophanes fr. 7 West = Diog. Laert. 8.36.

of beasts, should beg, as if he were a human begger" ("βασιλέα γὰρ ἐς τὸ βασιλικώτατον τῶν θηρίων μεταβαλόντα οὐκ ἀξιῶ ἀγείρειν, καθάπερ τοὺς πτωχοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων." Ibid.).

Philostratus demonstrates in this scene that human souls can transmigrate into animal bodies, revealing that man and beast live within the same community. Through such a theory, Philostratus helps explain Apollonius' vegetarianism, though this doctrine was not universally found among Pythagoreans. Iamblichus states in *VP* 18(85) that "only into those animals, which are lawful to sacrifice, does a human soul not enter. For this reason, one may only eat sacrificial animals, which are proper to eat, but no other living beings" (εἰς μόνα τῶν ζῴων οὐκ εἰσέρχεται ἀνθρώπου ψυχή, οἷς θέμις ἐστὶ τυθῆναι· διὰ τοῦτο τῶν θυσίμων χρὴ ἐσθίειν μόνον, οἷς ἂν τὸ ἐσθίειν καθήκῃ, ἄλλου δὲ μηδενὸς ζῴου). Porphyry also relates that Pythagoras and his followers partook of sacrificial animal meat.[86] Both authors imply that certain animals do not carry human souls, and these are not only appropriate for sacrifice but even for eating. In an earlier passage, Iamblichus describes the strict abstention from meat by the highest level Pythagorean adherents.[87] Therefore, only lower orders of Pythagoras' followers would consume sacrificial animals.[88]

Pythagorean dietetics was not merely prohibitive. They can, and are, equally conceived of and discussed in terms of what is *permitted* and the benefits of those foods. When he decided to take up the Pythagorean way of life, Apollonius did not merely

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[86] Porph. *De Abstentia* 1.26.3.
[87] Iamb. *VP* 24(107), supra.
[88] See further Burkert (1972): 180-2.

abstain from animal foods but also started eating dried fruits, herbs, and vegetables.[89] This "light" diet grants him the ability to prognosticate. He explains how he perceived the plague at Ephesus to Domitian by stating that he eats "my own particular foods, light and sweeter than the luxuries of others" (κἀμοὶ δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ σιτίων, ὡς λεπτὰ καὶ ἡδίω τῆς ἑτέρων συβάριδος, *VA* 8.7.27). He continues by stating:

> This diet, my king, guards my senses in a certain ineffable ether, and does not permit anything foul to be around them and allows me to see clearly, as the sheen of a mirror, everything that is happening and will be.
>
> τοῦτό μοι, ὦ βασιλεῦ, τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐν αἰθρίᾳ τινὶ ἀπορρήτῳ φυλάττει κοὐκ ἐᾷ θολερὸν περὶ αὐτὰς οὐδὲν εἶναι, διορᾶν τε, ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρου αὐγῇ, πάντα γιγνόμενά τε καὶ ἐσόμενα. (ibid.).

Apollonius relates his foreknowledge to his light (*leptos*) diet, which alludes to the Greek religious and ethical traditions that he follows. This light diet is directly linked to the ether, reintroducing the Middle Platonic physics of *prognōsis*.

Iamblichus uses the same term, *leptos*, when he first describes Pythagoras' diet and its benefits: "he limited himself to a diet of light and easily digestible food" (τῇ δὲ τῶν λεπτῶν καὶ εὐαναδότων ἐδωδῇ συμμετρηθείς, *VP* 3[13] tr. Dillon and Hershbell). He continues that a benefit of this diet was "purity of his soul" (ψυχῆς καθαρότητα, ibid.). Like Philostratus' Apollonius, Iamblichus' Pythagoras pursues a dietary regimen out of concern for the state of his soul.

In this section, I have demonstrated that the practitioner of *prognōsis* must maintain a ritual purity akin to the purity required for entrance to a holy temple. Philostratus' Apollonius maintains this purity through Pythagorean asceticism, particularly through the abstention from animal foods (*ta empsucha*) and wine. Apollonius follows this practice because of the commonality between man and animal.

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[89] *VA* 1.8, supra.

He emphasizes the way in which his "light" diet keeps his soul in a state of ethereal purity. Through his ascetic practices and dietetics, Philostratus' Apollonius brings together the physical component of *prognōsis* (the ether within the soul) with the religious component (purification) and ethical component (abstention from animal products). Philostratus once again highlights the Hellenistic background to Apollonius' foreknowledge.

V. *Prognōsis* and Middle Platonic Ethics

In the previous two sections, I examined the workings of *prognōsis*, both its philosophical basis and its ritual components. I end by examining Iarchas' initial statement about *prognōsis*, that those who practice it "become divine by it and work towards the salvation of mankind" (θεῖοί τε ὑπ' αὐτῆς γίγνονται καὶ πρὸς σωτηρίαν ἀνθρώπων πράττουσι, *VA* 3.42). Philostratus once again places *prognōsis* within a Greek philosophical framework, here focusing on the ethical goals found in Middle Platonic philosophy. *Prognōsis* leads both to divinization of the practitioner and aids in the salvation of mankind. Philostratus' Apollonius thus represents an important point in the history of Platonic thought with regard to these issues.

In the first century BCE, Eudorus stated that the ethical *telos* of Middle Platonic philosophy is assimilation to God.[90] David Sedley further suggests that a well-educated citizen of the Roman Empire would state assimilation to god as "the official moral goal, or *telos*" of Plato's philosophical system.[91] The importance of *homoiōsis theōi* in Plato's

[90] apud. Stob. *Anth.* 2.7.3f; cf. Dillon (1996): 122-3.
[91] Sedley (2000): 791.

later work and its reception cannot be denied. While Dillon suggests that Eudorus is specifically referencing *Theaetetus* 176b, the *locus classicus* for *homoiōsis theōi*,[92] I will also look at the *Timaeus*, which more strongly influences Philostratus' work.[93]

In the *Timaeus* Plato suggests that the manner in which god framed the universe is due to god's goodness. As he is good, and therefore completely without envy, he wishes everything to become like himself as much as possible.[94] Apollonius echoes Plato: "the cause of [god's] design is that he is good" (τοῦ δὲ ἐνθυμηθῆναι ταῦτα αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι αὐτόν, *VA* 8.7.22). Like Philostratus, Plato equates man's affinity to god with the human soul. Plato argues that the universe is a singular, living thing,[95] and it is fashioned in such a way so that it should be considered a god.[96] God fashions the world-soul out of sameness and difference, and from the remnants of these ingredients he makes the immortal, intellectual part of the human soul.[97] The soul is described as "the best of things brought into being by the most excellent of things intelligible and eternal" (λογισμοῦ δὲ μετέχουσα καὶ ἁρμονίας ψυχή, τῶν νοητῶν ἀεί τε ὄντων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀρίστη γενομένη τῶν γεννηθέντων, Tim 37a tr. Cornford). In so far as the soul is the most excellent thing created, and God is the most excellent thing that is intelligible, then the soul must contain within it some part of the divine. What separates the soul from all

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[92] Dillon (1996): 123.
[93] See the discussion of ether above; see also *VA* 6.22, where Philostratus specifically mentions the *Timaeus* as a subject of Apollonius' conversations.
[94] *Tim.* 29e.
[95] *Tim.* 30c-d.
[96] διὰ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα εὐδαίμονα θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐγεννήσατο (*Tim.* 34b).
[97] On the creation of the world soul, see *Tim.* 35a-37al; on the creation of man's soul, see *Tim.* 41d-42d.

other things is its possession of intelligence (*nous*),[98] which creates the likeness between man and the divine.

I suggested that the ether within the soul creates the affinity between man and the divine in the *VA* and in Platonic thought. The soul becomes the agent of assimilation in Plato and Philostratus, yet the process and purpose of assimilation is slightly different. In the *Timaeus* assimilation is accomplished through astronomy. Each star has a soul attached to it. This soul is implanted within a mortal body, and thus it must experience emotions and passions. The man who manages to conquer his emotions would lead a just life and would return to the star he came from after death.[99] Assimilation in Plato, like Philostratus, is soteriological, but it is concerned with the salvation of the individual soul from the world of sensation. Assimilation to God as described in *Theaetetus* 176a-b has a similar escapist soteriology.

> But it is not possible, Theodorus, that evil should be destroyed – for there must always be something opposed to the good; nor is it possible that it should have its seat in heaven. But it must inevitably haunt human life, and prowl about this earth. That is why a man should make all haste to escape from earth to heaven; and escape means becoming as like God as possible; and a man becomes like God when he becomes just and pure, with understanding. (trans. Leavett)
>
> Ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδωρε— ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη—οὔτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. (*Tht.* 176a-b)

The world is filled with evil that ultimately cannot be destroyed. The only way to escape from the evil is to become like God, and to become like God implies fleeing from the sensible world.

The soteriological aspect of assimilation to God as described in the *Timaeus* and *Theaetetus* is quite different from that which is described by Philostratus. For

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[98] *Tim.* 46d.
[99] *Tim.* 41d-42c.

Philostratus, assimilation to God is not about escaping from the sensible world nor does it solely concern the individual soul. Rather, Philostratus uses the prognosticator's assimilation to God for both the salvation of all mankind and the improvement of the sensible world. In his Apology, Apollonius expresses that the man who has become God-like has the duty of saving the rest of mankind and redeeming the sensible world. Apollonius describes a cosmology that has strong Platonic resonances.

> This account recognizes god as the creator of the generation and being of the universe, and the cause of his concern about these things is that he is good. Now since these things are related, I cling to this account and say that the good among men have something of God in them. We must consider the universe, the one that depends upon God the Demiurge, as being all the things in heaven, the sea, and the earth, of which things there is an equal share for men, save by misfortune. But there is a certain other universe, dependent upon a good man, which does not exceed the limit of wisdom, which you yourself, my King, will say requires a man who is likened to God.
>
> ὁ λόγος δὲ τῆς μὲν τῶν ὅλων γενέσεώς τε καὶ οὐσίας θεὸν δημιουργὸν οἶδε, τοῦ δὲ ἐνθυμηθῆναι ταῦτα αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι αὐτόν· ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ξυγγενῆ ταῦτα, ἔχομαι τοῦ λόγου καὶ φημὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων θεοῦ τι ἔχειν. κόσμος δὲ ὁ μὲν ἐπὶ θεῷ δημιουργῷ κείμενος τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ νομιζέσθω καὶ τὰ ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ γῇ πάντα, ὧν μετουσία ἴσῃ ἀνθρώποις, πλὴν τύχης. ἔστι δέ τις καὶ ἐπ' ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κόσμος οὐχ ὑπερβάλλων τὰ σοφίας μέτρα, ὅν που καὶ αὐτός, ὦ βασιλεῦ, φήσεις ἀνδρὸς δεῖσθαι θεῷ εἰκασμένου. (*VA* 8.7.22)

Philostratus frames this speech with a defense of the Indian Brahmans, from whom Apollonius states this doctrine comes. Philostratus thus brings together his defense of Apollonius' association with the Indian Brahmans and his defense of Apollonius' foreknowledge. He reasserts Apollonius' Hellenism on both accounts, since the Brahmans imparted upon Apollonius a Platonic philosophy. The man "who is likened to God" is the man who has become divine through *prognōsis*. It is worth noting that the second universe is delimited by wisdom, which has been central to the discussion of Apollonius' foreknowledge. It is on the plane of wisdom, namely the second universe, where Apollonius becomes an important figure.

Apollonius concludes this portion of the Apology by describing the man who can save this second universe:

> Now it requires a man, who would take care of a universe of such souls, a god who has come from wisdom. For this man is able to lead them away from their desires, by which they are carried out of their usual associations, and from their avarice, on account of which they do not say that they have anything, unless their mouths are held open for wealth to stream into it.
>
> ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἀνδρός, ὃς ἐπιμελήσεται τοῦ περὶ αὐτὰς κόσμου, θεὸς ὑπὸ σοφίας ἥκων. οὑτοσὶ γὰρ ἀπόχρη αὐτὰς ἐρώτων τε ἀπάγειν, ἐφ' οὓς ἀγριώτερον τῆς ξυνήθους ὁμιλίας ἐκφέρονται, καὶ φιλοχρηματίας, δι' ἣν οὔπω πᾶν ἔχειν φασίν, ἐπεὶ μὴ καὶ τὸ στόμα ὑπέχουσιν ἐπιρρέοντι τῷ πλούτῳ. (*VA* 8.7.23)

Apollonius elevates the savior-figure of the second universe to a divinity, specifically one that comes from wisdom. Since *prognōsis* is a type of wisdom and Iarchas states that the prognosticator becomes divine, Apollonius is clearly referring to himself. His task, as the divinized prognosticator, is to use his panoptic vision to better man. Philostratus thereby constructs a soteriology that, though based in Platonism, exceeds the goals of Middle Platonic thought. Whereas Plato and the Middle Platonists expressed assimilation to God as an escape from the sensible universe, Philostratus sees assimilation to God as leading to the salvation of the sensible universe.

Though Plato and Philostratus seem to have quite different takes on the soteriological aspect of assimilation, John Armstrong has recently suggested that one can in fact find a theory of assimilation in Plato that commits the individual to improving the sensible world instead of fleeing from it. Armstrong predicates this theory on the conception of God found in the *Timaeus*, *Philebus*, and *Laws*, where Plato equates God with *nous* (intellect).[100] In the twelfth book of the *Laws*, the guardian is said to use his knowledge of the cosmic intelligence for the ordering of the city:

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[100] Armstrong (2004).

> After [a guardian] has considered the way in which these matters relate to the Muse, he should apply them harmoniously to customs and to the practices of character. He should be able to give an account of as many of these customs and practices as have an account. The one incapable of acquiring these abilities in addition to the popular virtues would hardly ever become a competent ruler of an entire city, but would be an assistant to other rulers. (as translated in Armstrong [2004]: 178-9)
>
> τά τε κατὰ τὴν μοῦσαν τούτοις τῆς κοινωνίας συνθεασάμενος, χρήσηται πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἠθῶν ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ νόμιμα συναρμοττόντως, ὅσα τε λόγον ἔχει, τούτων δυνατὸς ᾖ δοῦναι τὸν λόγον· ὁ δὲ μὴ ταῦθ' οἷός τ' ὢν πρὸς ταῖς δημοσίαις ἀρεταῖς κεκτῆσθαι σχεδὸν ἄρχων μὲν οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο ἱκανὸς ὅλης πόλεως, ὑπηρέτης δ' ἂν ἄλλοις ἄρχουσιν. (*Leges* 967E2-968A4)

Armstrong notes the relationship between theoretical studies and application. He states that the explanation for such a move is the relationship between the divine and the human:

> The divine men of the *Laws* imitate on the social level what god does at the cosmic level. As the demiurge of the *Timaeus* looked to an eternal model before creating our world (*Tim.* 29a), the guardians too combine knowledge and practice. Contemplation and action are harmonious aspects of the ideal life.[101]

Armstrong's interpretation of the *Laws* reveals a clear relationship between Philostratus' theory of assimilation and salvation and Platonic doctrine. Each depend upon a sympathetic relationship between God and man, specifically located in the soul (predicated on ether in Philostratus and *nous* in Plato), and both see salvation as not merely interested in the reunion of the immortal soul with a divine element, but also interested in the improvement of the material world. The divinization of man through *prognōsis* thereby contains a strong Platonic element, adding the third leg to Philostratus' defense of Apollonius' foreknowledge.

VI. Conclusion

Apollonius of Tyana faces charges of magic on two counts: his association with Eastern sages and his foreknowledge. By sculpting a defense rooted in Greek religious and

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[101] Ibid: 179.

cultural identity, Philostratus supports Apollonius' emergence as a holy man and a monumental figure in the history of divination in the ancient world. Philostratus' theory of *prognōsis*, the backbone of his defense, is linked to an unmistakenly Hellenistic pedigree. This concept relates Apollonius' foreknowledge to Middle Platonic philosophy, religious ritual and a soteriological ethic, allowing for the development of his character as a wise and pure man worthy of panoptic vision and dedicated to practicing divination for the benefit of mankind.

Chapter 4
Apollonius on Trial

In the previous two chapters, I examined the two explicit reasons for the accusation of being a magician made against Apollonius. In this chapter, I will look at the underlying reason for the charge, namely the perceived threat Apollonius presents to traditional political and religious order. Whereas Philostratus used the term *magos* to refer to Apollonius' negative reputation in the programmatic chapter (*VA* 1.2), every subsequent time Apollonius comes under attack, he uses the term *goēs*. Apollonius faces slander in both legal and religious contexts.

In this chapter, I examine the use of the word *goēs* in the *VA*, looking at the legal and religious contexts individually. I argue that the accusation of *goēteia* occurs when Philostratus' Apollonius appears to challenge traditional authority, whether the political authority of Domitian or the religious authority of various priests. I conclude by suggesting that the accusation of *goēteia* stems from a misunderstanding of the authority Philostratus' Apollonius represents. Drawing upon the work of J.Z. Smith and Peter Brown, I analyze Philostratus' Apollonius in relation to both the locative/utopian religion dichotomy and the implications for the rise of the hly man. While Apollonius does represent a delocalized religious figure who can be construed to usurp traditional religious and political authority, his activities and statements reveal an equal concern for the renewal of traditional authority.

I. A Famework for Accusations of Magic

1. *Goēs* and *Goēteia*

Modern scholarship on Greco-Roman magic and ancient authors themselves often link the terms *magos* and *goēs*.[1] Philostratus, however, makes a point to differentiate between the two. As I argued in the introduction and in chapter two, Philostratus uses *magos* to refer specifically to Persian priests and only once gives the term a negative valence.[2] The fact that he switches to *goēs* for instances in which Apollonius faces legal accusations and religious slander already indicates that the word is a stronger term of abuse. In two short digressions from his main narrative, Philostratus provides us his view of the nature and abilities of the *goēs*.

The first occurs after Apollonius predicts the short reigns of Vitellius, Galba, and Otho. (*VA* 5.11) Philostratus explains that Apollonius "prognosticated such things by divine impulse" (τὰ τοιαῦτα δαιμονίᾳ κινήσει προεγίγνωσκε, *VA* 5.12) and rejects the conclusion that Apollonius is a *goēs* because of this *prognōsis* (τοῖς γόητα τὸν ἄνδρα ἡγουμένοις οὐχ ὑγιαίνει ὁ λόγος, ibid.). He continues to discuss his opinions of *goētes*:

> *Goētes*, who in my opinion are the most wretched of men, claim that they change that which has been decreed by fate, some by making recourse to torturing ghosts, others by barbaric sacrifices, and others by singing or anointing something.
>
> οἱ γόητες, ἡγοῦμαι δ' αὐτοὺς ἐγὼ κακοδαιμονεστάτους ἀνθρώπων, οἱ μὲν ἐς βασάνους εἰδώλων χωροῦντες, οἱ δ' ἐς θυσίας βαρβάρους, οἱ δὲ ἐς τὸ ἐπᾷσαί τι ἢ ἀλεῖψαι μεταποιεῖν φασι τὰ εἱμαρμένα. (*VA* 5.12)

Philostratus makes an explicit contrast between *goētes* and Apollonius. While some may link Apollonius' foreknowledge to *goēteia*, true *goētes* claim to alter fate, whereas

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[1] The best evidence for the conflation of the two terms comes from Phyrnichus' notice that *goēs* is more Attic than *magos*; see chapter two, note 33. Likewise, the Suda specifically differentiates between the terms *mageia*, *goēteia*, and *pharmakeia* (s.v. *goēteia*). For the linking of the terms in modern scholarship, see Collins (2008), 49-60; Ogden (2002), 5-6; Dickie (2001), 12-17; Graf (1997), 21-29.

[2] Cf. *Ep. Ap.* 16 and Apul. *Apol.* 25.

Apollonius "followed the decrees of the Fates" (ὁ δὲ εἵπετο μὲν τοῖς ἐκ Μοιρῶν, ibid.). Indeed, Apollonius places great importance to following and accepting Fate. At the end of his defense speech, Apollonius states "it falls to us to follow the Fates" (προσήκει γὰρ ταῖς Μοίραις ἕπεσθαι, 8.7.49). Likewise, Philostratus ends the work by praising Apollonius for revealing the mysteries of the soul "so that we might be led to the place the Fates have appointed for us" (οἳ τάττουσι Μοῖραι πορευοίμεθα, 8.31).

Philostratus' view of *goētes* stems not only from their claim to alter fate but also from the methods they use to achieve their goal. These methods highlight two important features of *goētes*, both suggesting their transgressive nature. First, their power over spirits shows them crossing the established boundaries between the land of the living and of the dead. Second, their use of "barbarian sacrifices" implies a foreign origin or at least the use of foreign ritual practices. Either way, "barbarian sacrifices" activates a sense of otherness that marginalizes the practitioner and characterizes their activities as going beyond normative Greek practices.[3]

Philostratus' second digression occurs after Apollonius frees himself from the chains in Domitian's prison "neither making a sacrifice . . . nor praying for anything, nor speaking" (μὴ γὰρ θύσαντα . . . μηδ' εὐξάμενόν τι, μηδὲ εἰπόντα, *VA* 7.38). In the following chapter, Philostratus states that "more simple-minded men attribute these things to *goētes*" (οἱ δὲ εὐηθέστεροι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐς τοὺς γόητας ἀναφέρουσι ταῦτα, *VA* 7.39). The people who do turn to the aid of *goētes*, according to him, include athletes, merchants, and especially lovers. Interestingly, the *defixiones* that survive from antiquity

[3] Philostratus also makes the common association of *goētes* with singing, for which we have attestations as early as Eurpides (*Hipp.* 1038-40; *Bacch.* 1038-40). On *goēteia* and song, see Johnston (1999): 111-112.

include curses and binding spells for each of these individuals.[4] By extension, *goētes*, in Philostratus' account, are individuals who take advantage of the simple-mindedness of men by claiming that *defixiones* can aid them in their pursuits.

Though focusing on the Classical period, Sarah Iles Johnston develops a similar theory about *goēteia*. In her analysis, she argues that "control of the dead was the very essence of *goēteia*."[5] She bases her conclusion on several changes that occurred in Greek ideas about the dead from Homer to the early Classical period. First, Greeks began to think that the souls of the dead, which were relatively impotent in the Archaic age, could cause tangible effects in the world of the living. She attributes this change in thought partly due to contact during the Orientalizing period with Mesopotamian and Egyptian ideas about the dead.[6] Thus from its very roots, *goēteia* had foreign associations.

Second, the change in attitude about the dead was reflected in Greek lamentation practice. Both the *thrēnos*, a controlled and orderly expression of grief that focused on the achievements of the dead, and the *goös*, a spontaneous lament connected with women related to the deceased that emphasized their pain as survivors, became more restricted by laws governing funerary practices.[7] The *thrēnos* became established poetically, while the *goös* was truncated in length, frequency, and number of participants allowed. The laments of female mourners could threaten the unity of the polis by rousing others to seek revenge on behalf of the dead and their survivors.[8]

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[4] For athletic curses, see the *defixiones* in Gager (1992):42-77; business, ibid.: 151-174; love, ibid.: 78-115.
[5] Johnston (1999): 105.
[6] Ibid.: 86-95.
[7] Ibid.: 100-102.
[8] Just as the restrictions placed on the *goös* revealed an anxiety about the disruption of social unity, the attempts to control *goēteia* reveal a similar concern, as I will argue below.

At about the same time lament was being restricted, the art of *goēteia* arose. In fact, Walter Burkert has demonstrated that *goēs* shares a common root with *goös*.[9] The Suda provides the most blatant linking of *goēteia* and necromancy, referring to *goēteia* as "the raising of the dead through invocation, whence it is derived from the wails and dirges that occur at funeral-rites" (γοητεία δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνάγειν νεκρὸν δι' ἐπικλήσεως, ὅθεν εἴρηται ἀπὸ τῶν γόων καὶ τῶν θρήνων τῶν περὶ τοὺς τάφους γινομένων, s.v. γοήτεια).[10]

Johnston argues that the association between *goēteia* and necromancy can be found in much earlier texts. Plato, for example, states in the *Laws* that those who practice *goēteia* claim to accomplish two things: lead up souls (*psychagōgein*) and persuade the gods.[11] Johnston argues that these two things are in fact related. *Defixiones*, particularly from the Classical period, called upon departed souls to act in the world of the living. To gain control over these souls, however, the practitioner required the assistance of a deity, usually one that was already associated in the Greek mind with control over the dead (e.g. Hermes, portrayed as *psychopompos* as early as *Odyssey* 24).[12] Johnston further adduces Plato's *Sophist*, in which the Athenian Stranger states that the sophist uses *goēteia* to bring to light "verbal ghosts" (εἴδωλα λεγόμενα, 234c5-6), and the *Republic*, in which Socrates calls that which only seems to exist an "apparition" (φάντασμα) produced by

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[9] Burkert (1962): esp. 43.
[10] The Suda differentiates between *mageia*, *goēteia*, and *pharmakeia*. *Mageia* and *goēteia* both deal with the invocation (*epiklēsis*) of a spirit, but *mageia* is given a positive valence (with specific reference to Apollonius of Tyana) and *goēteia* a negative one. Ps-Nonnos makes a similar differentiation (Ps-Nonnus, 4.17 = *PG* 38.491). *Pharmakeiai* deals specifically with poisons.
[11] Pl. *Leg.* 909b2-5.
[12] Johnston (1999): 71-80.

goēteia (584a9-10), to demonstrate Plato linking *goēteia* and necromancy metaphorically.[13]

Even earlier than Plato, the fifth-century historian Pherecydes makes a similar association between *goēteia* and binding spells. He refers to two groups of Idaean Dactyls: "those to the left" and "those to the right." The first group consists of *goētes*, whereas the second group consists of *analountes*, "releasers" (Ἀριστεροὶ μὲν, ὥς φησι Φερεκύδης, οἱ γόητες αὐτῶν· οἱ δὲ ἀναλύοντες, δεξιοὶ, Pherecyd. *FGrH* 3 F 47). Attic curse tablets as early as the fourth century BCE reveal that *analuō* could refer specifically to releasing from a binding spell.[14] The dichotomy between the two groups of Dactyls suggests that the *goētes*, in apposition to the *analuontes*, were ones involved in the casting of binding spells.[15]

Johnston's work on *goēteia* coupled with Philostratus' two digressions provides a portrait of the *goēs*: he is a foreigner, one who claims to alter fate through rituals, particularly those involving the dead, and he dupes the simple-minded, claiming the efficacy of *defixiones*. Philostratus ends the second digression by noting that this skill "goes against nature and the law" (φύσει διαβέβληται καὶ νόμῳ, ibid.).

2. Accusations of Magic

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[13] Johnston ignores the association Plato makes with *goēteia* and false persuasion. Before discussing *goēteia*'s claim to "lead up souls" (*psychagōgein*), the Athenian Stranger first states that *goēteia* "beguiles many of the living" (ψυχαγωγῶσι μὲν πολλοὺς τῶν ζώντων, *Leg.* 909b2, note that *psychagōgein* is used in both cases). Likewise, the use of *phantasma* and *eidōla* emphasize *goēteia*'s distance from the truth. In *Republic* 602c-d, Socrates argues that mimesis is a third remove from the truth and *skiagraphia* (scene-painting) "falls nothing short of *goēteia*" (γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει).

[14] Jordan (1985): #18. Cf. Johnston (1999): 105.

[15] The fact that the Dactyls were from Ida and thought to be *goētes* further emphasizes the foreign element of *goēteia*.

E.E. Evans-Pritchard's seminal work on witchcraft beliefs among the Azande has provided anthropologists and historians a theoretical framework for the study of witchcraft accusations.[16] He argued that witchcraft beliefs "embrace a system of values which regulate human conduct"[17] and are "a function of personal relations."[18] They have a normative effect on behavior and help negotiate social relations.[19] In Azande society, witchcraft accusations occur in areas where social relations are ambiguous; in situations where wealth, status, or other forms of "social separation" exists, accusations are not made. "A man quarrels with and is jealous of his social equals. . . . Commoners bear ill-will against commoners and princes hate princes."[20] From Evans-Pritchard's study came the notion that witchcraft beliefs provide a "homeostatic control system," for society.[21]

Peter Brown applied Evans-Pritchard's sociological model to the study of magic accusations in Late Antiquity.[22] While scholars prior to him linked the prevalence of magic accusations in Late Antiquity to a decline in the rationalism, morale, and culture of the Roman ruling classes, Brown suggests that the fear of magic was no greater in the fourth century CE than it was in the first century; we merely happen to have more accounts of these accusations.[23] Encountering the magician in these accounts places the

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[16] Evans-Pritchard (1937). For the impact of Evans-Pritchard's work, see the essays collected in Douglas (1970).
[17] Evans-Pritchard (1976): 18.
[18] Ibid.: 48.
[19] Ibid.: 42-48; cf. Douglas (1970): xvii-xxiii.
[20] Evans-Pritchard (1976): 46.
[21] Douglas (1970): xix. One major critique of the sociological approach pioneered by Evans-Pritchard has been its inability to explain why magic in particular is the tool for societal control. As J.Z. Smith states, "any form of *ressentiment*, for real imagined reasons . . . *may* trigger a language of alienating displacement of which the accusation of magic is *just one possibility* in any given culture's rich vocabulary of alterity." (1995: 19)
[22] Brown (1970), focusing specifically on the fourth century CE.
[23] Ibid.: 20. As evidence for the fear of magic in the first century, he cites Plin. *HN* 28.4.9, "there is no one who is not afraid of becoming the object of lethal spells." For the older view, see for example MacMullen

accusations into a context in which the structures of the governing class reached their highest level of uncertainty and change. Brown finds in these accusations the clash of two systems of power: the "articulate" power, which is the power "defined and agreed upon by everyone . . . authority vested in precise persons; admiration and success gained by recognized channels,"[24] and the "inarticulate" power, which is "the imponderable advantages of certain groups; personal skills that succeed in a way that is unacceptable or difficult to understand."[25] The clash of the traditional (i.e. articulate power) with a novel authority (i.e. inarticulate power) in a society can lead to accusations of magic.[26]

II. The legal accusation

Given Philostratus' statement that *goēteia* goes against the law, one would expect that his protagonist, when faced with legal charges, would be indicted for practicing this art. While Apollonius' unnamed accuser does call him a *goēs* (*VA* 7.17; 8.3) and Apollonius himself refers to the practices and characteristics of *goētes* throughout his defense speech (*VA* 8.7), the major legal charge at issue is having performed human sacrifice for divinatory purposes.[27]

(1966): 124-127. In discussing Apuleius' status as a philosopher in the *Apology*, MacMullen states that "popular and educated views, philosophy and magic, were drawing steadily closer. . . . astronomy and mathematics blended into astrology and numerology, the ancient sciences being in all these ways thoroughly contaminated with superstition." (124-5)

[24] Ibid.: 21.

[25] Ibid.: 21-22.

[26] It is worth noting that the two powers that clash still follow Evans-Pritchard's model of magic accusations occurring between social equals. The conflict occurs in the "inner ring of the court" (23) and reveals a theme of "the predominance of an ill-defined aristocracy of culture and inherited prestige, constantly pressing in upon an autocracy whose servants derived their status from membership of a meticulously graded bureaucracy" (25).

[27] Interestingly, the term *goēteia* never appears in the *VA*. Apollonius' accuser links the human sacrifice with divination, as can be ascertained by Apollonius' statement at *VA* 8.7.30 (supra, chapter 3).

Since the time of Augustus, who near the end of his life prohibited divinatory consultations without the presence of a third person, divination was at the very least a suspect activity; it had to be performed with witnesses and in a public place. Apollonius' accuser alleges that Apollonius performed a sacrifice of an Arcadian boy in the countryside, at nighttime, for the benefit of Nerva, whom Domitian already suspects of imperial ambitions. Though other topics arise, Aelianus, the prefect of the Praetorian Guard under Domitian, emphasizes the importance of this charge:

> One allegation is the least plausible of all to me, since I know that you find even the blood of sacrificial animals intolerable, but it is the most plausible to the emperor. You are said to have gone to Nerva in the country, and butchered an Arcadian boy for him when he was sacrificing the for the emperor's harm, and by this sacrifice you raised his hopes, and all this was done at night towards the end of the month. Since this charge is much the gravest, let us not consider any other comparable with it. When he seizes on your clothes, your way of life, and your foreknowledge, he is clearly leading up to this charge, and claiming that those things led to your crime against him."
>
> τὸ δὲ ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀπιθανώτατον, γιγνώσκω γάρ, ὅτι μηδὲ τὸ τῶν ἱερῶν αἷμα ἀνέχῃ, τῷ δὲ βασιλεῖ πιθανώτατον διαβάλλεται· φασὶν ἐς ἀγρὸν βαδίσαντά σε παρὰ Νερούαν τεμεῖν αὐτῷ παῖδα Ἀρκάδα θυομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸν βασιλέα καὶ ἐπᾶραι αὐτὸν τοῖς ἱεροῖς τούτοις, πεπρᾶχθαι δὲ ταῦτα νύκτωρ φθίνοντος ἤδη τοῦ μηνός. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κατηγόρημα, ἐπειδὴ πολλῷ μεῖζον, μὴ ἕτερόν τι παρ' ἐκεῖνο ἡγώμεθα, ὁ γὰρ λαμβανόμενος τοῦ σχήματος καὶ τῆς διαίτης καὶ τοῦ προγιγνώσκειν ἐς τοῦτο δήπου ξυντείνει καὶ ταῦτά γε καὶ τὴν παρανομίαν τὴν ἐς αὐτὸν δοῦναί σοί φησι καὶ τὸ ἐς τὴν θυσίαν θάρσος. χρὴ οὖν παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν ὑπὲρ τούτων ἀπολογίαν, ἔστω δέ σοι ὁ λόγος μὴ ὑπερορῶν τοῦ βασιλέως. (*VA* 7.20)

Apollonius' accuser uses the incidental counts of the indictment – clothes, way of life, foreknowledge – to bolster his negative representation of Apollonius, namely that he is a *goēs*.[28] If Euphrates can convince Domitian that Apollonius is a *goēs*, the charge of human sacrifice becomes all the more plausible. The underlying, implicit issue at stake, however, is the future of the imperial line. The legal accusation has less to do with magic and religion than it does with imperial politics.

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[28] Apollonius' accuser only calls him a *goēs* in an informal setting before the trial, never as part of the actual legal indictment itself.

III. The religious slander

Apollonius also faces the accusation of being a *goēs* in religious contexts. This occurs twice in the work: first in book four, by the hierophant initiating Athenians into the Eleusinian mysteries during the Epidaurian festival, second towards the end of book eight (after his trial in front of Domitian) by the priests who oversee the oracle of Trophonius. In each case, traditional religious officials, holders of Brown's concept of *articulate power*, bar Apollonius' entry and participation in religious ritual. In each case, Apollonius responds by demonstrating a superior knowledge of the rites than the priests, causing them to recant and to grant him access. The stakes are different than in the legal charge; to the priests, Apollonius presents a challenge to their religious authority; Apollonius attracts adherents to him and away from traditional religious practice. They label him a *goēs* in order to marginalize and discredit him, a move made to reestablish the traditional religious order, but one that ultimately fails. To better conceptualize these scenes, I will begin by examining Apollonius how Apollonius' changing relationship with the divine, particularly the god Asclepius, underwrites the perceived shift in religious authority.

1. Apollonius and Asclepius

Apollonius spent his youth in Aegae, where he first adopted the Pythagorean way of life. His teacher, Euxenus, inquires how he will begin his Pythagorean life, to which he replies "as doctors do, for even they, by purifying their patients' stomachs, prevent some from becoming sick and cure others" ("ὅθεν περ οἱ ἰατροί," ἔφη, "καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι καθαίροντες τὰς γαστέρας τοὺς μὲν οὐδὲ νοσεῖν ἐῶσι, τοὺς δὲ ἰῶνται," *VA* 1.8).

Apollonius uses dietetics to achieve a state of purity, thereby making a medical act a prerequisite to Pythagoreanism. It is surely no coincidence that after he cleanses himself of meats and wines he takes up residence at the temple of the god most strongly associated with medicine. When Apollonius moves to the temple, "the personnel of the temple were awed by him, and Asclepius told the priests he was glad to cure the sick with Apollonius as his witness" (ἐκπεπληγμένων δὲ αὐτὸν τῶν περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ ποτε πρὸς τὸν ἱερέα φήσαντος, ὡς χαίροι θεραπεύων τοὺς νοσοῦντας ὑπὸ Ἀπολλωνίῳ μάρτυρι, ibid.). Apollonius begins his relationship with Asclepius as a witness, a mere observer to the God's healing.

It is only a chapter later that Apollonius' relationship with Asclepius develops further. He becomes not a mere witness to Asclepius' deeds but also an agent for the god's cures:

> An Assyrian youth had come to visit Asclepius, but indulged himself even on his sickbed. Drink was his life, or rather his death, for in fact he had dropsy and from love of wine neglected a dry diet. So Asclepius neglected him and did not even visit him in sleep. But when the youth reproached him for this, the god appeared to him and said, "If you talk with Apollonius, you will get relief."
>
> μειράκιον γὰρ δὴ Ἀσσύριον παρὰ τὸν Ἀσκληπιὸν ἧκον ἐτρύφα νοσοῦν καὶ ἐν πότοις ἔζη, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπέθνησκεν· ὑδέρῳ δὲ ἄρα εἴχετο καὶ μέθῃ χαῖρον αὐχμοῦ ἠμέλει. ἠμελεῖτο δὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ οὐδὲ ὄναρ αὐτῷ ἐφοίτα. ἐπιμεμφομένῳ δὲ ταῦτα ἐπιστὰς ὁ θεὸς, "εἰ Ἀπολλωνίῳ," ἔφη, "διαλέγοιο, ῥᾴων ἔσῃ." (*VA* 1.8)

The Assyrian complains to Apollonius that Asclepius promises health but refuses to give it. Apollonius rebukes the Assyrian for blasphemy and restores him to health by informing him that the richness of his diet goes contrary to his illness. Asclepius essentially sends the Assyrian to Apollonius for medical advice, which Apollonius provides through his knowledge of dietetics. In essence, Apollonius has taken over the function of the priests of Asclepius. In traditional incubation ritual, Asclepius would

send a dream to the petitioner, which a priest interprets the following day in order to prescribe the correct cure. By going from witness to taking on the role of the priest, Apollonius' relationship to Asclepius has become closer and more intimate.

A dramatic shift occurs when Apollonius returns from India, in which Apollonius takes on the role of Asclepius himself. The cause for the shift comes from the knowledge he acquires from Iarchas, the leader of the Brahmans, about the relationship between *prognōsis*, the form of divination I described earlier, and medicine, namely that medicine derives directly from *prognōsis*. Philostratus reports Iarchas' discourse on medicine and prophecy:

> He said that it [*mantikē*] provides men many good things, but the greatest is the gift of medicine. The wise sons of Asclepius would never have attained their knowledge of this unless Asclepius had been born the son of Apollo, and by following his father's sayings and prophecies had inferred the remedies appropriate to each disease. He in turn transmitted them to his sons, and taught his followers which herbs should be applied to running wounds, and which to inflamed and dry ones, and as well how to make up medicines which reduce dropsy, staunch blood, cure consumption and similar wasting diseases. And who will deprive prophecy of cures drawn from venomous creatures and of using such creatures themselves to heal many illnesses. Without the wisdom of foreknowledge I do not think mankind would ever have ventured to compound the most deadly of drugs with the healing ones.
>
> καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτὴν ἀγαθὰ ἔλεγε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰργάσθαι, μέγιστον δὲ τὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς δῶρον· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε τοὺς σοφοὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας ἐς ἐπιστήμην τούτου παρελθεῖν, εἰ μὴ παῖς Ἀπόλλωνος Ἀσκληπιὸς γενόμενος καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐκείνου φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας ξυνθεὶς τὰ πρόσφορα ταῖς νόσοις φάρμακα παισί τε ἑαυτοῦ παρέδωκε καὶ τοὺς ξυνόντας ἐδιδάξατο, τίνας μὲν δεῖ προσάγειν πόας ὑγροῖς ἕλκεσι, τίνας δὲ αὐχμηροῖς καὶ ξηροῖς ξυμμετρίας τε ποτίμων φαρμάκων, ὑφ' ὧν ὕδεροι ἀποχετεύονται καὶ αἷμα ἴσχεται φθόαι τε παύονται καὶ τὰ οὕτω κοῖλα. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἰοβόλων δὲ ἄκη καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἰοβόλοις αὐτοῖς ἐς πολλὰ τῶν νοσημάτων χρῆσθαι τίς ἀφαιρήσεται τὴν μαντικήν; οὐ γάρ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἄνευ τῆς προγιγνωσκούσης σοφίας θαρσῆσαί ποτε ἄνθρωποι τὰ πάντων ὀλεθριώτατα φαρμάκων ἐγκαταμῖξαι τοῖς σώζουσιν. (*VA* 3.44)

Iarchas subordinates medicine to divination. Asclepius' power of healing comes directly from Apollo, the god most closely associated with divination, which Asclepius in turn transmits into medical knowledge to his followers. Prior to his trip to India, medical knowledge was the basis through which Apollonius understood Pythagorean *askēsis*.

Medical knowledge also allowed Apollonius to become Asclepius' agent. Now he has learned that purification, accomplished through Pythagorean *askēsis*, brings the gift of *prognōsis*, which is the source of man's medical knowledge. Moreover, through *prognōsis*, Apollonius (a name which incidentally means belonging to Apollo) becomes equated with the Delphic Apollo. The equation of Apollonius and Apollo reverses the divine-mortal hierarchy and places Apollonius on par with if not above Asclepius.

Indeed, in the opening of book four, Philostratus depicts Apollonius' triumphant return to Greece:

> And when they saw the man in Ionia, having arrived in Ephesus, not even the artisans remained by their handicrafts, but followed him, one being an admirer of his wisdom, another his beauty, another his way of life, another his bearing, some all these things together. Oracles were also circulating about him: some from the oracle at Colophon, praising the man as a partner of its own wisdom and absolutely wise and such things; some from Didyma; and some from the temple near Pergamon; for the God [Asclepius] commanded many of those being in need of health to go to Apollonius, for this was both what he wished and what seemed good to the Fates.
>
> Ἐπεὶ δὲ εἶδον τὸν ἄνδρα ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ παρελθόντα ἐς τὴν Ἔφεσον, οὐδὲ οἱ βάναυσοι ἔτι πρὸς ταῖς ἑαυτῶν τέχναις ἦσαν, ἀλλ' ἠκολούθουν ὁ μὲν σοφίας, ὁ δὲ εἴδους, ὁ δὲ διαίτης, ὁ δὲ σχήματος, οἱ δὲ πάντων ὁμοῦ θαυμασταὶ ὄντες, λόγοι τε περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐφοίτων οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Κολοφῶνι μαντείου κοινωνὸν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας καὶ ἀτεχνῶς σοφὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὸν ἄνδρα ᾄδοντες, οἱ δὲ ἐκ Διδύμων, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὸ Πέργαμον ἱεροῦ, πολλοὺς γὰρ τῶν ὑγιείας δεομένων ὁ θεὸς ἐκέλευσε προσφοιτᾶν τῷ Ἀπολλωνίῳ, τουτὶ γὰρ αὐτός τε βούλεσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν ταῖς Μοίραις. (*VA* 4.1)

Unlike the programmatic chapter, the reader now takes the position of the admirers of Apollonius instead of those who know this or that or consider him a *magos*. The Ionians who follow Apollonius function as a mirror for the reader, who has travelled with Apollonius to and back from India and has witnessed his spiritual and philosophical development. When he arrives in Ionia, he is greeted with messages from the gods recognizing his authority – from both Apollo (Apollo Clarius from the oracle at Colophon, and Apollo Didyma from Didyma) and Asclepius (the temple near Pergamon would be the Asklepieion). We had already seen Asclepius turning a votary to

Apollonius for healing in book one. In that scene, Asclepius was rejecting a votary, turning him to Apollonius instead of offering his own aid. Here Asclepius gladly sends the sick to Apollonius because it was both Fated and the god's own will. The actions may be the same, but the tone dramatically shifts.

Apollonius relationship with Asclepius has progressed from witness to agent to equivalent. In the final stage, Apollonius metaphorically *becomes Asclepius*. Apollonius arrives at Athens during the festival of the Epidauria. The festival originates from Asclepius arriving from Epidaurus too late for induction into the Eleusinian mysteries. The Athenians began celebrating the Epidauria in order to include Asclepius in the festival initiations. Now it is Apollonius who arrives too late to be initiated. When Apollonius sails into Piraeus, it is the time when, according to Philostratus, Athens is the most crowded city in Greece. The Athenians rejoice at Apollonius' arrival; some even state that they were about to head to Ionia, having heard of his arrival there. Apollonius' presence causes the Athenians to neglect the Epidauria, being more excited about Apollonius than at the prospect of being initiated. Apollonius convinces his followers to go to the festival to be initiated, since he himself desired to be initiated.

> But the priest did not wish to admit him to the rites, for he would never initiate a *goēs*, nor open the Eleusinian rite to a man impure in spiritual matters. But Apollonius, not having become lesser than himself by these things, said, "You have not yet mentioned the greatest thing, of those to which I would object, that knowing more than you about the rite, I have come to be initiated as if by someone wiser than myself."
> ὁ δὲ ἱεροφάντης οὐκ ἐβούλετο παρέχειν τὰ ἱερά, μὴ γὰρ ἄν ποτε μυῆσαι γόητα, μηδὲ τὴν Ἐλευσῖνα ἀνοῖξαι ἀνθρώπῳ μὴ καθαρῷ τὰ δαιμόνια. ὁ δὲ Ἀπολλώνιος οὐδὲν ὑπὸ τούτων ἧττων αὑτοῦ γενόμενος, "οὔπω," ἔφη, "τὸ μέγιστον, ὧν ἐγὼ ἐγκληθείην ἄν, εἴρηκας, ὅτι περὶ τῆς τελετῆς πλείω ἢ σὺ γιγνώσκων ἐγὼ δὲ ὡς παρὰ σοφώτερον ἐμαυτοῦ μυησόμενος ἦλθον." (*VA* 4.18)

The crowd applauds at Apollonius response to the priest, and the priest, recognizing the displeasure of the crowd, agrees to initiate him, since he appears to be a wise man. "But Apollonius replied, 'I will be initiated later, and this man will initiate me,' using his foreknowledge in regards to the hierophant who succeeded this one and presided over the temple four years later" ("μυήσομαι," ἔφη, "αὖθις, μυήσει δέ με ὁ δεῖνα," προγνώσει χρώμενος ἐς τὸν μετ' ἐκεῖνον ἱεροφάντην, ὃς μετὰ τέτταρα ἔτη τοῦ ἱεροῦ προΰστη, ibid.).

This scene is the first instance of Apollonius being labeled a *goēs*. Here we finally come to Apollonius' encounter with religious authority. The confrontation between the priest and Apollonius presents the clash of Brown's articulate and inarticulate power, leading to the slander of being a *goēs*. The priest represents the established order, the articulate power; Apollonius represents a new religious authority, whose presence draws people away from traditional religious activity and to him instead. Apollonius changing relationship with Asclepius demonstrates his development into a religious authority. First he was a witness to Asclepius healings, then an agent of Asclepius' cures, then a recognized equivalent to Asclepius, and finally he becomes Asclepius himself. So we see a shift of religious authority and veneration from Asclepius to Apollonius. Athenians flock to him and wish to ignore the festival; they had even been planning to leave Athens to sail to Ionia, leaving the Mysteries all together.

Another way of viewing the incident at the Epidauria is through J.Z. Smith's theory of locative versus utopian models of religion. The festival and the priest represent the locative model of religion, religion bounded by space and time. The priest's authority extends only as long as the festival is occurring and only within the space of the temple. Apollonius, on the other hand, displays the characteristics of a utopian model of religion,

one that is literally of no-place. Apollonius is a delocalized religious figure, who carries sanctity and religious authority with him wherever he goes (hence the Athenians desire to be where he is); he gathers adherents to him and away from locative religious practice. Apollonius is the quintessential Late Antique holy man. To quote Peter Brown from *The World of Late Antiquity*:

> Previously, the classical world had tended to think of its religion in terms of *things*. Ancient religion had revolved round great temples, against whose stones even the most impressive priest had paled into insignificance; the gods had spoken impersonally at their oracle-sites; their ceremonies assumed a life in which the community, the city, dwarfed the individual. In the fourth and fifth centuries, however, the individual, as a 'man of power,' came to dwarf the traditional communities: the person of the emperor had eclipsed the Senate and the city of Rome; the rise to prominence of the single *patronus*, the protector, threatened to erod the solidarity of the town council. Simeon the Stylite, gloriously conspicuous on his column, sifting lawsuits, prophesying, healing, rebuking and advising the governing classes of the whole eastern empire not far from the deserted temple of Baalbek, was the sign of a similar change. In the popular imagination, the emergence of the holy man at the expense of the temple marks the end of the classical word. (102-103)

While I agree with Brown and Smith's general assessment of localized and utopian religion (or temple religion and the holy man), the shift from one to the other does not represent a teleological move - the emergence of the holy man, or at least the emergence of Apollonius as holy man, does not necessarily equate an end to temple religion. In fact, quite the opposite is true. Apollonius represents a "both and" not a shift from one to the other. Though he is the delocalized pagan holy man, he also restores traditional religious rites – as we see him doing in encouraging the Athenians to participate in the Epidauria and in stating that he knows more about the rites than the priest. We thus find the implicit reason for the accusation of magic stemming from an authority that challenges the established religious hierarchy. The priest, unlike the reader and Apollonius' followers, misunderstand the religious change that occurs. Apollonius

may represent a delocalized religious authority, but he also renews the traditional religious rites.

Such is precisely the case when Apollonius is called a *goēs* by the priests of Trophonius. Apollonius embarks on a campaign of spiritual renewal. During his journeys through Greece in book four,

> Apollonius visited all the Greek sanctuaries, at Dodona, Delphi, and Abae, and walked to those of Amphiaraus and Trophonius, and climbed up to the shrine of the Muses on Helicon. As he visited the holy sites and made improvements, he was accompanied by the priests and followed by his pupils.
>
> Ἐπεφοίτησε δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς ἱεροῖς πᾶσι τῷ τε Δωδωναίῳ καὶ τῷ Πυθικῷ καὶ τῷ ἐν Ἀβαῖς, ἐς Ἀμφιάρεώ τε καὶ Τροφωνίου ἐβάδισε καὶ ἐς τὸ Μουσεῖον τὸ ἐν Ἑλικῶνι ἀνέβη. φοιτῶντι δὲ ἐς τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ διορθουμένῳ αὐτὰ ξυνεφοίτων μὲν οἱ ἱερεῖς, ἠκολούθουν δὲ οἱ γνώριμοι. (*VA* 4.24)

When Apollonius returns to the sanctuary of Trophonius in book eight, the priests bar his entry, telling most people that they would "never let a man who is a *goes* test the oracle" (μὴ ἄν ποτε γόητι ἀνθρώπῳ παρασχεῖν ἔλεγχον τοῦ ἱεροῦ, *VA* 8.19). Apollonius departs with his disciples to Lebadea, where he holds a discussion about the origins of the sanctuary and its procedure. Once again, Apollonius shows a greater knowledge of the traditional religious rites than the priests. The priests block his entry because of their opposition to his religious reforms and his religious authority. However, Apollonius does not seek to replace the oracle of Trophonius but to renew it. The accusation of being a *goēs* by the priests of Trophonius mirrors that of the priest at the Epidauria. Both misunderstand Apollonius as representing a threat to the normal hierarchy, of drawing individuals away from traditional religion, of replacing their authority with his own. They are only correct on the last count; Apollonius does present a new religious authority, but not at the expense of locative/temple religion.

Conclusion

I would like to conclude by returning to the scene from the *Historia Augusta* and suggesting that the "both-and" model of religious authority that Apollonius represents extends into his reception in late antiquity. In the scene from the *Historia Augusta*, Apollonius exercises both a local and a utopian authority. At the localized level, Apollonius becomes the savior of his own hometown of Tyana. At one level, the shift into cultural memory, the existence of Apollonius in canonized form, localizes Apollonius to Tyana; he is forever Apollonius of Tyana, not Apollonius of Capadocia (as Dio refers to him), or any other regional epithet. At the same time, however, the shift into cultural memory has given Apollonius an authority that transcends his locality. He commands the respect and religious awe of none other than the emperor of Rome and directs the course of the rest of his campaign. Even as far into the late fourth century CE, Apollonius continues to represent both tradition and innovation, both local and utopian, and both individual and communal religion.

Appendix I
Indian Sages in Greek Thought

Apollonius states that he has journeyed to the Brahmans because he considers their teachings to be "wiser and by far more divine" (σοφώτερά . . . πολλῷ θειότερα, *VA* 3.16). By the third century CE, the Brahmans were essential members in any list of eastern wise men and were frequently a source of Greek learning.[1] The *vitae* of philosophers commonly included a journey to India to study with the Indian sages. We can trace the placement of Greek philosophy in the mouth of Indian sages back to their first appearance in the Alexander historians, who use a dizzying number of terms, categorizations, and definitions in their description of the Indian sages. As A.B. Bosworth notes, Alexander had great difficulty understanding Indian society, particularly the place of the Brahmans within that society.[2] As a result of this difficulty, we find the Alexander historians employing a variety of strategies to comprehend Indian society, particularly the use of *interpretatio Graeca* and the analogizing of Indian sages with other eastern wise men who were more "familiar" to Greek audiences. The latter strategy made the Brahmans the Indian ancillaries to Persian *magoi*, which allowed for all the conceptions associated with *magoi* to be transferred onto the Brahmans. *Interpretatio Graeca*, on the other hand, made the Indian sages exponents of Greek philosophy, particularly Cynicism. Later writers such as Megasthenes incorporated Platonic and Pythagorean thought into the philosophy of the Indian sages. By placing Greek philosophy in the mouth of the Indian sages, the Alexander historians associated the Indian sages with other eastern wise men whom later tradition constructed as the source

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[1] see for example Diog. Laert. 1.1.
[2] Bosworth (1996): 92ff.

of Greek philosophy. At the same time, their association with Persian *magoi* in particular left the door open for them to be later linked with magical practices.

The earliest discussions of Indian sages occur in Aristobolus, Onesicritus, and Nearchus. I avoid the term "Brahman" here because it is merely one of the many terms used by the Alexander historians in labeling the Indian sages. Of these three writers, Onesicritus is of particular interest because he is the first to equate Indian and Greek philosophy. In fact, the account of his interview with Calanus and Mandanis inaugurates an entire tradition of Cynic literature on the Brahmans.[3] As Claire Muckensturm notes "Onesicritus served as a point of departure for an *interpretatio Graeca* which transformed the Indian sages into model Cynics."[4] Our interest lays not so much in the particulars of the Cynic tradition Onesicritus launches but rather in the general incorporation of Greek philosophy in his interview with the Indian sages.

Prior to discussing Onesicritus, I would like to make mention of Aristobolus' brief account of his encounter with two Indian sages.[5] He labels them *sophistēs* and states that they are both *Brachmanes*. Aristobolus describes the *Brachmanes* as philosophical ascetics whose primary teaching is about "endurance" (καρτερίαν, *FGrH* 139 F 41 = Strabo 15.1.61). The two Brahmans display different levels of commitment to their philosophy. The younger one chooses not to follow Alexander, while the older "accompanied the king to the end, and when he was with him changed his dress and mode of life" (τὸν δὲ συναπᾶραι μέχρι τέλους καὶ μεταμφιάσασθαι καὶ μεταθέσθαι τὴν δίαιταν συνόντα τῷ βασιλεῖ, ibid.). The older Brahman responds to criticisms made of

[3] On which, see Stoneman (1994a), (1994b), and (1995); Muckensturm (1993).
[4] Muckensturm (1993), 239; translation my own.
[5] *FGrH* 139 F 41 = Strabo 15.1.61

him by stating that he has completed the forty year time of asceticism (τὰ τετταράκοντα ἔτη τῆς ἀσκήσεως, ibid.).

From Aristobolus' account, we can already see the application of *interpretatio Graeca* in attempting to decode Indian society. Aristobolus translates the unrecognizable native category of "Brahman" into the more familiar Greek category of "sophist." He also implies that *Brachmanes* is but one category of Indian sophist. Megasthenes later explodes the number of categories and subcategories of wise men, indicating the extreme effort made by Greek writers to comprehend Indian society. In regards to their philosophy, Aristobolus has little to say. His emphasis on their endurance training gives their philosophy a Cynic patina. Unfortunately, we have no information about what (if any) philosophical training Aristobolus had.[6] If the older sage is Calanus, as Brown and Pearson both identify him,[7] then Aristobolus' Cynic coloring of the passage likely reflects influence from Onesicritus. However, Aristobolus is ultimately critical of the older sophist, whom he notes as having changed his dress and mode of life when he decided to follow Alexander. The younger sophist, on the other hand, he praises as having greater "self-mastery" (ἐγκρατέστερον, ibid.). Given the attribution of Cynic philosophy to the two sophists, the criticism of the older sophist suggests that Aristobolus is using the Indian sages to criticize Cynicism in general. In which case, India becomes a screen upon which Aristobolus can project his particular cultural concerns. Even if Aristobolus is not aiming his criticism at Cynicism, he nevertheless attributes a Greek philosophical lifestyle to the Indian sages.

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[6] Brown (1949): 42 suggests neither Aristobolus nor Nearchus had any philosophical training.
[7] Pearson (1960): 176; Brown (1949): 42. Bosworth disagrees with this identification but gives no compelling reason or evidence to counter it. See Bosworth (1996): 93 n100.

Turning to Onesicritus, we find the Indian sages more thoroughly Hellenized.[8] Like Aristobolus, he labels the two wise men he meets as sophists. Though Strabo does not preserve any other label given to them by Onesicritus, it is possible that he also referred to them as Brahmans, particularly given Nearchus later attempts to distinguish these sophists from true Brahmans.[9] Nearchus states that Brahmans are advisors to the king, while other sophists, such as Calanus, investigate the natural world.[10] Also like Aristobolus, Onesicritus' wise men are noted for their practices in endurance (*karteria*) and are held in great honor. Onesicritus also mentions that these wise men go naked, which perhaps led to the later term *gymnosophistēs*.[11]

Onescritus learns from two different wise men, Calanus and Mandanis, but both of them end up being mouth pieces for Cynic philosophy, the school to which Onescritus himself belonged. After Mandanis explains that the best philosophy is that which removes pleasure from pain, he asks if there are any such beliefs among the Greeks.[12] Onescritus responds that Pythagoras, Socrates, and Diogenes all had such philosophy. His reference to the three philosophers can be easily explained. As a student of Diogenes himself, Onesicritus elevates Diogenes to the level of the already canonized Pythagoras and Socrates by linking them together. Furthermore, it validates Diogenes as an inheritor of the Socratic tradition. The Cynic valoration of Socrates as a model of "self-discipline,

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[8] *FGrH* 134 F 17a = Strabo 15.1.63-65.
[9] *FGrH* 133 F 23 = Strabo 15.1.66-67
[10] Ibid.
[11] The earliest attestation for the term "gymnosophist" comes in the 1st century BCE from Berlin Papyrus 13044, which preserves the "riddle contest" between Alexander and the Indian sages that later appears in Plutarch . This term generally appears in late authors and seems to be more of a nickname given to the entire class of Indian philosophers than a particular signifier. See for example Lucian *Fugitivi* 7.1.
[12] *FGrH* 134 F 17a = Strabo 1.15.65

frugality, and voluntary hardship"[13] further explains the incorporation of Socrates into this list.

But what of Pythagoras? T.S. Brown suggests that part of the reason Pythagoras is included in the list is because he had traveled to the east, including India.[14] It is difficult to reconstruct the state of Pythagoras' *vita* in the third century BCE, but he had likely already accumulated a host of associations with eastern mystics. However, it is unlikely that the tradition of Pythagoras studying with Indian sages had developed prior to the Alexander historians. This is simply because prior to the Alexander historians, there would have been no reason for Pythagoras to visit India. Before them, India was primarily known as a land of marvels, particularly as described in the writings of Ctesias.[15] None of these pre-Alexandrian writings preserve any notion of Indian sages. Indeed, the earliest surviving testimony to Pythagoras studying with Indian sages comes a couple of centuries after Alexander in a fragment from Alexander Polyhistor's *On Pythagorean Symbols*, where he states that Pythagoras studied with the Assyrian Zaratus along with the Gauls and the Brahmans.[16] Alexander Polyhistor likely drew from an earlier source, but it is unlikely that this source predates the Alexander historians, who were the first to describe Indian sages to Greek audiences. What is more likely is that Onescritus' inclusion of Pythagoras in his list of Greek philosophers encouraged the development of a tradition that Pythagoras had gone to India himself.

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[13] Brown (1949): 42.
[14] Ibid.
[15] On Ctesias, see below and Romm (1992): 85-88.
[16] *FGrH* 273 F 94 = Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1.70.1.

Mandanis responds to Onesicritus' list by saying that he considers the Greeks sensible (*phronimōs*), except in their "placing custom over nature" (νόμον πρὸ τῆς φύσεως τιθεμένους, *FGrH* 134 F 17a = Strabo 1.15.65). Mandanis extols one of the basic points of Cynic philosophy, the preference of nature to custom. While the Indian sophists do not have the venerable place they come to have in later literature, they do become mouthpieces for contemporary Greek thought. Onesicritus translates whatever he might have actually heard from his meeting with the Indian sophists into terms familiar both to himself and his Greek audience. Once again, the Indian sophists function as a screen on which Onesicritus can project his own particular cultural values.

While our fragment of Onesicritus only preserves the label sophist in reference to the Indian sages, Nearchus provides an alternate categorization of the same sophists. Nearchus states that "Brahmans engage in affairs of state and attend the kings as counselors, but that the other sophists investigate natural phenomena and that Calanus is one of these" (τοὺς μὲν Βραχμᾶνας πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ παρακολουθεῖν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι συμβούλους, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους σκοπεῖν τὰ περὶ τὴν φύσιν, τούτων δ' εἶναι καὶ Κάλανον, *FGrH* 133 F 23 = Strabo 1.15.66).

Nearchus' definition of *Brachmanes* not only responds to Onesicritus' description of Calanus and Mandanis, but it also complicates the description provided by Aristobolus. Like Aristobolus, Nearchus defines the *Brachmanes* as a subcategory of Indian sophist, but he denies them any ascetic or Cynic philosophy. Furthermore, by defining *Brachmanes* as royal advisors, Nearchus implicitly associates them with the Persian *magoi*, thereby making the Indian sages comprehensible through the use of analogy with other foreign peoples more familiar to Greek audiences. In fact, Nearchus

uses a strategy of analogizing Indian land with more familiar foreign land throughout his work. Drawing upon the earlier work of Lionel Pearson, Phiroze Vasunia has demonstrated how Nearchus relies upon Herodotus' description of the Nile for his entire discussion of the Indus.[17] He further draws upon Herodotus in his discussion of Indian health and medical practices, which Pearson notes echoes Herodotus' statements about Egyptians.[18] Given Nearchus' reliance on Herodotus, one can easily see that his definition of the Indian *Brachmanes* stems from Herodotus' definition of the Persian *magoi*. Nearchus, however, does not associate either the *Brachmanes* or the other Indian sophists with any particular type of learning, Greek or otherwise.

Given Nearchus interest in defining Calanus specific position in Indian society and his inclusion of the story of Calanus death,[19] it is likely that he preserved some account of the initial meeting with Calanus. Pearson argues that this is unlikely since Nearchus never appears as "a principal authority" on the Indian sages.[20] However, it is likely that Nearchus does not appear as a principle authority because of the different strategy he takes in describing the Indian sages than Onesicritus or Aristobolus. The latter two describe the Indian sages with an eye towards Greek philosophy. Their strategy is *interpretatio Graeca* plain and simple. Nearchus, however, relies upon a more complex series of analogies. Onesicritus and Aristobolus merely equate Greek and Indian philosophy. Comprehension of Nearchus' description of the Indian sages requires the reader to have familiarity with another group of eastern sages particularly as

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[17] Vasunia (2001): 257ff. Cf. Pearson (1960): 120ff.
[18] Pearson (1960): 126.
[19] *FGrH* 133 F 4 = Arr. *Anab.* 7.3.6.
[20] Pearson (1960) 127.

described in another Greek author. While ultimately Nearchus is using a strategy of *interpretatio Graeca*, his strategy demands a greater knowledge of Greek ethnographic traditions than does Onesicritus or Aristobolus.

Throughout the Alexander historians, we can find a few commonalities in their depiction of the Indian sages. First, there is a lack of agreement about who the Indian sages were and what their position was in Indian society. Aristobolus and Onesicritus both label them "sophists," and Aristobolus further identifies the sophists as Brahmans. Nearchus, however, differentiates Brahmans, who were royal advisors, from the sophists that Aristobolus and Onesicritus meets. The latter are merely natural philosophers.

Interestingly, the confusion persists through Strabo's critique of the Alexander historians. Strabo comments upon the lack of agreement between their accounts of Calanus. He notes that some state that Calanus followed Alexander outside India, "contrary to the common custom of the philosophers there, for the philosopher attend the kings in India only, guiding them in their relations with the gods, as the Magi attend the Persian kings" (συνακολουθῆσαι γὰρ ὡς ἐγκωμιαστὴν τοῦ βασιλέως ἔξω τῶν τῆς Ἰνδικῆς ὅρων παρὰ τὸ κοινὸν ἔθος τῶν ἐκεῖ φιλοσόφων· ἐκείνους γὰρ τοῖς αὐτόθι συνεῖναι βασιλεῦσιν ὑφηγουμένους τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεούς,ὡς τοὺς μάγους τοῖς Πέρσαις, Strabo 15.1.68). In Strabo's critique, he accepts Nearchus' definition of Brahmans as royal advisors, a definition that does not appear in Aristobolus or Onesicritus. At the same time, he defines Calanus as a Brahman, which Onesicritus never does explicitly and Nearchus flat out rejects. In sum, Strabo accepts and rejects his sources inconsistently, which attests to the persistence of the difficulty Greek writers had in comprehending Brahmans and their place in society.

A second element that can be drawn from the Alexander historians is the use of the Indian sages as mouthpieces for Greek philosophy. Aristobolus and Onesicritus both make the Indian sages practitioners of Cynic philosophy. Aristobolus ultimately does this to critique Cynicism, while Onesicritus seeks to venerate it. In either case, India has become a place to negotiate Greek cultural concerns – here, the question of the value of Cynic philosophy. Moreover, the Indian sages are objects of desire for the Greeks. In Aristobolus, Alexander goes after the younger sage, seeking to get him to rejoin the group after he quits Alexander's company.[21] Onesicritus was himself sent to visit the Indian sages after Alexander had learned about their commitment to endurance and the honor they held among their people.[22] In both cases, Greeks desire the knowledge of the Indian sages and wish their company on their journeys. This incorporates Indian sages into the tradition of Greeks traveling to eastern wise men for wisdom. Indian sages too have become objects of intellectual journeys.

Megasthenes, the Seleucid ambassador to the court of Chandragupta Maurya whose *Indika* was the most influential work on the region, continues the trend started by the Alexander historians of interpreting Indian society through Greek conceptions. He provides a description of Indian society that divides the population into seven distinct groups. At first sight, Megasthenes' description of Indian society seems to be an attempt to comprehend the caste system. However, the Hindu caste system divides the population into only four groups. Scholars have been attempting to reconcile

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[21] *FGrH* 139 F 41 = Strabo 15.1.61.
[22] *FGrH* 134 F 17a = Strabo 15.1.63.

Megasthenes' seven classes with the four Hindu castes.[23] However, we are better served by recognizing the force of *interpretatio Graeca* in Megasthenes' account. Furthermore, the complexity, and occasional contradictions, within the account point to the difficulty Greek writers had in comprehending the caste system. Megasthenes ultimately employs the same strategies used by the Alexander historians. He uses Greek categories of thought to explain the indigenous society, and in so doing colors the Indian philosophers with Greek learning.

Megasthenes divides Indian society into seven classes (*merē*). Philosophers comprise the first class. According to Megasthenes, they are responsible for sacrifices and give advice to the king. The placement of philosophers at the top of Megasthenes' description of Indian society already suggests Platonic influences. Though looking at Indian society, the utopian societies of Plato's writings filter Megasthenes' perception. After the philosophers, the remaining parts of society include, in order, farmers, shepherds and hunters, warriors, *ephors*, and advisors and councilors to the king.[24] Though the philosophers are of primary interest to us, we can make some observations about the divisions as a whole. First, Megasthenes bases his divisions of Indian society strictly on occupation. He further states:

> It is not legal for a man either to marry a wife from another class or to change one's pursuit or work from one to another; nor yet for the same man to engage in several, except in the case he should be one of the philosophers, for, Megasthenes says, the philosopher is permitted to do so on account of his superiority. (tr. Lloyd)
>
> οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὔτε γαμεῖν ἐξ ἄλλου γένους οὔτ' ἐπιτήδευμα οὔτ' ἐργασίαν μεταλαμβάνειν ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης, οὐδὲ πλείους μεταχειρίζεσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν πλὴν εἰ τῶν φιλοσόφων τις εἴη· ἐᾶσθαι γὰρ τοῦτον δι'ἀρετήν. (*FGrH* 715 F 18b = Strabo 15.1.49)

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[23] See Kartunnen (1997) 82-88 for a synopsis of the various positions taken by scholars.
[24] *FGrH* 715 F 18b = Strabo 15.1.40-41; 47-49.

A.B. Bosworth notes that this could just as easily be a description of Plato's ideal Republic, where each individual specializes in one occupation.[25] Bosworth continues by noting that unlike Plato, Megasthenes adds the element of "marital exclusiveness."[26] He imagines that Megasthenes had some awareness of caste exclusivity in marital arrangements but did not fully understand how such marital arrangements functioned. He thus imports a Greek theory of a society divided by occupation to help fill in the gaps.

Despite the thorough description Megasthenes gives of a seven-fold Indian society, he nevertheless displays a great deal of difficulty in understanding exactly what role the Indian philosophers had within that society. He attempts to divide the philosophers in two different fashions. In the first way, he divides the philosophers based upon where they live and whom they worship. He separates mountain philosophers, who worship Dionysus, from plains philosophers, who worship Heracles.[27] Strabo preserves this account but ultimately rejects it as it is "mythical and refuted by many writers" (ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μυθώδη καὶ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἐλεγχόμενα, Strabo 15.1.58). Megasthenes was likely preserving an account from the Alexander historians, who frequently imported the Greek gods into India to "mythologize" Alexander's own expedition.

The second division Megasthenes offers is between *Brachmanes* and *Garmanes*.[28] Many scholars think *Garmanes* is a corruption of *Sarmanes*, which would be equivalent to the Sanskrit *Sramana*, who were wandering monks of India.[29] Megasthenes states that the *Brachmanes* hold higher esteem than the *Garmanes*, for they hold in agreement about

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[25] Bosworth (1996): 89.
[26] Bosworth (1996): 90.
[27] FGrH 715 F 33 = Strabo 15.1.58
[28] Ibid.
[29] Kartunnen (1997).

their beliefs. Megasthenes describes their philosophy in Cynic, Pythagorean, and Platonic terms. The Cynic elements of the Brahmans' philosophy, particularly in their devotion to *askēsis* to prepare for death (διὸ τῇ ἀσκήσει πλείστῃ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἑτοιμοθάνατον, *FGrH* 715 F 33 = Strabo 15.1.59), are likely remnants from the Alexander historians.

Megasthenes further states that "some of their opinions indicate mental simplicity, for the *Brachmanes* are better in deeds than in words" (τὰ δὲ περὶ φύσιν τὰ μὲν εὐήθειαν ἐμφαίνειν φησίν· ἐν ἔργοις γὰρ αὐτοὺς κρείττους ἢ λόγοις εἶναι, ibid.). The preference of deeds over words is yet another Cynic coloring to the *Brachmanes*.[30] He notes that the *Brachmanes* "are of the same opinion as the Greeks about man things," and continues to discuss the shape of the world, its development and eventual destruction, and the number of elements of the universe.[31] Megasthenes, like the Alexander historians, use *interpretatio Graeca* to comprehend Indian society and Indian philosophy. While *interpretatio Graeca* effaces the indigenous categories of thought, it constructs India as a repository of Greek knowledge, which will itself create the conditions by which India becomes an object of desire for Greek philosophers.

Megasthenes further divides the *Garmanes* into the *Hylobii* and doctors (*iatrikoi*), the latter also including enchanters (*epōidoi*), and diviners (*mantikoi*).[32] The *Hylobii* hold the greatest honor among the *Garmanes*. *Hylobii* are forest-dwellers who clothe themselves in the bark of trees and assist the king in worshipping the divine. The doctors are mendicants who cure the ill and help in childbirth. Megasthenes states that both

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[30] Cf. Branham, ed. (1996): 21.
[31] *FGrH* 715 F 33 = Strabo 15.1.59; See chapter 3 for a discussion of the physics of the Brahmans.
[32] *FGrH* 715 F 33 = Strabo 15.1.60.

groups practice endurance and describes their practice of staying in one position all day. While the Alexander historians attribute both asceticism and Cynicism to the Indian sages they meet, Megasthenes splits these practices to two separate groups. While he uses Cynic philosophy to describe the philosophy of the *Brachmanes*, he ascribes ascetic practices only to the *Garmanes*. There are a couple of possible explanations. Megasthenes could be working with more and possibly better information than the Alexander historians and is thus able to provide a more accurate account of the practices and beliefs of the Indian philosophers. On the other hand, Megasthenes description of Indian society rests more on Plato than Hindu religion, and he also provides two contradictory divisions of Indian philosophers. This suggests that he is not providing a better account of Indian society. Rather, he is using the details about the Indian sages from the Alexander historians to describe the various groups of people he encounters in India.

Megasthenes, like the Alexander historians, make the Indian sages a repository of Greek knowledge. He compliments the Cynic coloring given to the sages by the Alexander historians with shades of Pythagoreanism and Platonism. One can imagine an easy transition from repositories of Greek learning to objects of philosophical pilgrimages. The Indian sages espouse Greek wisdom because they are the sources of Greek wisdom. Shortly after the Alexander historians' importation of Greek philosophy into the Indian lands, other writers start incorporating India into the places voyaged by venerable philosophers, particularly with regards to Pythagoras. We have already noted how Alexander Polyhistor associates Pythagoras with the Indian sages, an association we can ultimately trace back to the equivalence made by Onesicritus between Indian and

Pythagorean philosophy.[33] According to Apuleius, Plato himself, whom Apuleius represents as a Pythagorean who had studied with the Egyptians, "would have directed his thoughts to the Indians and the Magi, had not the wars in Asia at that time prevented him" (*atque ad Indos et Magos intendisset animum, nisi tunc eum bella vetuissent*, Apul. *De Dogmate Platonis* 1.3). Apuleius also makes mention of Pythagoras' studies with the Indians. In a brief biography of Pythagoras preserved in *Florida* 15, Apuleius mentions the Egyptians, the Chaldeans, and the Brahmans as teachers of Pythagoras.[34] He specifically states that "among those Brahmans, it was the Gymnosophists whom he went to see" (*eorum ergo Brachmanum gymnosophistas adisse*, Apul. *Florida* 15.16) The Gymnosophists are to Apuleius a subcategory of Brahman. We are once again facing the utter confusion Greek writers had in categorizing Indian society. More importantly, the Gymnosophists are the major source of Pythagoras' philosophy.

> But the Brahmans were the source of most of his philosophy: what mantras there are for the mind, what exercises for the body, how many parts to the soul, how many stages of life; and what tortures or rewards (according to what they deserve) await the spirits of the dead."[35]
>
> Bracmani autem pleraque philosophiae eius contulerunt, quae mentium documenta, quae corporum exercitamenta, quot partes animi, quot vices vitae, quae diis manibus pro merito suo cuique tormenta vel praemia. (Apul. *Florida* 15.18)

Elsewhere, Apuleius praises the Gymnosophists more generally, as they "cultivate wisdom zealously, both the learned seniors and the studious juniors" (*sapientiam percolunt tam magistri senes quam discipuli iuniores*, Apul. *Florida* 6.9).

If we accept the testimony of Diogenes Laertius, then well before Apuleius, Aristotle had stated that the philosophy originated with the *barbaroi*, among them the

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[33] supra.
[34] Apul. *Florida* 15.14-18.
[35] Apul. *Florida* 15.18.

Indian Gymnosophists.[36] Indeed, throughout Diogenes Laertius' biographies, several philosophers are noted for studying with the Indian sages. About a century earlier, Lucian makes a very clear statement that philosophy began with the Brahmans. In his dialogue *Fugitivi*, the personified goddess Philosophy explains to Zeus that India was the first place to which she traveled:

> First, then, I went to the Indians, the mightiest nation upon earth. I had little trouble in persuading them to descend from their elephants and follow me. The Brahmans, who dwell between Oxydracae and the country of the Nechrei, are mine to a man: they live according to my laws, and are respected by all their neighbors; and the manner of their death is truly wonderful.[37]
>
> ὁρμήσασα δὲ εἰς Ἰνδοὺς τὸ πρῶτον, ἔθνος μέγιστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, οὐ χαλεπῶς ἔπεισα καταβάντας ἀπὸ τῶν ἐλεφάντων ἐμοὶ συνεῖναι, ὥστε καὶ γένος ὅλον, οἱ Βραχμᾶνες, τοῖς Νεχραίοις καὶ Ὀξυδράκαις ὅμορον, οὗτοι πάντες ὑπ' ἐμοὶ τάττονται καὶ βιοῦσίν τε κατὰ τὰ ἡμῖν δοκοῦντα, τιμώμενοι πρὸς τῶν περιοίκων ἁπάντων, καὶ ἀποθνήσκουσι παράδοξόν τινα τοῦ θανάτου τρόπον. (Luc. *Fug.* 6)

Lucian's dialogue also testifies to the state of the terms being used to identify the Indian sages. While Philosophy states that she went first to the Brahmans, Zeus responds by referring to them as the Gymnosophists.[38] While to Apuleius, the Gymnosophists are a subcategory of Brahman, Lucian uses the two terms completely interchangeably.

By the time Philostratus is writing his biography, Indian sages, whether they are referred to as *Brachmanes*, *gymnosophistes*, or simply *philosophoi*, are placed among those eastern mystics with whom philosophy began. When Indian sages are linked with *magoi*, it is almost solely in discussions of either the lives of philosophers or the history of philosophy. As noted above, Nearchus makes an implicit equivalence between *Brachmanes* and *magoi*, as both are advisors to the king. Strabo makes the equivalence explicit when he states about the Indian sages, "the philosophers attend the kings in India

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[36] Diog. Laert. 1.1.
[37] Luc. *Fug.* 6.
[38] Luc. *Fug.* 7.

only, guiding them in their relations with the gods, as the *magoi* attend the Persian kings" (ἐκείνους γὰρ τοῖς αὐτόθι συνεῖναι βασιλεῦσιν ὑφηγουμένους τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεούς, ὡς τοὺς μάγους τοῖς Πέρσαις, Strabo 15.1.68).

Appian compares the education of Caesar and Alexander the Great, noting how Alexander "interrogated [India's] Brahmans, who seemed to be astronomers and learned men of that country, like the *magoi* among the Persians" (τὰ μὲν Ἰνδῶν Ἀλέξανδρος ἐξετάζων τοὺς Βραχμᾶνας, οἳ δοκοῦσιν Ἰνδῶν εἶναι μετεωρολόγοι τε καὶ σοφοὶ καθὰ Περσῶν οἱ Μάγοι, *Bellum Civile* 2.21.154). Dio Chrysostom makes a similar association but adds a stronger positive valence to the term. In his forty-ninth discourse, Dio discusses the role of philosophers in civic and political affairs. He notes that the most powerful nations "have appointed [philosophers] as superintendents for their kings and chief magistrates" (ἐπιστάτας τοῖς βασιλεῦσι καὶ ἄρχοντας τούτους ἀπέδειξαν, *Or.* 49.7) He adduces the *magoi* among the Persians and the priests among the Egyptians. He continues "The Indians have appointed the Brahmans, who excel in self-control and righteousness and in their devotion to the divine, whence they know the future better than other men know their own present" (Ἰνδοὶ δὲ Βραχμᾶνας, ἐγκρατείᾳ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ διαφέροντας καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον φιλίᾳ, ὅθεν μᾶλλον ἴσασι τὰ μέλλοντα ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τὰ παρόντα αὐτοῖς, ibid.).[39]

Unfortunately, most of the earlier writings on Indian sages and *magoi* is lost and only preserved through works such as Diogenes Laertius. In the opening of his *Lives of the Philosophers*, for example, he cites Aristotle's lost *On Magic*, where he lists the Persian Magi, the Chaldeans of Babylon, the Gymnosophists of India, and the Druids of

[39] The Brahmans' divinatory skill is explored in chapter three.

the Celts as the originators of philosophy among the barbarians.[40] Diogenes Laertius also preserves a fragment from Clearchus of Soli's *On Education*, where he states that the Indian Gymnosophists are descendants of the *magoi*.[41] These two fragments indicate that shortly after Alexander's encounter with the Indian sages, they were quickly associated with other eastern sages.

Yet for Apollonius' accusers, Brahmans do not carry such a positive valence. As I noted above, Apollonius' accusers associate the Brahmans with the *magoi* and are thus a threat to traditional religion and society. The Indian sages have been associated with the *magoi* nearly from their first appearance in Greek literature.

Strabo and Appian both use *magoi* and *Brachmanes* in a relatively value neutral way. However, the term *magoi* has a complicated history. As early as Herodotus the Greeks new of the *magoi* as a *genos* of Persian society who served various religious functions.[42] In a rather short period of time, however, it starts to carry a negative valence. Fritz Graf notes the appearance of *magos* with negative valences in fifth-century drama.[43] Graf further notes the antithesis between magic and religion, particularly as expressed by Plato,[44] and between magic and science.[45] In both cases, the Greek authors give *magoi* a negative valence. To Plato, the *magoi* engage in practices outside the norms of *polis* religion and thereby threatens "the just relationship that normally unites humans and the gods."[46] The author of the Hippocratic *On the Sacred Disease* attacks the *magoi* for

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[40] Diog. Laert. 1.1. = Rose, *Aristotelis fragmenta* 35.
[41] Diog. Laert. 1.9 = Werhli iii, fg. 13.
[42] See Graf (1997) 20 with notes.
[43] Ibid., 22-24.
[44] Ibid., 24-7.
[45] Ibid., 30-35.
[46] Ibid., 25.

ignorance about the true cause of epilepsy. By labeling epilepsy as a "sacred disease," they imply that it is possible for the divine to pollute the human body. The author's charge against the *magoi* extends beyond ignorance into the realm of *asebeia*.

We thus see that the ambivalence Philostratus displays about the *Brachmanes* originates from ambivalence about *magoi* themselves. The *magoi* are on the one hand sources for Greek thought, as we see demonstrated throughout discussions of the history of philosophy and of the lives of eminent Greek philosophers. At the same time, however, Greek writers represent the *magoi* as engaging in practices that threaten the structures and functioning of traditional *polis* religion and society. From their first appearance in Greek literature, Indian sages quickly become assimilated to the Persian *magoi*. Like them, the Indian sages are royal advisors and mouthpieces of (later even the originary sources) Greek thought. Interestingly, they do not carry the negative connotations that the *magoi* do until the time of Apollonius' accusers. However, Apollonius' accusers are able to give the Indian sages these negative connotations precisely because the Greek literary tradition about the Indian sages equated them with *magoi*. They are thus capable of carrying all the valences – positive and negative – that the *magoi* carry.

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